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From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, cj.chengjian@huawei.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 12:03:45 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <db75e673-0723-7052-bdd2-a5ddff2a6c79@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <155570011247.27135.12509150054846153288.stgit@chester>

On 4/19/19 11:55 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> Prevent userspace from changing the the /proc/PID/attr values if the
> task's credentials are currently overriden.  This not only makes sense
> conceptually, it also prevents some really bizarre error cases caused
> when trying to commit credentials to a task with overridden
> credentials.
> 
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Reported-by: "chengjian (D)" <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

looks good

Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

> ---
>  fs/proc/base.c |    5 +++++
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index ddef482f1334..87ba007b86db 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2539,6 +2539,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
>  		rcu_read_unlock();
>  		return -EACCES;
>  	}
> +	/* Prevent changes to overridden credentials. */
> +	if (current_cred() != current_real_cred()) {
> +		rcu_read_unlock();
> +		return -EBUSY;
> +	}
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
>  
>  	if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
> 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-04-19 22:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-19 18:55 [PATCH] proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials Paul Moore
2019-04-19 18:59 ` Paul Moore
2019-04-19 20:26   ` James Morris
2019-04-29 13:57     ` Paul Moore
2019-04-19 19:03 ` John Johansen [this message]
2019-04-21 17:14 ` Casey Schaufler

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