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* Linux 5.4.57
@ 2020-08-07  8:15 Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-08-07  8:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-08-07  8:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, akpm, torvalds, stable; +Cc: lwn, jslaby, Greg Kroah-Hartman

I'm announcing the release of the 5.4.57 kernel.

All users of the 5.4 kernel series must upgrade.

The updated 5.4.y git tree can be found at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git linux-5.4.y
and can be browsed at the normal kernel.org git web browser:
	https://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git;a=summary

thanks,

greg k-h

------------

 Makefile                                |    2 
 arch/arm/include/asm/percpu.h           |    2 
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h   |    8 ++-
 drivers/char/random.c                   |    1 
 fs/ext4/inode.c                         |    5 ++
 include/linux/bpf.h                     |   13 ++++-
 include/linux/prandom.h                 |   78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/random.h                  |   63 +------------------------
 include/linux/skmsg.h                   |   13 +++++
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c                    |    4 -
 kernel/time/timer.c                     |    8 +++
 lib/random32.c                          |    2 
 net/core/sock_map.c                     |   50 ++++++++++++++++++--
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c |   12 ++--
 14 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)

Greg Kroah-Hartman (1):
      Linux 5.4.57

Grygorii Strashko (1):
      ARM: percpu.h: fix build error

Jiang Ying (1):
      ext4: fix direct I/O read error

Linus Torvalds (2):
      random32: remove net_rand_state from the latent entropy gcc plugin
      random32: move the pseudo-random 32-bit definitions to prandom.h

Lorenz Bauer (2):
      selftests: bpf: Fix detach from sockmap tests
      bpf: sockmap: Require attach_bpf_fd when detaching a program

Marc Zyngier (1):
      arm64: Workaround circular dependency in pointer_auth.h

Willy Tarreau (2):
      random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity
      random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: Linux 5.4.57
  2020-08-07  8:15 Linux 5.4.57 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-08-07  8:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-08-07  8:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel, akpm, torvalds, stable; +Cc: lwn, jslaby, Greg Kroah-Hartman

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index c33fb4eebd4d..dd753ef637fd 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 4
-SUBLEVEL = 56
+SUBLEVEL = 57
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/percpu.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/percpu.h
index f44f448537f2..1a3eedbac4a2 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/percpu.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/percpu.h
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_ARM_PERCPU_H_
 #define _ASM_ARM_PERCPU_H_
 
+#include <asm/thread_info.h>
+
 /*
  * Same as asm-generic/percpu.h, except that we store the per cpu offset
  * in the TPIDRPRW. TPIDRPRW only exists on V6K and V7
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
index 7a24bad1a58b..076a4157a74f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 #define __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H
 
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
-#include <linux/random.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/memory.h>
@@ -30,6 +29,13 @@ struct ptrauth_keys {
 	struct ptrauth_key apga;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Only include random.h once ptrauth_keys_* structures are defined
+ * to avoid yet another circular include hell (random.h * ends up
+ * including asm/smp.h, which requires ptrauth_keys_kernel).
+ */
+#include <linux/random.h>
+
 static inline void ptrauth_keys_init(struct ptrauth_keys *keys)
 {
 	if (system_supports_address_auth()) {
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 8ff28c14af7e..e877c20e0ee0 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1330,6 +1330,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
 
 	fast_mix(fast_pool);
 	add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
+	this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, fast_pool->pool[cycles & 3]);
 
 	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
 		if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c
index 7e0c77de551b..a284d99a1ee5 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -3836,6 +3836,11 @@ static ssize_t ext4_direct_IO_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
 	struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
 	size_t count = iov_iter_count(iter);
 	ssize_t ret;
+	loff_t offset = iocb->ki_pos;
+	loff_t size = i_size_read(inode);
+
+	if (offset >= size)
+		return 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * Shared inode_lock is enough for us - it protects against concurrent
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 3bf3835d0e86..7aa0d8b5aaf0 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -956,11 +956,14 @@ static inline void bpf_map_offload_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 #endif /* CONFIG_NET && CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_BPF_STREAM_PARSER)
-int sock_map_prog_update(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 which);
+int sock_map_prog_update(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_prog *prog,
+			 struct bpf_prog *old, u32 which);
 int sock_map_get_from_fd(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog);
+int sock_map_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr, enum bpf_prog_type ptype);
 #else
 static inline int sock_map_prog_update(struct bpf_map *map,
-				       struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 which)
+				       struct bpf_prog *prog,
+				       struct bpf_prog *old, u32 which)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
@@ -970,6 +973,12 @@ static inline int sock_map_get_from_fd(const union bpf_attr *attr,
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
+
+static inline int sock_map_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr,
+				       enum bpf_prog_type ptype)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
 #endif
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS)
diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..aa16e6468f91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * include/linux/prandom.h
+ *
+ * Include file for the fast pseudo-random 32-bit
+ * generation.
+ */
+#ifndef _LINUX_PRANDOM_H
+#define _LINUX_PRANDOM_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+
+u32 prandom_u32(void);
+void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
+void prandom_reseed_late(void);
+
+struct rnd_state {
+	__u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
+};
+
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
+
+u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
+void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state);
+
+#define prandom_init_once(pcpu_state)			\
+	DO_ONCE(prandom_seed_full_state, (pcpu_state))
+
+/**
+ * prandom_u32_max - returns a pseudo-random number in interval [0, ep_ro)
+ * @ep_ro: right open interval endpoint
+ *
+ * Returns a pseudo-random number that is in interval [0, ep_ro). Note
+ * that the result depends on PRNG being well distributed in [0, ~0U]
+ * u32 space. Here we use maximally equidistributed combined Tausworthe
+ * generator, that is, prandom_u32(). This is useful when requesting a
+ * random index of an array containing ep_ro elements, for example.
+ *
+ * Returns: pseudo-random number in interval [0, ep_ro)
+ */
+static inline u32 prandom_u32_max(u32 ep_ro)
+{
+	return (u32)(((u64) prandom_u32() * ep_ro) >> 32);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle minimum values for seeds
+ */
+static inline u32 __seed(u32 x, u32 m)
+{
+	return (x < m) ? x + m : x;
+}
+
+/**
+ * prandom_seed_state - set seed for prandom_u32_state().
+ * @state: pointer to state structure to receive the seed.
+ * @seed: arbitrary 64-bit value to use as a seed.
+ */
+static inline void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed)
+{
+	u32 i = (seed >> 32) ^ (seed << 10) ^ seed;
+
+	state->s1 = __seed(i,   2U);
+	state->s2 = __seed(i,   8U);
+	state->s3 = __seed(i,  16U);
+	state->s4 = __seed(i, 128U);
+}
+
+/* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */
+static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32(u32 seed)
+{
+	return seed * 1664525 + 1013904223;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index f189c927fdea..5b3ec7d2791f 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -108,61 +108,12 @@ declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
 
 unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
 
-u32 prandom_u32(void);
-void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
-void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
-void prandom_reseed_late(void);
-
-struct rnd_state {
-	__u32 s1, s2, s3, s4;
-};
-
-u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
-void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t nbytes);
-void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state);
-
-#define prandom_init_once(pcpu_state)			\
-	DO_ONCE(prandom_seed_full_state, (pcpu_state))
-
-/**
- * prandom_u32_max - returns a pseudo-random number in interval [0, ep_ro)
- * @ep_ro: right open interval endpoint
- *
- * Returns a pseudo-random number that is in interval [0, ep_ro). Note
- * that the result depends on PRNG being well distributed in [0, ~0U]
- * u32 space. Here we use maximally equidistributed combined Tausworthe
- * generator, that is, prandom_u32(). This is useful when requesting a
- * random index of an array containing ep_ro elements, for example.
- *
- * Returns: pseudo-random number in interval [0, ep_ro)
- */
-static inline u32 prandom_u32_max(u32 ep_ro)
-{
-	return (u32)(((u64) prandom_u32() * ep_ro) >> 32);
-}
-
 /*
- * Handle minimum values for seeds
+ * This is designed to be standalone for just prandom
+ * users, but for now we include it from <linux/random.h>
+ * for legacy reasons.
  */
-static inline u32 __seed(u32 x, u32 m)
-{
-	return (x < m) ? x + m : x;
-}
-
-/**
- * prandom_seed_state - set seed for prandom_u32_state().
- * @state: pointer to state structure to receive the seed.
- * @seed: arbitrary 64-bit value to use as a seed.
- */
-static inline void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed)
-{
-	u32 i = (seed >> 32) ^ (seed << 10) ^ seed;
-
-	state->s1 = __seed(i,   2U);
-	state->s2 = __seed(i,   8U);
-	state->s3 = __seed(i,  16U);
-	state->s4 = __seed(i, 128U);
-}
+#include <linux/prandom.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
 # include <asm/archrandom.h>
@@ -193,10 +144,4 @@ static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
 }
 #endif
 
-/* Pseudo random number generator from numerical recipes. */
-static inline u32 next_pseudo_random32(u32 seed)
-{
-	return seed * 1664525 + 1013904223;
-}
-
 #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h
index 4bdb5e4bbd6a..20f3550b0b11 100644
--- a/include/linux/skmsg.h
+++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h
@@ -450,6 +450,19 @@ static inline void psock_set_prog(struct bpf_prog **pprog,
 		bpf_prog_put(prog);
 }
 
+static inline int psock_replace_prog(struct bpf_prog **pprog,
+				     struct bpf_prog *prog,
+				     struct bpf_prog *old)
+{
+	if (cmpxchg(pprog, old, prog) != old)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (old)
+		bpf_prog_put(old);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline void psock_progs_drop(struct sk_psock_progs *progs)
 {
 	psock_set_prog(&progs->msg_parser, NULL);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 8bc904f9badb..bf03d04a9e2f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -2029,10 +2029,10 @@ static int bpf_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr)
 		ptype = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE;
 		break;
 	case BPF_SK_MSG_VERDICT:
-		return sock_map_get_from_fd(attr, NULL);
+		return sock_map_prog_detach(attr, BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG);
 	case BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_PARSER:
 	case BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT:
-		return sock_map_get_from_fd(attr, NULL);
+		return sock_map_prog_detach(attr, BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB);
 	case BPF_LIRC_MODE2:
 		return lirc_prog_detach(attr);
 	case BPF_FLOW_DISSECTOR:
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
index 1e9b81a930c0..a3ae244b1bcd 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/debug.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -1742,6 +1743,13 @@ void update_process_times(int user_tick)
 	scheduler_tick();
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
 		run_posix_cpu_timers();
+
+	/* The current CPU might make use of net randoms without receiving IRQs
+	 * to renew them often enough. Let's update the net_rand_state from a
+	 * non-constant value that's not affine to the number of calls to make
+	 * sure it's updated when there's some activity (we don't care in idle).
+	 */
+	this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, rol32(jiffies, 24) + user_tick);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index 763b920a6206..3d749abb9e80 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static inline void prandom_state_selftest(void)
 }
 #endif
 
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy;
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
 
 /**
  *	prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator.
diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
index 6bbc118bf00e..df52061f99f7 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_map.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
@@ -71,7 +71,42 @@ int sock_map_get_from_fd(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	map = __bpf_map_get(f);
 	if (IS_ERR(map))
 		return PTR_ERR(map);
-	ret = sock_map_prog_update(map, prog, attr->attach_type);
+	ret = sock_map_prog_update(map, prog, NULL, attr->attach_type);
+	fdput(f);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int sock_map_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr, enum bpf_prog_type ptype)
+{
+	u32 ufd = attr->target_fd;
+	struct bpf_prog *prog;
+	struct bpf_map *map;
+	struct fd f;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (attr->attach_flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	f = fdget(ufd);
+	map = __bpf_map_get(f);
+	if (IS_ERR(map))
+		return PTR_ERR(map);
+
+	prog = bpf_prog_get(attr->attach_bpf_fd);
+	if (IS_ERR(prog)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(prog);
+		goto put_map;
+	}
+
+	if (prog->type != ptype) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto put_prog;
+	}
+
+	ret = sock_map_prog_update(map, NULL, prog, attr->attach_type);
+put_prog:
+	bpf_prog_put(prog);
+put_map:
 	fdput(f);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1015,27 +1050,32 @@ static struct sk_psock_progs *sock_map_progs(struct bpf_map *map)
 }
 
 int sock_map_prog_update(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_prog *prog,
-			 u32 which)
+			 struct bpf_prog *old, u32 which)
 {
 	struct sk_psock_progs *progs = sock_map_progs(map);
+	struct bpf_prog **pprog;
 
 	if (!progs)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	switch (which) {
 	case BPF_SK_MSG_VERDICT:
-		psock_set_prog(&progs->msg_parser, prog);
+		pprog = &progs->msg_parser;
 		break;
 	case BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_PARSER:
-		psock_set_prog(&progs->skb_parser, prog);
+		pprog = &progs->skb_parser;
 		break;
 	case BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT:
-		psock_set_prog(&progs->skb_verdict, prog);
+		pprog = &progs->skb_verdict;
 		break;
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
 
+	if (old)
+		return psock_replace_prog(pprog, prog, old);
+
+	psock_set_prog(pprog, prog);
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c
index e1f1becda529..c812f0178b64 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c
@@ -793,19 +793,19 @@ static void test_sockmap(unsigned int tasks, void *data)
 	}
 
 	err = bpf_prog_detach(fd, BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_PARSER);
-	if (err) {
+	if (!err) {
 		printf("Failed empty parser prog detach\n");
 		goto out_sockmap;
 	}
 
 	err = bpf_prog_detach(fd, BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT);
-	if (err) {
+	if (!err) {
 		printf("Failed empty verdict prog detach\n");
 		goto out_sockmap;
 	}
 
 	err = bpf_prog_detach(fd, BPF_SK_MSG_VERDICT);
-	if (err) {
+	if (!err) {
 		printf("Failed empty msg verdict prog detach\n");
 		goto out_sockmap;
 	}
@@ -1094,19 +1094,19 @@ static void test_sockmap(unsigned int tasks, void *data)
 		assert(status == 0);
 	}
 
-	err = bpf_prog_detach(map_fd_rx, __MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE);
+	err = bpf_prog_detach2(parse_prog, map_fd_rx, __MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE);
 	if (!err) {
 		printf("Detached an invalid prog type.\n");
 		goto out_sockmap;
 	}
 
-	err = bpf_prog_detach(map_fd_rx, BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_PARSER);
+	err = bpf_prog_detach2(parse_prog, map_fd_rx, BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_PARSER);
 	if (err) {
 		printf("Failed parser prog detach\n");
 		goto out_sockmap;
 	}
 
-	err = bpf_prog_detach(map_fd_rx, BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT);
+	err = bpf_prog_detach2(verdict_prog, map_fd_rx, BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT);
 	if (err) {
 		printf("Failed parser prog detach\n");
 		goto out_sockmap;

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

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