From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,
pbonzini@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, jpoimboe@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 25/37] KVM/nVMX: Use __vmx_vcpu_run in nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2022 10:10:26 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221003131038.12645-26-cascardo@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221003131038.12645-1-cascardo@canonical.com>
From: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
commit 150f17bfab37e981ba03b37440638138ff2aa9ec upstream.
Replace inline assembly in nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw
with a call to __vmx_vcpu_run. The function is not
performance critical, so (double) GPR save/restore
in __vmx_vcpu_run can be tolerated, as far as performance
effects are concerned.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
[sean: dropped versioning info from changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20201231002702.2223707-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[cascardo: small fixups]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 32 +++-----------------------------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 --
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 34ee4835b017..e1947ef3cd7b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include "mmu.h"
#include "nested.h"
#include "trace.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
#include "x86.h"
static bool __read_mostly enable_shadow_vmcs = 1;
@@ -2863,35 +2864,8 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
}
- asm(
- "sub $%c[wordsize], %%" _ASM_SP "\n\t" /* temporarily adjust RSP for CALL */
- "cmp %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_state_rsp](%[loaded_vmcs]) \n\t"
- "je 1f \n\t"
- __ex("vmwrite %%" _ASM_SP ", %[HOST_RSP]") "\n\t"
- "mov %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_state_rsp](%[loaded_vmcs]) \n\t"
- "1: \n\t"
- "add $%c[wordsize], %%" _ASM_SP "\n\t" /* un-adjust RSP */
-
- /* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */
- "cmpb $0, %c[launched](%[loaded_vmcs])\n\t"
-
- /*
- * VMLAUNCH and VMRESUME clear RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} on VM-Exit, set
- * RFLAGS.CF on VM-Fail Invalid and set RFLAGS.ZF on VM-Fail
- * Valid. vmx_vmenter() directly "returns" RFLAGS, and so the
- * results of VM-Enter is captured via CC_{SET,OUT} to vm_fail.
- */
- "call vmx_vmenter\n\t"
-
- CC_SET(be)
- : ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, CC_OUT(be) (vm_fail)
- : [HOST_RSP]"r"((unsigned long)HOST_RSP),
- [loaded_vmcs]"r"(vmx->loaded_vmcs),
- [launched]"i"(offsetof(struct loaded_vmcs, launched)),
- [host_state_rsp]"i"(offsetof(struct loaded_vmcs, host_state.rsp)),
- [wordsize]"i"(sizeof(ulong))
- : "memory"
- );
+ vm_fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
+ vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched);
if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr)
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 0127333609bb..fd3fb3cf0264 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6540,8 +6540,6 @@ void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp)
}
}
-bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched);
-
static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 7a3362ab5986..a6a35dc3743e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
struct shared_msr_entry *find_msr_entry(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr);
void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp);
+bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched);
#define POSTED_INTR_ON 0
#define POSTED_INTR_SN 1
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-03 13:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-03 13:10 [PATCH 5.4 00/37] IBRS support // Retbleed mitigations Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 01/37] Revert "x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections" Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 02/37] Revert "x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id" Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 03/37] x86/devicetable: Move x86 specific macro out of generic code Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 04/37] x86/cpu: Add consistent CPU match macros Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 05/37] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 06/37] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 07/37] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 08/37] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 09/37] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 10/37] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 11/37] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 12/37] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 13/37] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 14/37] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 15/37] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 16/37] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 17/37] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 18/37] x86/speculation: Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER to work with objtool Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 19/37] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 20/37] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 21/37] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 22/37] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 23/37] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 24/37] KVM/VMX: Use TEST %REG,%REG instead of CMP $0,%REG in vmenter.S Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo [this message]
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 26/37] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 27/37] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 28/37] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 29/37] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 30/37] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 31/37] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 32/37] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 33/37] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 34/37] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 35/37] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 36/37] x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS parts Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-03 13:10 ` [PATCH 5.4 37/37] x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-10-05 10:34 ` [PATCH 5.4 00/37] IBRS support // Retbleed mitigations Greg KH
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