* [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 01/12] efi_loader: capsule: drop __weak from efi_get_public_key_data() AKASHI Takahiro
` (11 more replies)
0 siblings, 12 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
As I proposed and discussed in [1] and [2], I have made a couple of
improvements on the current implementation of capsule update in this
patch set.
* add signing feature to mkeficapsule
* add "--guid" option to mkeficapsule
* add man page of mkeficapsule
* update uefi document regarding capsule update
* revise pytests
* (as RFC) add CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH
# We have had some discussion about fdtsig.sh.
# So RFCs (patch#11,#12) are still included for further discussion
# if they are useful or not.
# For smooth merge, the rest (patch#1-10) should work without them.
[1] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2021-April/447918.html
[2] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2021-July/455292.html
Prerequisite patches
====================
None
Test
====
* locally passed the pytest which is included in this patch series
on sandbox built.
(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE should explicitly be turned on
in order to exercise the authentication code.)
Changes
=======
v6 (Nov 02, 2021)
* rebased on pre-v2022.01-rc1
* add patch#2 to rework/refactor the code for better readability (patch#2)
* use exit(EXIT_SUCCESS/FAILURE) (patch#3)
* truncate >80chars lines in pytest scripts (patch#6)
v5 (Oct 27, 2021)
* rebased on pre-v2022.01-rc1 (WIP/26Oct2021)
* drop already-merged patches
* drop __weak from efi_get_public_key_data() (patch#1)
* describe the format of public key node in device tree (patch#4)
* re-order patches by grouping closely-related patches (patch#6-8)
* modify pytest to make the test results correctly verified
either with or without CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE (patch#9)
* add RFCs for embedding public keys during the build process (patch#10,11)
v4 (Oct 7, 2021)
* rebased on v2021.10
* align with "Revert "efi_capsule: Move signature from DTB to .rodata""
* add more missing *revert* commits (patch#1,#2,#3)
* add fdtsig.sh, replacing dtb support in mkeficapsule (patch#4)
* update/revise the man/uefi doc (patch#6,#7)
* fix a bug in parsing guid string (patch#8)
* add a test for "--guid" option (patch#10)
* use dtb-based authentication test as done in v1 (patch#11)
v3 (Aug 31, 2021)
* rebased on v2021.10-rc3
* remove pytest-related patches
* add function descriptions in mkeficapsule.c
* correct format specifiers in printf()
* let main() return 0 or -1 only
* update doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst for syntax change of mkeficapsule
v2 (July 28, 2021)
* rebased on v2021.10-rc*
* removed dependency on target's configuration
* removed fdtsig.sh and others
* add man page
* update the UEFI document
* add dedicate defconfig for testing on sandbox
* add gitlab CI support
* add "--guid" option to mkeficapsule
(yet rather RFC)
Initial release (May 12, 2021)
* based on v2021.07-rc2
AKASHI Takahiro (12):
efi_loader: capsule: drop __weak from efi_get_public_key_data()
tools: mkeficapsule: rework the code a little bit
tools: mkeficapsule: add firmwware image signing
tools: mkeficapsule: add man page
doc: update UEFI document for usage of mkeficapsule
test/py: efi_capsule: add image authentication test
tools: mkeficapsule: allow for specifying GUID explicitly
test/py: efi_capsule: align with the syntax change of mkeficapsule
test/py: efi_capsule: add a test for "--guid" option
test/py: efi_capsule: check the results in case of
CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
(RFC) tools: add fdtsig.sh
(RFC) efi_loader, dts: add public keys for capsules to device tree
MAINTAINERS | 2 +
doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst | 143 ++--
doc/mkeficapsule.1 | 107 +++
dts/Makefile | 23 +-
lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 7 +
lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c | 2 +-
.../py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py | 5 +
test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 59 +-
test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts | 10 +
.../test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py | 91 ++-
.../test_capsule_firmware_signed.py | 254 +++++++
tools/Kconfig | 8 +
tools/Makefile | 8 +-
tools/fdtsig.sh | 40 ++
tools/mkeficapsule.c | 657 +++++++++++++++---
15 files changed, 1238 insertions(+), 178 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 doc/mkeficapsule.1
create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts
create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py
create mode 100755 tools/fdtsig.sh
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 01/12] efi_loader: capsule: drop __weak from efi_get_public_key_data()
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 02/12] tools: mkeficapsule: rework the code a little bit AKASHI Takahiro
` (10 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
As we discussed in ML, currently a device tree is the only place
to store public keys for capsule authentication. So __weak is not
necessary for now.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
---
lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c
index 44f5da61a9be..850937fd120f 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ out:
}
#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
-int __weak efi_get_public_key_data(void **pkey, efi_uintn_t *pkey_len)
+int efi_get_public_key_data(void **pkey, efi_uintn_t *pkey_len)
{
const void *fdt_blob = gd->fdt_blob;
const void *blob;
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 02/12] tools: mkeficapsule: rework the code a little bit
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 01/12] efi_loader: capsule: drop __weak from efi_get_public_key_data() AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:57 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-07 6:35 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 03/12] tools: mkeficapsule: add firmwware image signing AKASHI Takahiro
` (9 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 2 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
Abstract common routines to make the code easily understandable.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
tools/mkeficapsule.c | 219 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 155 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
index 4995ba4e0c2a..8427fedd941c 100644
--- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c
+++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
@@ -61,17 +61,117 @@ static void print_usage(void)
tool_name);
}
+/**
+ * read_bin_file - read a firmware binary file
+ * @bin: Path to a firmware binary file
+ * @data: Pointer to pointer of allocated buffer
+ * @bin_size: Size of allocated buffer
+ *
+ * Read out a content of binary, @bin, into @data.
+ * A caller should free @data.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0 - on success
+ * * -1 - on failure
+ */
+static int read_bin_file(char *bin, void **data, off_t *bin_size)
+{
+ FILE *g;
+ struct stat bin_stat;
+ void *buf;
+ size_t size;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ g = fopen(bin, "r");
+ if (!g) {
+ printf("cannot open %s\n", bin);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (stat(bin, &bin_stat) < 0) {
+ printf("cannot determine the size of %s\n", bin);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ buf = malloc(bin_stat.st_size);
+ if (!buf) {
+ printf("cannot allocate memory: %zx\n",
+ (size_t)bin_stat.st_size);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ size = fread(buf, 1, bin_stat.st_size, g);
+ if (size < bin_stat.st_size) {
+ printf("read failed (%zx)\n", size);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *data = buf;
+ *bin_size = bin_stat.st_size;
+err:
+ fclose(g);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_capsule_file - write a capsule file
+ * @bin: FILE stream
+ * @data: Pointer to data
+ * @bin_size: Size of data
+ *
+ * Write out data, @data, with the size @bin_size.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0 - on success
+ * * -1 - on failure
+ */
+static int write_capsule_file(FILE *f, void *data, size_t size, const char *msg)
+{
+ size_t size_written;
+
+ size_written = fwrite(data, 1, size, f);
+ if (size_written < size) {
+ printf("%s: write failed (%zx != %zx)\n", msg,
+ size_written, size);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * create_fwbin - create an uefi capsule file
+ * @path: Path to a created capsule file
+ * @bin: Path to a firmware binary to encapsulate
+ * @guid: GUID of related FMP driver
+ * @index: Index number in capsule
+ * @instance: Instance number in capsule
+ * @mcount: Monotonic count in authentication information
+ * @private_file: Path to a private key file
+ * @cert_file: Path to a certificate file
+ *
+ * This function actually does the job of creating an uefi capsule file.
+ * All the arguments must be supplied.
+ * If either @private_file ror @cert_file is NULL, the capsule file
+ * won't be signed.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0 - on success
+ * * -1 - on failure
+ */
static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
unsigned long index, unsigned long instance)
{
struct efi_capsule_header header;
struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header capsule;
struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header image;
- FILE *f, *g;
- struct stat bin_stat;
- u8 *data;
- size_t size;
+ FILE *f;
+ void *data;
+ off_t bin_size;
u64 offset;
+ int ret;
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("For output: %s\n", path);
@@ -79,25 +179,28 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
printf("\tindex: %ld\n\tinstance: %ld\n", index, instance);
#endif
- g = fopen(bin, "r");
- if (!g) {
- printf("cannot open %s\n", bin);
- return -1;
- }
- if (stat(bin, &bin_stat) < 0) {
- printf("cannot determine the size of %s\n", bin);
- goto err_1;
- }
- data = malloc(bin_stat.st_size);
- if (!data) {
- printf("cannot allocate memory: %zx\n", (size_t)bin_stat.st_size);
- goto err_1;
- }
+ f = NULL;
+ data = NULL;
+ ret = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * read a firmware binary
+ */
+ if (read_bin_file(bin, &data, &bin_size))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * write a capsule file
+ */
f = fopen(path, "w");
if (!f) {
printf("cannot open %s\n", path);
- goto err_2;
+ goto err;
}
+
+ /*
+ * capsule file header
+ */
header.capsule_guid = efi_guid_fm_capsule;
header.header_size = sizeof(header);
/* TODO: The current implementation ignores flags */
@@ -105,70 +208,58 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
header.capsule_image_size = sizeof(header)
+ sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64)
+ sizeof(image)
- + bin_stat.st_size;
-
- size = fwrite(&header, 1, sizeof(header), f);
- if (size < sizeof(header)) {
- printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
- goto err_3;
- }
+ + bin_size;
+ if (write_capsule_file(f, &header, sizeof(header),
+ "Capsule header"))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * firmware capsule header
+ * This capsule has only one firmware capsule image.
+ */
capsule.version = 0x00000001;
capsule.embedded_driver_count = 0;
capsule.payload_item_count = 1;
- size = fwrite(&capsule, 1, sizeof(capsule), f);
- if (size < (sizeof(capsule))) {
- printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
- goto err_3;
- }
+ if (write_capsule_file(f, &capsule, sizeof(capsule),
+ "Firmware capsule header"))
+ goto err;
+
offset = sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64);
- size = fwrite(&offset, 1, sizeof(offset), f);
- if (size < sizeof(offset)) {
- printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
- goto err_3;
- }
+ if (write_capsule_file(f, &offset, sizeof(offset),
+ "Offset to capsule image"))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * firmware capsule image header
+ */
image.version = 0x00000003;
memcpy(&image.update_image_type_id, guid, sizeof(*guid));
image.update_image_index = index;
image.reserved[0] = 0;
image.reserved[1] = 0;
image.reserved[2] = 0;
- image.update_image_size = bin_stat.st_size;
+ image.update_image_size = bin_size;
image.update_vendor_code_size = 0; /* none */
image.update_hardware_instance = instance;
image.image_capsule_support = 0;
+ if (write_capsule_file(f, &image, sizeof(image),
+ "Firmware capsule image header"))
+ goto err;
- size = fwrite(&image, 1, sizeof(image), f);
- if (size < sizeof(image)) {
- printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
- goto err_3;
- }
- size = fread(data, 1, bin_stat.st_size, g);
- if (size < bin_stat.st_size) {
- printf("read failed (%zx)\n", size);
- goto err_3;
- }
- size = fwrite(data, 1, bin_stat.st_size, f);
- if (size < bin_stat.st_size) {
- printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
- goto err_3;
- }
-
- fclose(f);
- fclose(g);
- free(data);
-
- return 0;
+ /*
+ * firmware binary
+ */
+ if (write_capsule_file(f, data, bin_size, "Firmware binary"))
+ goto err;
-err_3:
- fclose(f);
-err_2:
+ ret = 0;
+err:
+ if (f)
+ fclose(f);
+ free_sig_data(&auth_context);
free(data);
-err_1:
- fclose(g);
- return -1;
+ return ret;
}
/*
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 03/12] tools: mkeficapsule: add firmwware image signing
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 01/12] efi_loader: capsule: drop __weak from efi_get_public_key_data() AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 02/12] tools: mkeficapsule: rework the code a little bit AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-07 6:53 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 04/12] tools: mkeficapsule: add man page AKASHI Takahiro
` (8 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
With this enhancement, mkeficapsule will be able to sign a capsule
file when it is created. A signature added will be used later
in the verification at FMP's SetImage() call.
To do that, We need specify additional command parameters:
-monotonic-cout <count> : monotonic count
-private-key <private key file> : private key file
-certificate <certificate file> : certificate file
Only when all of those parameters are given, a signature will be added
to a capsule file.
Users are expected to maintain and increment the monotonic count at
every time of the update for each firmware image.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
---
tools/Kconfig | 8 +
tools/Makefile | 8 +-
tools/mkeficapsule.c | 382 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
3 files changed, 376 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/Kconfig b/tools/Kconfig
index 91ce8ae3e516..117c921da3fe 100644
--- a/tools/Kconfig
+++ b/tools/Kconfig
@@ -90,4 +90,12 @@ config TOOLS_SHA512
help
Enable SHA512 support in the tools builds
+config TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE
+ bool "Build efimkcapsule command"
+ default y if EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK
+ help
+ This command allows users to create a UEFI capsule file and,
+ optionally sign that file. If you want to enable UEFI capsule
+ update feature on your target, you certainly need this.
+
endmenu
diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile
index b45219e2c30c..5a73cc4b363d 100644
--- a/tools/Makefile
+++ b/tools/Makefile
@@ -238,8 +238,12 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MIPS) += mips-relocs
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1_COMPILER) += asn1_compiler
HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -idirafter $(srctree)/include
-mkeficapsule-objs := mkeficapsule.o $(LIBFDT_OBJS)
-hostprogs-$(CONFIG_EFI_HAVE_CAPSULE_SUPPORT) += mkeficapsule
+HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += -luuid
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO),y)
+HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += \
+ $(shell pkg-config --libs libssl libcrypto 2> /dev/null || echo "-lssl -lcrypto")
+endif
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE) += mkeficapsule
# We build some files with extra pedantic flags to try to minimize things
# that won't build on some weird host compiler -- though there are lots of
diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
index 8427fedd941c..086757ee8ad7 100644
--- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c
+++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
@@ -15,6 +15,16 @@
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <linux/kconfig.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#endif
+
typedef __u8 u8;
typedef __u16 u16;
typedef __u32 u32;
@@ -38,12 +48,25 @@ efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit =
EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_FIT_GUID;
efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw =
EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID;
+efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
+static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:p:c:m:dh";
+#else
+static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:h";
+#endif
static struct option options[] = {
{"fit", required_argument, NULL, 'f'},
{"raw", required_argument, NULL, 'r'},
{"index", required_argument, NULL, 'i'},
{"instance", required_argument, NULL, 'I'},
+#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
+ {"private-key", required_argument, NULL, 'p'},
+ {"certificate", required_argument, NULL, 'c'},
+ {"monotonic-count", required_argument, NULL, 'm'},
+ {"dump-sig", no_argument, NULL, 'd'},
+#endif
{"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
{NULL, 0, NULL, 0},
};
@@ -57,10 +80,252 @@ static void print_usage(void)
"\t-r, --raw <raw image> new raw image file\n"
"\t-i, --index <index> update image index\n"
"\t-I, --instance <instance> update hardware instance\n"
+#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
+ "\t-p, --private-key <privkey file> private key file\n"
+ "\t-c, --certificate <cert file> signer's certificate file\n"
+ "\t-m, --monotonic-count <count> monotonic count\n"
+ "\t-d, --dump_sig dump signature (*.p7)\n"
+#endif
"\t-h, --help print a help message\n",
tool_name);
}
+/**
+ * auth_context - authentication context
+ * @key_file: Path to a private key file
+ * @cert_file: Path to a certificate file
+ * @image_data: Pointer to firmware data
+ * @image_size: Size of firmware data
+ * @auth: Authentication header
+ * @sig_data: Signature data
+ * @sig_size: Size of signature data
+ *
+ * Data structure used in create_auth_data(). @key_file through
+ * @image_size are input parameters. @auth, @sig_data and @sig_size
+ * are filled in by create_auth_data().
+ */
+struct auth_context {
+ char *key_file;
+ char *cert_file;
+ u8 *image_data;
+ size_t image_size;
+ struct efi_firmware_image_authentication auth;
+ u8 *sig_data;
+ size_t sig_size;
+};
+
+static int dump_sig;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
+/**
+ * fileio-read_pkey - read out a private key
+ * @filename: Path to a private key file
+ *
+ * Read out a private key file and parse it into "EVP_PKEY" structure.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Pointer to private key structure - on success
+ * * NULL - on failure
+ */
+static EVP_PKEY *fileio_read_pkey(const char *filename)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+ BIO *bio;
+
+ bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
+ if (!bio)
+ goto out;
+
+ key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+out:
+ BIO_free_all(bio);
+ if (!key) {
+ printf("Can't load key from file '%s'\n", filename);
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ }
+
+ return key;
+}
+
+/**
+ * fileio-read_cert - read out a certificate
+ * @filename: Path to a certificate file
+ *
+ * Read out a certificate file and parse it into "X509" structure.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * Pointer to certificate structure - on success
+ * * NULL - on failure
+ */
+static X509 *fileio_read_cert(const char *filename)
+{
+ X509 *cert = NULL;
+ BIO *bio;
+
+ bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
+ if (!bio)
+ goto out;
+
+ cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+out:
+ BIO_free_all(bio);
+ if (!cert) {
+ printf("Can't load certificate from file '%s'\n", filename);
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ }
+
+ return cert;
+}
+
+/**
+ * create_auth_data - compose authentication data in capsule
+ * @auth_context: Pointer to authentication context
+ *
+ * Fill up an authentication header (.auth) and signature data (.sig_data)
+ * in @auth_context, using library functions from openssl.
+ * All the parameters in @auth_context must be filled in by a caller.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0 - on success
+ * * -1 - on failure
+ */
+static int create_auth_data(struct auth_context *ctx)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+ X509 *cert = NULL;
+ BIO *data_bio = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ PKCS7 *p7;
+ int flags, ret = -1;
+
+ OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
+ key = fileio_read_pkey(ctx->key_file);
+ if (!key)
+ goto err;
+ cert = fileio_read_cert(ctx->cert_file);
+ if (!cert)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * create a BIO, containing:
+ * * firmware image
+ * * monotonic count
+ * in this order!
+ * See EDK2's FmpAuthenticatedHandlerRsa2048Sha256()
+ */
+ data_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ BIO_write(data_bio, ctx->image_data, ctx->image_size);
+ BIO_write(data_bio, &ctx->auth.monotonic_count,
+ sizeof(ctx->auth.monotonic_count));
+
+ md = EVP_get_digestbyname("SHA256");
+ if (!md)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* create signature */
+ /* TODO: maybe add PKCS7_NOATTR and PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP */
+ flags = PKCS7_BINARY | PKCS7_DETACHED;
+ p7 = PKCS7_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, data_bio, flags | PKCS7_PARTIAL);
+ if (!p7)
+ goto err;
+ if (!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, cert, key, md, flags))
+ goto err;
+ if (!PKCS7_final(p7, data_bio, flags))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* convert pkcs7 into DER */
+ ctx->sig_data = NULL;
+ ctx->sig_size = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)p7, &ctx->sig_data,
+ ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7));
+ if (!ctx->sig_size)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* fill auth_info */
+ ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.dwLength = sizeof(ctx->auth.auth_info)
+ + ctx->sig_size;
+ ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wRevision = WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0;
+ ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;
+ memcpy(&ctx->auth.auth_info.cert_type, &efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7,
+ sizeof(efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7));
+
+ ret = 0;
+err:
+ BIO_free_all(data_bio);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+ X509_free(cert);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * dump_signature - dump out a signature
+ * @path: Path to a capsule file
+ * @signature: Signature data
+ * @sig_size: Size of signature data
+ *
+ * Signature data pointed to by @signature will be saved into
+ * a file whose file name is @path with ".p7" suffix.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0 - on success
+ * * -1 - on failure
+ */
+static int dump_signature(const char *path, u8 *signature, size_t sig_size)
+{
+ char *sig_path;
+ FILE *f;
+ size_t size;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ sig_path = malloc(strlen(path) + 3 + 1);
+ if (!sig_path)
+ return ret;
+
+ sprintf(sig_path, "%s.p7", path);
+ f = fopen(sig_path, "w");
+ if (!f)
+ goto err;
+
+ size = fwrite(signature, 1, sig_size, f);
+ if (size == sig_size)
+ ret = 0;
+
+ fclose(f);
+err:
+ free(sig_path);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * free_sig_data - free out signature data
+ * @ctx: Pointer to authentication context
+ *
+ * Free signature data allocated in create_auth_data().
+ */
+static void free_sig_data(struct auth_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->sig_size)
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->sig_data);
+}
+#else
+static int create_auth_data(struct auth_context *ctx)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int dump_signature(const char *path, u8 *signature, size_t sig_size)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void free_sig_data(struct auth_context *ctx) {}
+#endif
+
/**
* read_bin_file - read a firmware binary file
* @bin: Path to a firmware binary file
@@ -162,11 +427,13 @@ static int write_capsule_file(FILE *f, void *data, size_t size, const char *msg)
* * -1 - on failure
*/
static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
- unsigned long index, unsigned long instance)
+ unsigned long index, unsigned long instance,
+ uint64_t mcount, char *privkey_file, char *cert_file)
{
struct efi_capsule_header header;
struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header capsule;
struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header image;
+ struct auth_context auth_context;
FILE *f;
void *data;
off_t bin_size;
@@ -176,9 +443,9 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("For output: %s\n", path);
printf("\tbin: %s\n\ttype: %pUl\n", bin, guid);
- printf("\tindex: %ld\n\tinstance: %ld\n", index, instance);
+ printf("\tindex: %lu\n\tinstance: %lu\n", index, instance);
#endif
-
+ auth_context.sig_size = 0;
f = NULL;
data = NULL;
ret = -1;
@@ -189,6 +456,27 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
if (read_bin_file(bin, &data, &bin_size))
goto err;
+ /* first, calculate signature to determine its size */
+ if (privkey_file && cert_file) {
+ auth_context.key_file = privkey_file;
+ auth_context.cert_file = cert_file;
+ auth_context.auth.monotonic_count = mcount;
+ auth_context.image_data = data;
+ auth_context.image_size = bin_size;
+
+ if (create_auth_data(&auth_context)) {
+ printf("Signing firmware image failed\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (dump_sig &&
+ dump_signature(path, auth_context.sig_data,
+ auth_context.sig_size)) {
+ printf("Creating signature file failed\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* write a capsule file
*/
@@ -209,6 +497,9 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
+ sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64)
+ sizeof(image)
+ bin_size;
+ if (auth_context.sig_size)
+ header.capsule_image_size += sizeof(auth_context.auth)
+ + auth_context.sig_size;
if (write_capsule_file(f, &header, sizeof(header),
"Capsule header"))
goto err;
@@ -239,13 +530,32 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
image.reserved[1] = 0;
image.reserved[2] = 0;
image.update_image_size = bin_size;
+ if (auth_context.sig_size)
+ image.update_image_size += sizeof(auth_context.auth)
+ + auth_context.sig_size;
image.update_vendor_code_size = 0; /* none */
image.update_hardware_instance = instance;
image.image_capsule_support = 0;
+ if (auth_context.sig_size)
+ image.image_capsule_support |= CAPSULE_SUPPORT_AUTHENTICATION;
if (write_capsule_file(f, &image, sizeof(image),
"Firmware capsule image header"))
goto err;
+ /*
+ * signature
+ */
+ if (auth_context.sig_size) {
+ if (write_capsule_file(f, &auth_context.auth,
+ sizeof(auth_context.auth),
+ "Authentication header"))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (write_capsule_file(f, auth_context.sig_data,
+ auth_context.sig_size, "Signature"))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/*
* firmware binary
*/
@@ -262,23 +572,37 @@ err:
return ret;
}
-/*
- * Usage:
- * $ mkeficapsule -f <firmware binary> <output file>
+/**
+ * main - main entry function of mkeficapsule
+ * @argc: Number of arguments
+ * @argv: Array of pointers to arguments
+ *
+ * Create an uefi capsule file, optionally signing it.
+ * Parse all the arguments and pass them on to create_fwbin().
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0 - on success
+ * * -1 - on failure
*/
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *file;
efi_guid_t *guid;
unsigned long index, instance;
+ uint64_t mcount;
+ char *privkey_file, *cert_file;
int c, idx;
file = NULL;
guid = NULL;
index = 0;
instance = 0;
+ mcount = 0;
+ privkey_file = NULL;
+ cert_file = NULL;
+ dump_sig = 0;
for (;;) {
- c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "f:r:i:I:v:h", options, &idx);
+ c = getopt_long(argc, argv, opts_short, options, &idx);
if (c == -1)
break;
@@ -286,7 +610,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
case 'f':
if (file) {
printf("Image already specified\n");
- return -1;
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
file = optarg;
guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit;
@@ -294,7 +618,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
case 'r':
if (file) {
printf("Image already specified\n");
- return -1;
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
file = optarg;
guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw;
@@ -305,26 +629,44 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
case 'I':
instance = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0);
break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
+ case 'p':
+ if (privkey_file) {
+ printf("Private Key already specified\n");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ privkey_file = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ if (cert_file) {
+ printf("Certificate file already specified\n");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ cert_file = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ mcount = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ dump_sig = 1;
+ break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO */
case 'h':
print_usage();
- return 0;
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
}
- /* need an output file */
- if (argc != optind + 1) {
+ /* check necessary parameters */
+ if ((argc != optind + 1) || !file ||
+ ((privkey_file && !cert_file) ||
+ (!privkey_file && cert_file))) {
print_usage();
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
- /* need a fit image file or raw image file */
- if (!file) {
- print_usage();
- exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
- }
-
- if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance)
- < 0) {
+ if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance,
+ mcount, privkey_file, cert_file) < 0) {
printf("Creating firmware capsule failed\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 04/12] tools: mkeficapsule: add man page
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 03/12] tools: mkeficapsule: add firmwware image signing AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 05/12] doc: update UEFI document for usage of mkeficapsule AKASHI Takahiro
` (7 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
Add a man page for mkeficapsule command.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
---
MAINTAINERS | 1 +
doc/mkeficapsule.1 | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 96 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 doc/mkeficapsule.1
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 9d8cba902800..569332db4719 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -718,6 +718,7 @@ S: Maintained
T: git https://source.denx.de/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-efi.git
F: doc/api/efi.rst
F: doc/develop/uefi/*
+F: doc/mkeficapsule.1
F: doc/usage/bootefi.rst
F: drivers/rtc/emul_rtc.c
F: include/capitalization.h
diff --git a/doc/mkeficapsule.1 b/doc/mkeficapsule.1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..837e09ab451e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/mkeficapsule.1
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+.TH MAEFICAPSULE 1 "May 2021"
+
+.SH NAME
+mkeficapsule \- Generate EFI capsule file for U-Boot
+
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.B mkeficapsule
+.RB [\fIoptions\fP] " \fIcapsule-file\fP"
+
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+The
+\fBmkeficapsule\fP
+command is used to create an EFI capsule file for use with the U-Boot
+EFI capsule update.
+A capsule file may contain various type of firmware blobs which
+are to be applied to the system and must be placed in the specific
+directory on the UEFI system partition. An update will be automatically
+executed at next reboot.
+
+Optionally, a capsule file can be signed with a given private key.
+In this case, the update will be authenticated by verifying the signature
+before applying.
+
+\fBmkeficapsule\fP supports two different format of image files:
+.TP
+.I raw image
+format is a single binary blob of any type of firmware.
+
+.TP
+.I FIT (Flattened Image Tree) image
+format
+is the same as used in the new \fIuImage\fP format and allows for
+multiple binary blobs in a single capsule file.
+This type of image file can be generated by \fBmkimage\fP.
+
+.SH "OPTIONS"
+One of \fB--fit\fP or \fB--raw\fP option must be specified.
+
+.TP
+.BI "-f, --fit \fIfit-image-file\fP"
+Specify a FIT image file
+
+.TP
+.BI "-r, --raw \fIraw-image-file\fP"
+Specify a raw image file
+
+.TP
+.BI "-i, --index \fIindex\fP"
+Specify an image index
+
+.TP
+.BI "-I, --instance \fIinstance\fP"
+Specify a hardware instance
+
+.TP
+.BI "-h, --help"
+Print a help message
+
+.TP 0
+.B With signing:
+
+\fB--private-key\fP, \fB--certificate\fP and \fB--monotonic-count\fP are
+all mandatory.
+
+.TP
+.BI "-p, --private-key \fIprivate-key-file\fP"
+Specify signer's private key file in PEM
+
+.TP
+.BI "-c, --certificate \fIcertificate-file\fP"
+Specify signer's certificate file in EFI certificate list format
+
+.TP
+.BI "-m, --monotonic-count \fIcount\fP"
+Specify a monotonic count which is set to be monotonically incremented
+at every firmware update.
+
+.TP
+.BI "-d, --dump_sig"
+Dump signature data into *.p7 file
+
+.PP
+.SH FILES
+.TP
+.BI "\fI/EFI/UpdateCapsule\fP"
+The directory in which all capsule files be placed
+
+.SH SEE ALSO
+.B mkimage
+
+.SH AUTHORS
+Written by AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
+
+.SH HOMEPAGE
+http://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot/WebHome
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 05/12] doc: update UEFI document for usage of mkeficapsule
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 04/12] tools: mkeficapsule: add man page AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 06/12] test/py: efi_capsule: add image authentication test AKASHI Takahiro
` (6 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
Now we can use mkeficapsule command instead of EDK-II's script
to create a signed capsule file. So update the instruction for
capsule authentication.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
---
doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst | 143 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst
index f17138f5c765..864d61734bee 100644
--- a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst
+++ b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst
@@ -284,37 +284,52 @@ Support has been added for the UEFI capsule update feature which
enables updating the U-Boot image using the UEFI firmware management
protocol (FMP). The capsules are not passed to the firmware through
the UpdateCapsule runtime service. Instead, capsule-on-disk
-functionality is used for fetching the capsule from the EFI System
-Partition (ESP) by placing the capsule file under the
-\EFI\UpdateCapsule directory.
-
-The directory \EFI\UpdateCapsule is checked for capsules only within the
-EFI system partition on the device specified in the active boot option
-determined by reference to BootNext variable or BootOrder variable processing.
-The active Boot Variable is the variable with highest priority BootNext or
-within BootOrder that refers to a device found to be present. Boot variables
-in BootOrder but referring to devices not present are ignored when determining
-active boot variable.
-Before starting a capsule update make sure your capsules are installed in the
-correct ESP partition or set BootNext.
+functionality is used for fetching capsules from the EFI System
+Partition (ESP) by placing capsule files under the directory::
+
+ \EFI\UpdateCapsule
+
+The directory is checked for capsules only within the
+EFI system partition on the device specified in the active boot option,
+which is determined by BootXXXX variable in BootNext, or if not, the highest
+priority one within BootOrder. Any BootXXXX variables referring to devices
+not present are ignored when determining the active boot option.
+
+Please note that capsules will be applied in the alphabetic order of
+capsule file names.
+
+Creating a capsule file
+***********************
+
+A capsule file can be created by using tools/mkeficapsule.
+To build this tool, enable::
+
+ CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE=y
+ CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO=y
+
+Run the following command::
+
+ $ mkeficapsule \
+ --index 1 --instance 0 \
+ [--fit <FIT image> | --raw <raw image>] \
+ <capsule_file_name>
Performing the update
*********************
-Since U-boot doesn't currently support SetVariable at runtime there's a Kconfig
-option (CONFIG_EFI_IGNORE_OSINDICATIONS) to disable the OsIndications variable
-check. If that option is enabled just copy your capsule to \EFI\UpdateCapsule.
-
-If that option is disabled, you'll need to set the OsIndications variable with::
+Put capsule files under the directory mentioned above.
+Then, following the UEFI specification, you'll need to set
+the EFI_OS_INDICATIONS_FILE_CAPSULE_DELIVERY_SUPPORTED
+bit in OsIndications variable with::
=> setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -v OsIndications =0x04
-Finally, the capsule update can be initiated either by rebooting the board,
-which is the preferred method, or by issuing the following command::
+Since U-boot doesn't currently support SetVariable at runtime, its value
+won't be taken over across the reboot. If this is the case, you can skip
+this feature check with the Kconfig option (CONFIG_EFI_IGNORE_OSINDICATIONS)
+set.
- => efidebug capsule disk-update
-
-**The efidebug command is should only be used during debugging/development.**
+Finally, the capsule update can be initiated by rebooting the board.
Enabling Capsule Authentication
*******************************
@@ -324,82 +339,58 @@ be updated by verifying the capsule signature. The capsule signature
is computed and prepended to the capsule payload at the time of
capsule generation. This signature is then verified by using the
public key stored as part of the X509 certificate. This certificate is
-in the form of an efi signature list (esl) file, which is embedded as
-part of U-Boot.
+in the form of an efi signature list (esl) file, which is embedded in
+a device tree.
The capsule authentication feature can be enabled through the
following config, in addition to the configs listed above for capsule
update::
CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y
- CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH=<path to .esl cert>
The public and private keys used for the signing process are generated
-and used by the steps highlighted below::
+and used by the steps highlighted below.
- 1. Install utility commands on your host
- * OPENSSL
+1. Install utility commands on your host
+ * openssl
* efitools
- 2. Create signing keys and certificate files on your host
+2. Create signing keys and certificate files on your host::
$ openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj /CN=CRT/ \
-keyout CRT.key -out CRT.crt -nodes -days 365
$ cert-to-efi-sig-list CRT.crt CRT.esl
- $ openssl x509 -in CRT.crt -out CRT.cer -outform DER
- $ openssl x509 -inform DER -in CRT.cer -outform PEM -out CRT.pub.pem
-
- $ openssl pkcs12 -export -out CRT.pfx -inkey CRT.key -in CRT.crt
- $ openssl pkcs12 -in CRT.pfx -nodes -out CRT.pem
-
-The capsule file can be generated by using the GenerateCapsule.py
-script in EDKII::
-
- $ ./BaseTools/BinWrappers/PosixLike/GenerateCapsule -e -o \
- <capsule_file_name> --monotonic-count <val> --fw-version \
- <val> --lsv <val> --guid \
- e2bb9c06-70e9-4b14-97a3-5a7913176e3f --verbose \
- --update-image-index <val> --signer-private-cert \
- /path/to/CRT.pem --trusted-public-cert \
- /path/to/CRT.pub.pem --other-public-cert /path/to/CRT.pub.pem \
- <u-boot.bin>
-
-Place the capsule generated in the above step on the EFI System
-Partition under the EFI/UpdateCapsule directory
-
-Testing on QEMU
-***************
+3. Run the following command to create and sign the capsule file::
-Currently, support has been added on the QEMU ARM64 virt platform for
-updating the U-Boot binary as a raw image when the platform is booted
-in non-secure mode, i.e. with CONFIG_TFABOOT disabled. For this
-configuration, the QEMU platform needs to be booted with
-'secure=off'. The U-Boot binary placed on the first bank of the NOR
-flash at offset 0x0. The U-Boot environment is placed on the second
-NOR flash bank at offset 0x4000000.
+ $ mkeficapsule --monotonic-count 1 \
+ --private-key CRT.key \
+ --certificate CRT.crt \
+ --index 1 --instance 0 \
+ [--fit <FIT image> | --raw <raw image>] \
+ <capsule_file_name>
-The capsule update feature is enabled with the following configuration
-settings::
+4. Insert the signature list into a device tree in the following format::
- CONFIG_MTD=y
- CONFIG_FLASH_CFI_MTD=y
- CONFIG_CMD_MTDPARTS=y
- CONFIG_CMD_DFU=y
- CONFIG_DFU_MTD=y
- CONFIG_PCI_INIT_R=y
- CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK=y
- CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT=y
- CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE=y
- CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_RAW=y
+ {
+ signature {
+ capsule-key = [ <binary of signature list> ];
+ }
+ ...
+ }
-In addition, the following config needs to be disabled(QEMU ARM specific)::
+ You can do this manually with::
- CONFIG_TFABOOT
+ $ dtc -@ -I dts -O dtb -o signature.dtbo signature.dts
+ $ fdtoverlay -i orig.dtb -o new.dtb -v signature.dtbo
-The capsule file can be generated by using the tools/mkeficapsule::
+ where signature.dts looks like::
- $ mkeficapsule --raw <u-boot.bin> --index 1 <capsule_file_name>
+ &{/} {
+ signature {
+ capsule-key = /incbin/("CRT.esl");
+ };
+ };
Executing the boot manager
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 06/12] test/py: efi_capsule: add image authentication test
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 05/12] doc: update UEFI document for usage of mkeficapsule AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 07/12] tools: mkeficapsule: allow for specifying GUID explicitly AKASHI Takahiro
` (5 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
Add a couple of test cases against capsule image authentication
for capsule-on-disk, where only a signed capsule file with the verified
signature will be applied to the system.
Due to the difficulty of embedding a public key (esl file) in U-Boot
binary during pytest setup time, all the keys/certificates are pre-created.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
.../py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py | 5 +
test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 52 +++-
test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts | 10 +
.../test_capsule_firmware_signed.py | 254 ++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts
create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py
index 4fd6353c2040..aa9bf5eee3aa 100644
--- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py
@@ -3,3 +3,8 @@
# Directories
CAPSULE_DATA_DIR = '/EFI/CapsuleTestData'
CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR = '/EFI/UpdateCapsule'
+
+# v1.5.1 or earlier of efitools has a bug in sha256 calculation, and
+# you need build a newer version on your own.
+# The path must terminate with '/'.
+EFITOOLS_PATH = ''
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py
index 6ad5608cd71c..27c05971ca32 100644
--- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py
@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ import pytest
from capsule_defs import *
#
-# Fixture for UEFI secure boot test
+# Fixture for UEFI capsule test
#
-
@pytest.fixture(scope='session')
def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config):
- """Set up a file system to be used in UEFI capsule test.
+ """Set up a file system to be used in UEFI capsule and
+ authentication test.
Args:
request: Pytest request object.
@@ -40,6 +40,36 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config):
check_call('mkdir -p %s' % data_dir, shell=True)
check_call('mkdir -p %s' % install_dir, shell=True)
+ capsule_auth_enabled = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
+ 'config_efi_capsule_authenticate')
+ if capsule_auth_enabled:
+ # Create private key (SIGNER.key) and certificate (SIGNER.crt)
+ check_call('cd %s; '
+ 'openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 '
+ '-subj /CN=TEST_SIGNER/ -keyout SIGNER.key '
+ '-out SIGNER.crt -nodes -days 365'
+ % data_dir, shell=True)
+ check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-sig-list SIGNER.crt SIGNER.esl'
+ % (data_dir, EFITOOLS_PATH), shell=True)
+
+ # Update dtb adding capsule certificate
+ check_call('cd %s; '
+ 'cp %s/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts .'
+ % (data_dir, u_boot_config.source_dir), shell=True)
+ check_call('cd %s; '
+ 'dtc -@ -I dts -O dtb -o signature.dtbo signature.dts; '
+ 'fdtoverlay -i %s/arch/sandbox/dts/test.dtb '
+ '-o test_sig.dtb signature.dtbo'
+ % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True)
+
+ # Create *malicious* private key (SIGNER2.key) and certificate
+ # (SIGNER2.crt)
+ check_call('cd %s; '
+ 'openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 '
+ '-subj /CN=TEST_SIGNER/ -keyout SIGNER2.key '
+ '-out SIGNER2.crt -nodes -days 365'
+ % data_dir, shell=True)
+
# Create capsule files
# two regions: one for u-boot.bin and the other for u-boot.env
check_call('cd %s; echo -n u-boot:Old > u-boot.bin.old; echo -n u-boot:New > u-boot.bin.new; echo -n u-boot-env:Old -> u-boot.env.old; echo -n u-boot-env:New > u-boot.env.new' % data_dir,
@@ -56,6 +86,22 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config):
check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --raw u-boot.bin.new --index 1 Test02' %
(data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir),
shell=True)
+ if capsule_auth_enabled:
+ # firmware signed with proper key
+ check_call('cd %s; '
+ '%s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --monotonic-count 1 '
+ '--private-key SIGNER.key --certificate SIGNER.crt '
+ '--raw u-boot.bin.new Test11'
+ % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir),
+ shell=True)
+ # firmware signed with *mal* key
+ check_call('cd %s; '
+ '%s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --monotonic-count 1 '
+ '--private-key SIGNER2.key '
+ '--certificate SIGNER2.crt '
+ '--raw u-boot.bin.new Test12'
+ % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir),
+ shell=True)
# Create a disk image with EFI system partition
check_call('virt-make-fs --partition=gpt --size=+1M --type=vfat %s %s' %
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..078cfc76c93c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+
+/dts-v1/;
+/plugin/;
+
+&{/} {
+ signature {
+ capsule-key = /incbin/("SIGNER.esl");
+ };
+};
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..593b032e9015
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+# Copyright (c) 2021, Linaro Limited
+# Author: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
+#
+# U-Boot UEFI: Firmware Update (Signed capsule) Test
+
+"""
+This test verifies capsule-on-disk firmware update
+with signed capsule files
+"""
+
+import pytest
+from capsule_defs import CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR
+
+@pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('efi_capsule_firmware_raw')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('efi_capsule_authenticate')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('dfu')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('dfu_sf')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_efidebug')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_fat')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_memory')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_nvedit_efi')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_sf')
+@pytest.mark.slow
+class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareSigned(object):
+ def test_efi_capsule_auth1(
+ self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data):
+ """
+ Test Case 1 - Update U-Boot on SPI Flash, raw image format
+ 0x100000-0x150000: U-Boot binary (but dummy)
+
+ If the capsule is properly signed, the authentication
+ should pass and the firmware be updated.
+ """
+ disk_img = efi_capsule_data
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1-a, before reboot'):
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi',
+ 'efidebug boot order 1',
+ 'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004',
+ 'env set dfu_alt_info '
+ '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 '
+ '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
+ 'env save'])
+
+ # initialize content
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'sf probe 0:0',
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old'
+ % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
+ 'sf write 4000000 100000 10',
+ 'sf read 5000000 100000 10',
+ 'md.b 5000000 10'])
+ assert 'Old' in ''.join(output)
+
+ # place a capsule file
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test11' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
+ 'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test11 $filesize'
+ % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR,
+ 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
+ assert 'Test11' in ''.join(output)
+
+ # reboot
+ mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/test_efi_capsule'
+ u_boot_console.config.dtb = mnt_point + CAPSULE_DATA_DIR \
+ + '/test_sig.dtb'
+ u_boot_console.restart_uboot()
+
+ capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
+ 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early')
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1-b, after reboot'):
+ if not capsule_early:
+ # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables
+ # are not available.
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'env set dfu_alt_info '
+ '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 '
+ '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
+ assert 'Test11' in ''.join(output)
+
+ # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command(
+ 'env print -e Capsule0000')
+
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
+ assert 'Test11' not in ''.join(output)
+
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'sf probe 0:0',
+ 'sf read 4000000 100000 10',
+ 'md.b 4000000 10'])
+ assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)
+
+ def test_efi_capsule_auth2(
+ self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data):
+ """
+ Test Case 2 - Update U-Boot on SPI Flash, raw image format
+ 0x100000-0x150000: U-Boot binary (but dummy)
+
+ If the capsule is signed but with an invalid key,
+ the authentication should fail and the firmware
+ not be updated.
+ """
+ disk_img = efi_capsule_data
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2-a, before reboot'):
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi',
+ 'efidebug boot order 1',
+ 'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004',
+ 'env set dfu_alt_info '
+ '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 '
+ '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
+ 'env save'])
+
+ # initialize content
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'sf probe 0:0',
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old'
+ % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
+ 'sf write 4000000 100000 10',
+ 'sf read 5000000 100000 10',
+ 'md.b 5000000 10'])
+ assert 'Old' in ''.join(output)
+
+ # place a capsule file
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test12' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
+ 'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test12 $filesize'
+ % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR,
+ 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
+ assert 'Test12' in ''.join(output)
+
+ # reboot
+ mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/test_efi_capsule'
+ u_boot_console.config.dtb = mnt_point + CAPSULE_DATA_DIR \
+ + '/test_sig.dtb'
+ u_boot_console.restart_uboot()
+
+ capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
+ 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early')
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2-b, after reboot'):
+ if not capsule_early:
+ # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables
+ # are not available.
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'env set dfu_alt_info '
+ '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 '
+ '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
+ assert 'Test12' in ''.join(output)
+
+ # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command(
+ 'env print -e Capsule0000')
+
+ # deleted any way
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
+ assert 'Test12' not in ''.join(output)
+
+ # TODO: check CapsuleStatus in CapsuleXXXX
+
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'sf probe 0:0',
+ 'sf read 4000000 100000 10',
+ 'md.b 4000000 10'])
+ assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output)
+
+ def test_efi_capsule_auth3(
+ self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data):
+ """
+ Test Case 3 - Update U-Boot on SPI Flash, raw image format
+ 0x100000-0x150000: U-Boot binary (but dummy)
+
+ If the capsule is not signed, the authentication
+ should fail and the firmware not be updated.
+ """
+ disk_img = efi_capsule_data
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3-a, before reboot'):
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi',
+ 'efidebug boot order 1',
+ 'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004',
+ 'env set dfu_alt_info '
+ '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 '
+ '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
+ 'env save'])
+
+ # initialize content
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'sf probe 0:0',
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old'
+ % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
+ 'sf write 4000000 100000 10',
+ 'sf read 5000000 100000 10',
+ 'md.b 5000000 10'])
+ assert 'Old' in ''.join(output)
+
+ # place a capsule file
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test02' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
+ 'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test02 $filesize'
+ % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR,
+ 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
+ assert 'Test02' in ''.join(output)
+
+ # reboot
+ mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/test_efi_capsule'
+ u_boot_console.config.dtb = mnt_point + CAPSULE_DATA_DIR \
+ + '/test_sig.dtb'
+ u_boot_console.restart_uboot()
+
+ capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
+ 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early')
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3-b, after reboot'):
+ if not capsule_early:
+ # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables
+ # are not available.
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'env set dfu_alt_info '
+ '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 '
+ '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
+ assert 'Test02' in ''.join(output)
+
+ # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command(
+ 'env print -e Capsule0000')
+
+ # deleted any way
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
+ assert 'Test02' not in ''.join(output)
+
+ # TODO: check CapsuleStatus in CapsuleXXXX
+
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'sf probe 0:0',
+ 'sf read 4000000 100000 10',
+ 'md.b 4000000 10'])
+ assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output)
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 07/12] tools: mkeficapsule: allow for specifying GUID explicitly
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 06/12] test/py: efi_capsule: add image authentication test AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 08/12] test/py: efi_capsule: align with the syntax change of mkeficapsule AKASHI Takahiro
` (4 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
The existing options, "--fit" and "--raw," are only used to put a proper
GUID in a capsule header, where GUID identifies a particular FMP (Firmware
Management Protocol) driver which then would handle the firmware binary in
a capsule. In fact, mkeficapsule does the exact same job in creating
a capsule file whatever the firmware binary type is.
To prepare for the future extension, the command syntax will be a bit
modified to allow users to specify arbitrary GUID for their own FMP driver.
OLD:
[--fit <image> | --raw <image>] <capsule file>
NEW:
[--fit | --raw | --guid <guid-string>] <image> <capsule file>
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst | 4 +-
doc/mkeficapsule.1 | 26 +++++++++----
tools/mkeficapsule.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst
index 864d61734bee..54fefd76f0f5 100644
--- a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst
+++ b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst
@@ -367,8 +367,8 @@ and used by the steps highlighted below.
--private-key CRT.key \
--certificate CRT.crt \
--index 1 --instance 0 \
- [--fit <FIT image> | --raw <raw image>] \
- <capsule_file_name>
+ [--fit | --raw | --guid <guid-string] \
+ <image_blob> <capsule_file_name>
4. Insert the signature list into a device tree in the following format::
diff --git a/doc/mkeficapsule.1 b/doc/mkeficapsule.1
index 837e09ab451e..312e8a8b3188 100644
--- a/doc/mkeficapsule.1
+++ b/doc/mkeficapsule.1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ mkeficapsule \- Generate EFI capsule file for U-Boot
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B mkeficapsule
-.RB [\fIoptions\fP] " \fIcapsule-file\fP"
+.RB [\fIoptions\fP] " \fIimage-blob\fP \fIcapsule-file\fP"
.SH "DESCRIPTION"
The
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Optionally, a capsule file can be signed with a given private key.
In this case, the update will be authenticated by verifying the signature
before applying.
-\fBmkeficapsule\fP supports two different format of image files:
+\fBmkeficapsule\fP takes any type of image files, including:
.TP
.I raw image
format is a single binary blob of any type of firmware.
@@ -33,16 +33,28 @@ is the same as used in the new \fIuImage\fP format and allows for
multiple binary blobs in a single capsule file.
This type of image file can be generated by \fBmkimage\fP.
+.PP
+If you want to use other types than above two, you should explicitly
+specify a guid for the FMP driver.
+
.SH "OPTIONS"
-One of \fB--fit\fP or \fB--raw\fP option must be specified.
+One of \fB--fit\fP, \fB--raw\fP or \fB--guid\fP option must be specified.
.TP
-.BI "-f, --fit \fIfit-image-file\fP"
-Specify a FIT image file
+.BI "-f, --fit
+Indicate that the blob is a FIT image file
.TP
-.BI "-r, --raw \fIraw-image-file\fP"
-Specify a raw image file
+.BI "-r, --raw
+Indicate that the blob is a raw image file
+
+.TP
+.BI "-g, --guid \fIguid-string\fP"
+Specify guid for image blob type. The format is:
+ xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
+
+The first three elements are in little endian, while the rest
+is in big endian.
.TP
.BI "-i, --index \fIindex\fP"
diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
index 086757ee8ad7..94c640bbddce 100644
--- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c
+++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
-
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
#include <linux/kconfig.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
@@ -51,14 +51,15 @@ efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw =
efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
-static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:p:c:m:dh";
+static const char *opts_short = "frg:i:I:v:p:c:m:dh";
#else
-static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:h";
+static const char *opts_short = "frg:i:I:v:h";
#endif
static struct option options[] = {
- {"fit", required_argument, NULL, 'f'},
- {"raw", required_argument, NULL, 'r'},
+ {"fit", no_argument, NULL, 'f'},
+ {"raw", no_argument, NULL, 'r'},
+ {"guid", required_argument, NULL, 'g'},
{"index", required_argument, NULL, 'i'},
{"instance", required_argument, NULL, 'I'},
#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
@@ -73,11 +74,12 @@ static struct option options[] = {
static void print_usage(void)
{
- printf("Usage: %s [options] <output file>\n"
+ printf("Usage: %s [options] <image blob> <output file>\n"
"Options:\n"
- "\t-f, --fit <fit image> new FIT image file\n"
- "\t-r, --raw <raw image> new raw image file\n"
+ "\t-f, --fit FIT image type\n"
+ "\t-r, --raw raw image type\n"
+ "\t-g, --guid <guid string> guid for image blob type\n"
"\t-i, --index <index> update image index\n"
"\t-I, --instance <instance> update hardware instance\n"
#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
@@ -572,6 +574,37 @@ err:
return ret;
}
+/**
+ * convert_uuid_to_guid() - convert uuid string to guid string
+ * @buf: String for UUID
+ *
+ * UUID and GUID have the same data structure, but their string
+ * formats are different due to the endianness. See lib/uuid.c.
+ * Since uuid_parse() can handle only UUID, this function must
+ * be called to get correct data for GUID when parsing a string.
+ *
+ * The correct data will be returned in @buf.
+ */
+void convert_uuid_to_guid(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+
+ c = buf[0];
+ buf[0] = buf[3];
+ buf[3] = c;
+ c = buf[1];
+ buf[1] = buf[2];
+ buf[2] = c;
+
+ c = buf[4];
+ buf[4] = buf[5];
+ buf[5] = c;
+
+ c = buf[6];
+ buf[6] = buf[7];
+ buf[7] = c;
+}
+
/**
* main - main entry function of mkeficapsule
* @argc: Number of arguments
@@ -586,14 +619,13 @@ err:
*/
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- char *file;
efi_guid_t *guid;
+ unsigned char uuid_buf[16];
unsigned long index, instance;
uint64_t mcount;
char *privkey_file, *cert_file;
int c, idx;
- file = NULL;
guid = NULL;
index = 0;
instance = 0;
@@ -608,21 +640,31 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
switch (c) {
case 'f':
- if (file) {
- printf("Image already specified\n");
+ if (guid) {
+ printf("Image type already specified\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
- file = optarg;
guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit;
break;
case 'r':
- if (file) {
- printf("Image already specified\n");
+ if (guid) {
+ printf("Image type already specified\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
- file = optarg;
guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw;
break;
+ case 'g':
+ if (guid) {
+ printf("Image type already specified\n");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ if (uuid_parse(optarg, uuid_buf)) {
+ printf("Wrong guid format\n");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ convert_uuid_to_guid(uuid_buf);
+ guid = (efi_guid_t *)uuid_buf;
+ break;
case 'i':
index = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0);
break;
@@ -658,14 +700,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
}
/* check necessary parameters */
- if ((argc != optind + 1) || !file ||
+ if ((argc != optind + 2) || !guid ||
((privkey_file && !cert_file) ||
(!privkey_file && cert_file))) {
print_usage();
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
- if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance,
+ if (create_fwbin(argv[argc - 1], argv[argc - 2], guid, index, instance,
mcount, privkey_file, cert_file) < 0) {
printf("Creating firmware capsule failed\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 08/12] test/py: efi_capsule: align with the syntax change of mkeficapsule
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 07/12] tools: mkeficapsule: allow for specifying GUID explicitly AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 09/12] test/py: efi_capsule: add a test for "--guid" option AKASHI Takahiro
` (3 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
Since the syntax of mkeficapsule was changed in the previous commit,
we need to modify command line arguments in a pytest script.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py
index 27c05971ca32..a5a25c53dcb4 100644
--- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py
@@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config):
check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkimage -f uboot_bin_env.its uboot_bin_env.itb' %
(data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir),
shell=True)
- check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --fit uboot_bin_env.itb --index 1 Test01' %
+ check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --fit uboot_bin_env.itb Test01' %
(data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir),
shell=True)
- check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --raw u-boot.bin.new --index 1 Test02' %
+ check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --raw u-boot.bin.new Test02' %
(data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir),
shell=True)
if capsule_auth_enabled:
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 09/12] test/py: efi_capsule: add a test for "--guid" option
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 08/12] test/py: efi_capsule: align with the syntax change of mkeficapsule AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 10/12] test/py: efi_capsule: check the results in case of CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE AKASHI Takahiro
` (2 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
This test scenario tests a new feature of mkeficapsule, "--guid" option,
which allows us to specify FMP driver's guid explicitly at the command
line.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 3 +
.../test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py | 67 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 70 insertions(+)
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py
index a5a25c53dcb4..9076087a12b7 100644
--- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py
@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config):
check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --raw u-boot.bin.new Test02' %
(data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir),
shell=True)
+ check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --guid E2BB9C06-70E9-4B14-97A3-5A7913176E3F u-boot.bin.new Test03' %
+ (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir),
+ shell=True)
if capsule_auth_enabled:
# firmware signed with proper key
check_call('cd %s; '
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py
index 9eeaae27d626..9cc973560fa1 100644
--- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py
@@ -247,3 +247,70 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object):
'sf read 4000000 100000 10',
'md.b 4000000 10'])
assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)
+
+ def test_efi_capsule_fw4(
+ self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data):
+ """
+ Test Case 4 - Test "--guid" option of mkeficapsule
+ The test scenario is the same as Case 3.
+ """
+ disk_img = efi_capsule_data
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 4-a, before reboot'):
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi -s ""',
+ 'efidebug boot order 1',
+ 'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004',
+ 'env set dfu_alt_info "sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
+ 'env save'])
+
+ # initialize content
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'sf probe 0:0',
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
+ 'sf write 4000000 100000 10',
+ 'sf read 5000000 100000 10',
+ 'md.b 5000000 10'])
+ assert 'Old' in ''.join(output)
+
+ # place a capsule file
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test03' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
+ 'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test03 $filesize' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR,
+ 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
+ assert 'Test03' in ''.join(output)
+
+ # reboot
+ u_boot_console.restart_uboot()
+
+ capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
+ 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early')
+ with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 4-b, after reboot'):
+ if not capsule_early:
+ # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables
+ # are not available.
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'env set dfu_alt_info "sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
+ assert 'Test03' in ''.join(output)
+
+ # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command(
+ 'env print -e Capsule0000')
+
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list(['efidebug capsule esrt'])
+
+ # ensure that EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID is in the ESRT.
+ assert 'E2BB9C06-70E9-4B14-97A3-5A7913176E3F' in ''.join(output)
+
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
+ 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
+ assert 'Test03' not in ''.join(output)
+
+ output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
+ 'sf probe 0:0',
+ 'sf read 4000000 100000 10',
+ 'md.b 4000000 10'])
+ assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 10/12] test/py: efi_capsule: check the results in case of CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 09/12] test/py: efi_capsule: add a test for "--guid" option AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 11/12] (RFC) tools: add fdtsig.sh AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 12/12] (RFC) efi_loader, dts: add public keys for capsules to device tree AKASHI Takahiro
11 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
Before the capsule authentication is supported, this test script works
correctly, but with the feature enabled, most tests will fail due to
unsigned capsules.
So check the results depending on CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE or not.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
.../test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py | 26 ++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py
index 9cc973560fa1..6e803f699f2f 100644
--- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py
@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object):
capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early')
+ capsule_auth = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
+ 'config_efi_capsule_authenticate')
with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2-b, after reboot'):
if not capsule_early:
# make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables
@@ -171,12 +173,18 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object):
'sf probe 0:0',
'sf read 4000000 100000 10',
'md.b 4000000 10'])
- assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)
+ if capsule_auth:
+ assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output)
+ else:
+ assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)
output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
'sf read 4000000 150000 10',
'md.b 4000000 10'])
- assert 'u-boot-env:New' in ''.join(output)
+ if capsule_auth:
+ assert 'u-boot-env:Old' in ''.join(output)
+ else:
+ assert 'u-boot-env:New' in ''.join(output)
def test_efi_capsule_fw3(
self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data):
@@ -215,6 +223,8 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object):
capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early')
+ capsule_auth = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
+ 'config_efi_capsule_authenticate')
with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3-b, after reboot'):
if not capsule_early:
# make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables
@@ -246,7 +256,10 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object):
'sf probe 0:0',
'sf read 4000000 100000 10',
'md.b 4000000 10'])
- assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)
+ if capsule_auth:
+ assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output)
+ else:
+ assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)
def test_efi_capsule_fw4(
self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data):
@@ -285,6 +298,8 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object):
capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early')
+ capsule_auth = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
+ 'config_efi_capsule_authenticate')
with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 4-b, after reboot'):
if not capsule_early:
# make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables
@@ -313,4 +328,7 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object):
'sf probe 0:0',
'sf read 4000000 100000 10',
'md.b 4000000 10'])
- assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)
+ if capsule_auth:
+ assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output)
+ else:
+ assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 11/12] (RFC) tools: add fdtsig.sh
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 10/12] test/py: efi_capsule: check the results in case of CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 12/12] (RFC) efi_loader, dts: add public keys for capsules to device tree AKASHI Takahiro
11 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
With this script, a public key is added to a device tree blob
as the default efi_get_public_key_data() expects.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
MAINTAINERS | 1 +
tools/fdtsig.sh | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
create mode 100755 tools/fdtsig.sh
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 569332db4719..860f58ef6640 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -738,6 +738,7 @@ F: cmd/bootefi.c
F: cmd/efidebug.c
F: cmd/nvedit_efi.c
F: tools/efivar.py
+F: tools/fdtsig.sh
F: tools/file2include.c
F: tools/mkeficapsule.c
diff --git a/tools/fdtsig.sh b/tools/fdtsig.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..c2b2a6dc5ec8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/fdtsig.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+#
+# script to add a certificate (efi-signature-list) to dtb blob
+
+usage() {
+ if [ -n "$*" ]; then
+ echo "ERROR: $*"
+ fi
+ echo "Usage: "$(basename $0) " <esl file> <dtb file>"
+}
+
+if [ "$#" -ne 2 ]; then
+ usage "Arguments missing"
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+ESL=$1
+DTB=$2
+NEW_DTB=$(basename $DTB)_tmp
+SIG=signature
+
+cat << 'EOF' > $SIG.dts
+/dts-v1/;
+/plugin/;
+
+&{/} {
+ signature {
+EOF
+echo "capsule-key = /incbin/(\"$ESL\");" >> $SIG.dts
+cat << 'EOF' >> $SIG.dts
+ };
+};
+EOF
+
+dtc -@ -I dts -O dtb -o $SIG.dtbo $SIG.dts
+fdtoverlay -i $DTB -o $NEW_DTB $SIG.dtbo
+mv $NEW_DTB $DTB
+
+rm $SIG.dts $SIG.dtsn $SIG.dtbo
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 12/12] (RFC) efi_loader, dts: add public keys for capsules to device tree
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 11/12] (RFC) tools: add fdtsig.sh AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 0:55 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
11 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xypron.glpk, agraf, sjg
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot,
AKASHI Takahiro
By specifying CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH, the build process will
automatically insert the given key into the device tree.
Otherwise, users are required to do so manually, possibly, with
the utility script, fdtsig.sh.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst | 4 ++++
dts/Makefile | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 7 +++++++
3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst
index 54fefd76f0f5..7f85b9e5a4a6 100644
--- a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst
+++ b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst
@@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ following config, in addition to the configs listed above for capsule
update::
CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y
+ CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH=<path to .esl cert>
The public and private keys used for the signing process are generated
and used by the steps highlighted below.
@@ -392,6 +393,9 @@ and used by the steps highlighted below.
};
};
+ If CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH is specified, the build process will
+ take care of it for you.
+
Executing the boot manager
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
diff --git a/dts/Makefile b/dts/Makefile
index cb3111382959..6c5486719ecd 100644
--- a/dts/Makefile
+++ b/dts/Makefile
@@ -20,11 +20,30 @@ $(obj)/dt-$(SPL_NAME).dtb: dts/dt.dtb $(objtree)/tools/fdtgrep FORCE
mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(call if_changed,fdtgrep)
+quiet_cmd_fdtsig = FDTSIG $@
+ cmd_fdtsig = \
+ cat $< > $@; \
+ $(srctree)/tools/fdtsig.sh \
+ $(patsubst "%",%,$(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH)) $@
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE),y)
+ifneq ($(patsubst "%",%,$(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH)),)
+DTB_ov := $(obj)/dt.dtb_ov
+
+$(obj)/dt.dtb_ov: $(DTB) FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,fdtsig)
+else
+DTB_ov := $(DTB)
+endif
+else
+DTB_ov := $(DTB)
+endif
+
ifeq ($(CONFIG_OF_DTB_PROPS_REMOVE),y)
-$(obj)/dt.dtb: $(DTB) $(objtree)/tools/fdtgrep FORCE
+$(obj)/dt.dtb: $(DTB_ov) $(objtree)/tools/fdtgrep FORCE
$(call if_changed,fdt_rm_props)
else
-$(obj)/dt.dtb: $(DTB) FORCE
+$(obj)/dt.dtb: $(DTB_ov) FORCE
$(call if_changed,shipped)
endif
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
index 52f71c07c991..d12b1e56ae80 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
@@ -208,6 +208,13 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
Select this option if you want to enable capsule
authentication
+config EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH
+ string "Path to .esl cert for capsule authentication"
+ depends on EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
+ help
+ Provide the EFI signature list (esl) certificate used for capsule
+ authentication
+
config EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TO_TEXT
bool "Device path to text protocol"
default y
--
2.33.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 02/12] tools: mkeficapsule: rework the code a little bit
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 02/12] tools: mkeficapsule: rework the code a little bit AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 14:57 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-07 6:35 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
1 sibling, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2021-11-02 14:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: AKASHI Takahiro
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt, Alex Graf, Ilias Apalodimas, Sughosh Ganu,
Masami Hiramatsu, U-Boot Mailing List
On Mon, 1 Nov 2021 at 18:55, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> Abstract common routines to make the code easily understandable.
> No functional change.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> ---
> tools/mkeficapsule.c | 219 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
> 1 file changed, 155 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 07/12] tools: mkeficapsule: allow for specifying GUID explicitly
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 07/12] tools: mkeficapsule: allow for specifying GUID explicitly AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-04 2:12 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2021-11-02 14:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: AKASHI Takahiro
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt, Alex Graf, Ilias Apalodimas, Sughosh Ganu,
Masami Hiramatsu, U-Boot Mailing List
Hi Takahiro,
On Mon, 1 Nov 2021 at 18:56, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> The existing options, "--fit" and "--raw," are only used to put a proper
> GUID in a capsule header, where GUID identifies a particular FMP (Firmware
> Management Protocol) driver which then would handle the firmware binary in
> a capsule. In fact, mkeficapsule does the exact same job in creating
> a capsule file whatever the firmware binary type is.
>
> To prepare for the future extension, the command syntax will be a bit
> modified to allow users to specify arbitrary GUID for their own FMP driver.
> OLD:
> [--fit <image> | --raw <image>] <capsule file>
> NEW:
> [--fit | --raw | --guid <guid-string>] <image> <capsule file>
Do these drivers have names? A guid is not a very friendly thing to
have to provide.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> ---
> doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst | 4 +-
> doc/mkeficapsule.1 | 26 +++++++++----
> tools/mkeficapsule.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Regards,
Simon
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 08/12] test/py: efi_capsule: align with the syntax change of mkeficapsule
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 08/12] test/py: efi_capsule: align with the syntax change of mkeficapsule AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2021-11-02 14:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: AKASHI Takahiro
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt, Alex Graf, Ilias Apalodimas, Sughosh Ganu,
Masami Hiramatsu, U-Boot Mailing List
On Mon, 1 Nov 2021 at 18:56, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> Since the syntax of mkeficapsule was changed in the previous commit,
> we need to modify command line arguments in a pytest script.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> ---
> test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 10/12] test/py: efi_capsule: check the results in case of CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 10/12] test/py: efi_capsule: check the results in case of CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2021-11-02 14:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: AKASHI Takahiro
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt, Alex Graf, Ilias Apalodimas, Sughosh Ganu,
Masami Hiramatsu, U-Boot Mailing List
On Mon, 1 Nov 2021 at 18:56, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> Before the capsule authentication is supported, this test script works
> correctly, but with the feature enabled, most tests will fail due to
> unsigned capsules.
> So check the results depending on CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE or not.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> ---
> .../test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py | 26 ++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 12/12] (RFC) efi_loader, dts: add public keys for capsules to device tree
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 12/12] (RFC) efi_loader, dts: add public keys for capsules to device tree AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-04 2:17 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2021-11-02 14:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: AKASHI Takahiro
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt, Alex Graf, Ilias Apalodimas, Sughosh Ganu,
Masami Hiramatsu, U-Boot Mailing List
Hi Takahiro,
On Mon, 1 Nov 2021 at 18:56, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> By specifying CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH, the build process will
> automatically insert the given key into the device tree.
> Otherwise, users are required to do so manually, possibly, with
> the utility script, fdtsig.sh.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> ---
> doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst | 4 ++++
> dts/Makefile | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
> lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 7 +++++++
> 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
I'd like to explore how binman could handle this, perhaps by calling
the capsule tool you have written. What do you think?
Regards,
Simon
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 06/12] test/py: efi_capsule: add image authentication test
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 06/12] test/py: efi_capsule: add image authentication test AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-02 16:15 ` Ilias Apalodimas
0 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2021-11-02 14:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: AKASHI Takahiro
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt, Alex Graf, Ilias Apalodimas, Sughosh Ganu,
Masami Hiramatsu, U-Boot Mailing List
On Mon, 1 Nov 2021 at 18:56, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> Add a couple of test cases against capsule image authentication
> for capsule-on-disk, where only a signed capsule file with the verified
> signature will be applied to the system.
>
> Due to the difficulty of embedding a public key (esl file) in U-Boot
> binary during pytest setup time, all the keys/certificates are pre-created.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> ---
> .../py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py | 5 +
> test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 52 +++-
> test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts | 10 +
> .../test_capsule_firmware_signed.py | 254 ++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts
> create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 06/12] test/py: efi_capsule: add image authentication test
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
@ 2021-11-02 16:15 ` Ilias Apalodimas
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Ilias Apalodimas @ 2021-11-02 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Simon Glass
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro, Heinrich Schuchardt, Alex Graf, Sughosh Ganu,
Masami Hiramatsu, U-Boot Mailing List
On Tue, 2 Nov 2021 at 16:58, Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 1 Nov 2021 at 18:56, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > Add a couple of test cases against capsule image authentication
> > for capsule-on-disk, where only a signed capsule file with the verified
> > signature will be applied to the system.
> >
> > Due to the difficulty of embedding a public key (esl file) in U-Boot
> > binary during pytest setup time, all the keys/certificates are pre-created.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> > ---
> > .../py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py | 5 +
> > test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 52 +++-
> > test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts | 10 +
> > .../test_capsule_firmware_signed.py | 254 ++++++++++++++++++
> > 4 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts
> > create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py
>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 07/12] tools: mkeficapsule: allow for specifying GUID explicitly
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
@ 2021-11-04 2:12 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-04 2:49 ` Simon Glass
0 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-04 2:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Simon Glass
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt, Alex Graf, Ilias Apalodimas, Sughosh Ganu,
Masami Hiramatsu, U-Boot Mailing List
On Tue, Nov 02, 2021 at 08:58:18AM -0600, Simon Glass wrote:
> Hi Takahiro,
>
> On Mon, 1 Nov 2021 at 18:56, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > The existing options, "--fit" and "--raw," are only used to put a proper
> > GUID in a capsule header, where GUID identifies a particular FMP (Firmware
> > Management Protocol) driver which then would handle the firmware binary in
> > a capsule. In fact, mkeficapsule does the exact same job in creating
> > a capsule file whatever the firmware binary type is.
> >
> > To prepare for the future extension, the command syntax will be a bit
> > modified to allow users to specify arbitrary GUID for their own FMP driver.
> > OLD:
> > [--fit <image> | --raw <image>] <capsule file>
> > NEW:
> > [--fit | --raw | --guid <guid-string>] <image> <capsule file>
>
> Do these drivers have names?
No, even there is no driver in the upstream tree.
> A guid is not a very friendly thing to
> have to provide.
This feature is expected to be used when a user wants to have his own
custom capsule format, yet using the existing command binary.
It will be very much so when loading a FMP (firmware management
protocol) driver dynamically will be supported in the future.
-Takahiro Akashi
> >
> > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> > ---
> > doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst | 4 +-
> > doc/mkeficapsule.1 | 26 +++++++++----
> > tools/mkeficapsule.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> > 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
> >
>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
>
> Regards,
> Simon
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 12/12] (RFC) efi_loader, dts: add public keys for capsules to device tree
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
@ 2021-11-04 2:17 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-04 2:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Simon Glass
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt, Alex Graf, Ilias Apalodimas, Sughosh Ganu,
Masami Hiramatsu, U-Boot Mailing List
On Tue, Nov 02, 2021 at 08:58:30AM -0600, Simon Glass wrote:
> Hi Takahiro,
>
> On Mon, 1 Nov 2021 at 18:56, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > By specifying CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH, the build process will
> > automatically insert the given key into the device tree.
> > Otherwise, users are required to do so manually, possibly, with
> > the utility script, fdtsig.sh.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> > ---
> > doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst | 4 ++++
> > dts/Makefile | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
> > lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 7 +++++++
> > 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> I'd like to explore how binman could handle this, perhaps by calling
> the capsule tool you have written. What do you think?
Please do so if you like :)
-Takahiro Akashi
> Regards,
> Simon
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 07/12] tools: mkeficapsule: allow for specifying GUID explicitly
2021-11-04 2:12 ` AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-04 2:49 ` Simon Glass
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2021-11-04 2:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: AKASHI Takahiro, Simon Glass, Heinrich Schuchardt, Alex Graf,
Ilias Apalodimas, Sughosh Ganu, Masami Hiramatsu,
U-Boot Mailing List
On Wed, 3 Nov 2021 at 20:12, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 02, 2021 at 08:58:18AM -0600, Simon Glass wrote:
> > Hi Takahiro,
> >
> > On Mon, 1 Nov 2021 at 18:56, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > The existing options, "--fit" and "--raw," are only used to put a proper
> > > GUID in a capsule header, where GUID identifies a particular FMP (Firmware
> > > Management Protocol) driver which then would handle the firmware binary in
> > > a capsule. In fact, mkeficapsule does the exact same job in creating
> > > a capsule file whatever the firmware binary type is.
> > >
> > > To prepare for the future extension, the command syntax will be a bit
> > > modified to allow users to specify arbitrary GUID for their own FMP driver.
> > > OLD:
> > > [--fit <image> | --raw <image>] <capsule file>
> > > NEW:
> > > [--fit | --raw | --guid <guid-string>] <image> <capsule file>
> >
> > Do these drivers have names?
>
> No, even there is no driver in the upstream tree.
>
> > A guid is not a very friendly thing to
> > have to provide.
>
> This feature is expected to be used when a user wants to have his own
> custom capsule format, yet using the existing command binary.
> It will be very much so when loading a FMP (firmware management
> protocol) driver dynamically will be supported in the future.
OMG
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 02/12] tools: mkeficapsule: rework the code a little bit
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 02/12] tools: mkeficapsule: rework the code a little bit AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:57 ` Simon Glass
@ 2021-11-07 6:35 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2021-11-08 4:18 ` AKASHI Takahiro
1 sibling, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Heinrich Schuchardt @ 2021-11-07 6:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: AKASHI Takahiro
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot, agraf, sjg
On 11/2/21 01:55, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> Abstract common routines to make the code easily understandable.
> No functional change.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
> ---
> tools/mkeficapsule.c | 219 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
> 1 file changed, 155 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
> index 4995ba4e0c2a..8427fedd941c 100644
> --- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c
> +++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
> @@ -61,17 +61,117 @@ static void print_usage(void)
> tool_name);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * read_bin_file - read a firmware binary file
> + * @bin: Path to a firmware binary file
> + * @data: Pointer to pointer of allocated buffer
> + * @bin_size: Size of allocated buffer
> + *
> + * Read out a content of binary, @bin, into @data.
> + * A caller should free @data.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * 0 - on success
> + * * -1 - on failure
> + */
> +static int read_bin_file(char *bin, void **data, off_t *bin_size)
> +{
> + FILE *g;
> + struct stat bin_stat;
> + void *buf;
> + size_t size;
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + g = fopen(bin, "r");
> + if (!g) {
> + printf("cannot open %s\n", bin);
> + return -1;
> + }
> + if (stat(bin, &bin_stat) < 0) {
> + printf("cannot determine the size of %s\n", bin);
> + ret = -1;
> + goto err;
> + }
> + buf = malloc(bin_stat.st_size);
bin_stat.st_size is of type off_t which is a 64bit type if the operating
system supports file sizes exceeding 4 GiB.
malloc() expects a size_t argument. You should check for an overflow
here before casting from 64bit to 32bit on a 32bit system.
> + if (!buf) {
> + printf("cannot allocate memory: %zx\n",
> + (size_t)bin_stat.st_size);
> + ret = -1;
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + size = fread(buf, 1, bin_stat.st_size, g);
> + if (size < bin_stat.st_size) {
> + printf("read failed (%zx)\n", size);
> + ret = -1;
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + *data = buf;
> + *bin_size = bin_stat.st_size;
> +err:
> + fclose(g);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * write_capsule_file - write a capsule file
> + * @bin: FILE stream
> + * @data: Pointer to data
> + * @bin_size: Size of data
> + *
> + * Write out data, @data, with the size @bin_size.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * 0 - on success
> + * * -1 - on failure
> + */
> +static int write_capsule_file(FILE *f, void *data, size_t size, const char *msg)
> +{
> + size_t size_written;
> +
> + size_written = fwrite(data, 1, size, f);
> + if (size_written < size) {
> + printf("%s: write failed (%zx != %zx)\n", msg,
> + size_written, size);
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * create_fwbin - create an uefi capsule file
> + * @path: Path to a created capsule file
> + * @bin: Path to a firmware binary to encapsulate
> + * @guid: GUID of related FMP driver
> + * @index: Index number in capsule
> + * @instance: Instance number in capsule
> + * @mcount: Monotonic count in authentication information
> + * @private_file: Path to a private key file
> + * @cert_file: Path to a certificate file
> + *
> + * This function actually does the job of creating an uefi capsule file.
> + * All the arguments must be supplied.
> + * If either @private_file ror @cert_file is NULL, the capsule file
> + * won't be signed.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * 0 - on success
> + * * -1 - on failure
> + */
> static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> unsigned long index, unsigned long instance)
> {
> struct efi_capsule_header header;
> struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header capsule;
> struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header image;
> - FILE *f, *g;
> - struct stat bin_stat;
> - u8 *data;
> - size_t size;
> + FILE *f;
> + void *data;
> + off_t bin_size;
> u64 offset;
> + int ret;
>
> #ifdef DEBUG
> printf("For output: %s\n", path);
> @@ -79,25 +179,28 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> printf("\tindex: %ld\n\tinstance: %ld\n", index, instance);
> #endif
>
> - g = fopen(bin, "r");
> - if (!g) {
> - printf("cannot open %s\n", bin);
> - return -1;
> - }
> - if (stat(bin, &bin_stat) < 0) {
> - printf("cannot determine the size of %s\n", bin);
> - goto err_1;
> - }
> - data = malloc(bin_stat.st_size);
Please, check for overflow before casting from off_t to size_t.
Best regards
Heinrich
> - if (!data) {
> - printf("cannot allocate memory: %zx\n", (size_t)bin_stat.st_size);
> - goto err_1;
> - }
> + f = NULL;
> + data = NULL;
> + ret = -1;
> +
> + /*
> + * read a firmware binary
> + */
> + if (read_bin_file(bin, &data, &bin_size))
> + goto err;
> +
> + /*
> + * write a capsule file
> + */
> f = fopen(path, "w");
> if (!f) {
> printf("cannot open %s\n", path);
> - goto err_2;
> + goto err;
> }
> +
> + /*
> + * capsule file header
> + */
> header.capsule_guid = efi_guid_fm_capsule;
> header.header_size = sizeof(header);
> /* TODO: The current implementation ignores flags */
> @@ -105,70 +208,58 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> header.capsule_image_size = sizeof(header)
> + sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64)
> + sizeof(image)
> - + bin_stat.st_size;
> -
> - size = fwrite(&header, 1, sizeof(header), f);
> - if (size < sizeof(header)) {
> - printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
> - goto err_3;
> - }
> + + bin_size;
> + if (write_capsule_file(f, &header, sizeof(header),
> + "Capsule header"))
> + goto err;
>
> + /*
> + * firmware capsule header
> + * This capsule has only one firmware capsule image.
> + */
> capsule.version = 0x00000001;
> capsule.embedded_driver_count = 0;
> capsule.payload_item_count = 1;
> - size = fwrite(&capsule, 1, sizeof(capsule), f);
> - if (size < (sizeof(capsule))) {
> - printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
> - goto err_3;
> - }
> + if (write_capsule_file(f, &capsule, sizeof(capsule),
> + "Firmware capsule header"))
> + goto err;
> +
> offset = sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64);
> - size = fwrite(&offset, 1, sizeof(offset), f);
> - if (size < sizeof(offset)) {
> - printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
> - goto err_3;
> - }
> + if (write_capsule_file(f, &offset, sizeof(offset),
> + "Offset to capsule image"))
> + goto err;
>
> + /*
> + * firmware capsule image header
> + */
> image.version = 0x00000003;
> memcpy(&image.update_image_type_id, guid, sizeof(*guid));
> image.update_image_index = index;
> image.reserved[0] = 0;
> image.reserved[1] = 0;
> image.reserved[2] = 0;
> - image.update_image_size = bin_stat.st_size;
> + image.update_image_size = bin_size;
> image.update_vendor_code_size = 0; /* none */
> image.update_hardware_instance = instance;
> image.image_capsule_support = 0;
> + if (write_capsule_file(f, &image, sizeof(image),
> + "Firmware capsule image header"))
> + goto err;
>
> - size = fwrite(&image, 1, sizeof(image), f);
> - if (size < sizeof(image)) {
> - printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
> - goto err_3;
> - }
> - size = fread(data, 1, bin_stat.st_size, g);
> - if (size < bin_stat.st_size) {
> - printf("read failed (%zx)\n", size);
> - goto err_3;
> - }
> - size = fwrite(data, 1, bin_stat.st_size, f);
> - if (size < bin_stat.st_size) {
> - printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
> - goto err_3;
> - }
> -
> - fclose(f);
> - fclose(g);
> - free(data);
> -
> - return 0;
> + /*
> + * firmware binary
> + */
> + if (write_capsule_file(f, data, bin_size, "Firmware binary"))
> + goto err;
>
> -err_3:
> - fclose(f);
> -err_2:
> + ret = 0;
> +err:
> + if (f)
> + fclose(f);
> + free_sig_data(&auth_context);
> free(data);
> -err_1:
> - fclose(g);
>
> - return -1;
> + return ret;
> }
>
> /*
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 03/12] tools: mkeficapsule: add firmwware image signing
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 03/12] tools: mkeficapsule: add firmwware image signing AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2021-11-07 6:53 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2021-11-08 4:38 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Heinrich Schuchardt @ 2021-11-07 6:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: AKASHI Takahiro
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot, agraf, sjg
On 11/2/21 01:55, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> With this enhancement, mkeficapsule will be able to sign a capsule
> file when it is created. A signature added will be used later
> in the verification at FMP's SetImage() call.
>
> To do that, We need specify additional command parameters:
> -monotonic-cout <count> : monotonic count
> -private-key <private key file> : private key file
> -certificate <certificate file> : certificate file
> Only when all of those parameters are given, a signature will be added
> to a capsule file.
>
> Users are expected to maintain and increment the monotonic count at
> every time of the update for each firmware image.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
You licensed tools/mkeficapsule.c under GPL-2.0 which is imcompatible
with OpenSSL (https://www.gnu.org/licenses/license-list.html#OpenSSL).
Either agree with all contributors of the tool to use a more liberal
license or use another library.
> ---
> tools/Kconfig | 8 +
> tools/Makefile | 8 +-
> tools/mkeficapsule.c | 382 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 3 files changed, 376 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/Kconfig b/tools/Kconfig
> index 91ce8ae3e516..117c921da3fe 100644
> --- a/tools/Kconfig
> +++ b/tools/Kconfig
> @@ -90,4 +90,12 @@ config TOOLS_SHA512
> help
> Enable SHA512 support in the tools builds
>
> +config TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE
> + bool "Build efimkcapsule command"
> + default y if EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK
> + help
> + This command allows users to create a UEFI capsule file and,
> + optionally sign that file. If you want to enable UEFI capsule
> + update feature on your target, you certainly need this.
> +
> endmenu
> diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile
> index b45219e2c30c..5a73cc4b363d 100644
> --- a/tools/Makefile
> +++ b/tools/Makefile
> @@ -238,8 +238,12 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MIPS) += mips-relocs
> hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1_COMPILER) += asn1_compiler
> HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -idirafter $(srctree)/include
>
> -mkeficapsule-objs := mkeficapsule.o $(LIBFDT_OBJS)
> -hostprogs-$(CONFIG_EFI_HAVE_CAPSULE_SUPPORT) += mkeficapsule
> +HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += -luuid
> +ifeq ($(CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO),y)
> +HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += \
> + $(shell pkg-config --libs libssl libcrypto 2> /dev/null || echo "-lssl -lcrypto")
> +endif
> +hostprogs-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE) += mkeficapsule
>
> # We build some files with extra pedantic flags to try to minimize things
> # that won't build on some weird host compiler -- though there are lots of
> diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
> index 8427fedd941c..086757ee8ad7 100644
> --- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c
> +++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,16 @@
> #include <sys/stat.h>
> #include <sys/types.h>
>
> +#include <linux/kconfig.h>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
> +#include <openssl/asn1.h>
> +#include <openssl/bio.h>
> +#include <openssl/evp.h>
> +#include <openssl/err.h>
> +#include <openssl/pem.h>
> +#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
> +#endif
> +
> typedef __u8 u8;
> typedef __u16 u16;
> typedef __u32 u32;
> @@ -38,12 +48,25 @@ efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit =
> EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_FIT_GUID;
> efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw =
> EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID;
> +efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
> +static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:p:c:m:dh";
> +#else
> +static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:h";
> +#endif
>
> static struct option options[] = {
> {"fit", required_argument, NULL, 'f'},
> {"raw", required_argument, NULL, 'r'},
> {"index", required_argument, NULL, 'i'},
> {"instance", required_argument, NULL, 'I'},
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
> + {"private-key", required_argument, NULL, 'p'},
> + {"certificate", required_argument, NULL, 'c'},
> + {"monotonic-count", required_argument, NULL, 'm'},
> + {"dump-sig", no_argument, NULL, 'd'},
> +#endif
> {"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
> {NULL, 0, NULL, 0},
> };
> @@ -57,10 +80,252 @@ static void print_usage(void)
> "\t-r, --raw <raw image> new raw image file\n"
> "\t-i, --index <index> update image index\n"
> "\t-I, --instance <instance> update hardware instance\n"
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
> + "\t-p, --private-key <privkey file> private key file\n"
> + "\t-c, --certificate <cert file> signer's certificate file\n"
> + "\t-m, --monotonic-count <count> monotonic count\n"
> + "\t-d, --dump_sig dump signature (*.p7)\n"
> +#endif
> "\t-h, --help print a help message\n",
> tool_name);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * auth_context - authentication context
> + * @key_file: Path to a private key file
> + * @cert_file: Path to a certificate file
> + * @image_data: Pointer to firmware data
> + * @image_size: Size of firmware data
> + * @auth: Authentication header
> + * @sig_data: Signature data
> + * @sig_size: Size of signature data
> + *
> + * Data structure used in create_auth_data(). @key_file through
> + * @image_size are input parameters. @auth, @sig_data and @sig_size
> + * are filled in by create_auth_data().
> + */
> +struct auth_context {
> + char *key_file;
> + char *cert_file;
> + u8 *image_data;
> + size_t image_size;
> + struct efi_firmware_image_authentication auth;
> + u8 *sig_data;
> + size_t sig_size;
> +};
> +
> +static int dump_sig;
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
> +/**
> + * fileio-read_pkey - read out a private key
> + * @filename: Path to a private key file
> + *
> + * Read out a private key file and parse it into "EVP_PKEY" structure.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * Pointer to private key structure - on success
> + * * NULL - on failure
> + */
> +static EVP_PKEY *fileio_read_pkey(const char *filename)
> +{
> + EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
> + BIO *bio;
> +
> + bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
> + if (!bio)
> + goto out;
> +
> + key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
> +
> +out:
> + BIO_free_all(bio);
> + if (!key) {
> + printf("Can't load key from file '%s'\n", filename);
> + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
> + }
> +
> + return key;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * fileio-read_cert - read out a certificate
> + * @filename: Path to a certificate file
> + *
> + * Read out a certificate file and parse it into "X509" structure.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * Pointer to certificate structure - on success
> + * * NULL - on failure
> + */
> +static X509 *fileio_read_cert(const char *filename)
> +{
> + X509 *cert = NULL;
> + BIO *bio;
> +
> + bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
> + if (!bio)
> + goto out;
> +
> + cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
> +
> +out:
> + BIO_free_all(bio);
> + if (!cert) {
> + printf("Can't load certificate from file '%s'\n", filename);
> + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
> + }
> +
> + return cert;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * create_auth_data - compose authentication data in capsule
> + * @auth_context: Pointer to authentication context
> + *
> + * Fill up an authentication header (.auth) and signature data (.sig_data)
> + * in @auth_context, using library functions from openssl.
> + * All the parameters in @auth_context must be filled in by a caller.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * 0 - on success
> + * * -1 - on failure
> + */
> +static int create_auth_data(struct auth_context *ctx)
> +{
> + EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
> + X509 *cert = NULL;
> + BIO *data_bio = NULL;
> + const EVP_MD *md;
> + PKCS7 *p7;
> + int flags, ret = -1;
> +
> + OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
> + OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
> + ERR_load_crypto_strings();
> +
> + key = fileio_read_pkey(ctx->key_file);
> + if (!key)
> + goto err;
> + cert = fileio_read_cert(ctx->cert_file);
> + if (!cert)
> + goto err;
> +
> + /*
> + * create a BIO, containing:
> + * * firmware image
> + * * monotonic count
> + * in this order!
> + * See EDK2's FmpAuthenticatedHandlerRsa2048Sha256()
> + */
> + data_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
> + BIO_write(data_bio, ctx->image_data, ctx->image_size);
> + BIO_write(data_bio, &ctx->auth.monotonic_count,
> + sizeof(ctx->auth.monotonic_count));
> +
> + md = EVP_get_digestbyname("SHA256");
> + if (!md)
> + goto err;
> +
> + /* create signature */
> + /* TODO: maybe add PKCS7_NOATTR and PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP */
> + flags = PKCS7_BINARY | PKCS7_DETACHED;
> + p7 = PKCS7_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, data_bio, flags | PKCS7_PARTIAL);
> + if (!p7)
> + goto err;
> + if (!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, cert, key, md, flags))
> + goto err;
> + if (!PKCS7_final(p7, data_bio, flags))
> + goto err;
> +
> + /* convert pkcs7 into DER */
> + ctx->sig_data = NULL;
> + ctx->sig_size = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)p7, &ctx->sig_data,
> + ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7));
> + if (!ctx->sig_size)
> + goto err;
> +
> + /* fill auth_info */
> + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.dwLength = sizeof(ctx->auth.auth_info)
> + + ctx->sig_size;
> + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wRevision = WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0;
> + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;
> + memcpy(&ctx->auth.auth_info.cert_type, &efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7,
> + sizeof(efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7));
> +
> + ret = 0;
> +err:
> + BIO_free_all(data_bio);
> + EVP_PKEY_free(key);
> + X509_free(cert);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * dump_signature - dump out a signature
> + * @path: Path to a capsule file
> + * @signature: Signature data
> + * @sig_size: Size of signature data
> + *
> + * Signature data pointed to by @signature will be saved into
> + * a file whose file name is @path with ".p7" suffix.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * 0 - on success
> + * * -1 - on failure
> + */
> +static int dump_signature(const char *path, u8 *signature, size_t sig_size)
> +{
> + char *sig_path;
> + FILE *f;
> + size_t size;
> + int ret = -1;
> +
> + sig_path = malloc(strlen(path) + 3 + 1);
> + if (!sig_path)
> + return ret;
> +
> + sprintf(sig_path, "%s.p7", path);
> + f = fopen(sig_path, "w");
> + if (!f)
> + goto err;
> +
> + size = fwrite(signature, 1, sig_size, f);
> + if (size == sig_size)
> + ret = 0;
> +
> + fclose(f);
> +err:
> + free(sig_path);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * free_sig_data - free out signature data
> + * @ctx: Pointer to authentication context
> + *
> + * Free signature data allocated in create_auth_data().
> + */
> +static void free_sig_data(struct auth_context *ctx)
> +{
> + if (ctx->sig_size)
> + OPENSSL_free(ctx->sig_data);
> +}
> +#else
> +static int create_auth_data(struct auth_context *ctx)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int dump_signature(const char *path, u8 *signature, size_t sig_size)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void free_sig_data(struct auth_context *ctx) {}
> +#endif
> +
> /**
> * read_bin_file - read a firmware binary file
> * @bin: Path to a firmware binary file
> @@ -162,11 +427,13 @@ static int write_capsule_file(FILE *f, void *data, size_t size, const char *msg)
> * * -1 - on failure
> */
> static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> - unsigned long index, unsigned long instance)
> + unsigned long index, unsigned long instance,
> + uint64_t mcount, char *privkey_file, char *cert_file)
> {
> struct efi_capsule_header header;
> struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header capsule;
> struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header image;
> + struct auth_context auth_context;
> FILE *f;
> void *data;
> off_t bin_size;
> @@ -176,9 +443,9 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> #ifdef DEBUG
scripts/checkpatch.pl gives the following warning for this file:
Use 'if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG...))' instead of '#if or #ifdef' where possible.
Best regards
Heinrich
> printf("For output: %s\n", path);
> printf("\tbin: %s\n\ttype: %pUl\n", bin, guid);
> - printf("\tindex: %ld\n\tinstance: %ld\n", index, instance);
> + printf("\tindex: %lu\n\tinstance: %lu\n", index, instance);
> #endif
> -
> + auth_context.sig_size = 0;
> f = NULL;
> data = NULL;
> ret = -1;
> @@ -189,6 +456,27 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> if (read_bin_file(bin, &data, &bin_size))
> goto err;
>
> + /* first, calculate signature to determine its size */
> + if (privkey_file && cert_file) {
> + auth_context.key_file = privkey_file;
> + auth_context.cert_file = cert_file;
> + auth_context.auth.monotonic_count = mcount;
> + auth_context.image_data = data;
> + auth_context.image_size = bin_size;
> +
> + if (create_auth_data(&auth_context)) {
> + printf("Signing firmware image failed\n");
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + if (dump_sig &&
> + dump_signature(path, auth_context.sig_data,
> + auth_context.sig_size)) {
> + printf("Creating signature file failed\n");
> + goto err;
> + }
> + }
> +
> /*
> * write a capsule file
> */
> @@ -209,6 +497,9 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> + sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64)
> + sizeof(image)
> + bin_size;
> + if (auth_context.sig_size)
> + header.capsule_image_size += sizeof(auth_context.auth)
> + + auth_context.sig_size;
> if (write_capsule_file(f, &header, sizeof(header),
> "Capsule header"))
> goto err;
> @@ -239,13 +530,32 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> image.reserved[1] = 0;
> image.reserved[2] = 0;
> image.update_image_size = bin_size;
> + if (auth_context.sig_size)
> + image.update_image_size += sizeof(auth_context.auth)
> + + auth_context.sig_size;
> image.update_vendor_code_size = 0; /* none */
> image.update_hardware_instance = instance;
> image.image_capsule_support = 0;
> + if (auth_context.sig_size)
> + image.image_capsule_support |= CAPSULE_SUPPORT_AUTHENTICATION;
> if (write_capsule_file(f, &image, sizeof(image),
> "Firmware capsule image header"))
> goto err;
>
> + /*
> + * signature
> + */
> + if (auth_context.sig_size) {
> + if (write_capsule_file(f, &auth_context.auth,
> + sizeof(auth_context.auth),
> + "Authentication header"))
> + goto err;
> +
> + if (write_capsule_file(f, auth_context.sig_data,
> + auth_context.sig_size, "Signature"))
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> /*
> * firmware binary
> */
> @@ -262,23 +572,37 @@ err:
> return ret;
> }
>
> -/*
> - * Usage:
> - * $ mkeficapsule -f <firmware binary> <output file>
> +/**
> + * main - main entry function of mkeficapsule
> + * @argc: Number of arguments
> + * @argv: Array of pointers to arguments
> + *
> + * Create an uefi capsule file, optionally signing it.
> + * Parse all the arguments and pass them on to create_fwbin().
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * 0 - on success
> + * * -1 - on failure
> */
> int main(int argc, char **argv)
> {
> char *file;
> efi_guid_t *guid;
> unsigned long index, instance;
> + uint64_t mcount;
> + char *privkey_file, *cert_file;
> int c, idx;
>
> file = NULL;
> guid = NULL;
> index = 0;
> instance = 0;
> + mcount = 0;
> + privkey_file = NULL;
> + cert_file = NULL;
> + dump_sig = 0;
> for (;;) {
> - c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "f:r:i:I:v:h", options, &idx);
> + c = getopt_long(argc, argv, opts_short, options, &idx);
> if (c == -1)
> break;
>
> @@ -286,7 +610,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
> case 'f':
> if (file) {
> printf("Image already specified\n");
> - return -1;
> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> }
> file = optarg;
> guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit;
> @@ -294,7 +618,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
> case 'r':
> if (file) {
> printf("Image already specified\n");
> - return -1;
> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> }
> file = optarg;
> guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw;
> @@ -305,26 +629,44 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
> case 'I':
> instance = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0);
> break;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
> + case 'p':
> + if (privkey_file) {
> + printf("Private Key already specified\n");
> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + }
> + privkey_file = optarg;
> + break;
> + case 'c':
> + if (cert_file) {
> + printf("Certificate file already specified\n");
> + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> + }
> + cert_file = optarg;
> + break;
> + case 'm':
> + mcount = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0);
> + break;
> + case 'd':
> + dump_sig = 1;
> + break;
> +#endif /* CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO */
> case 'h':
> print_usage();
> - return 0;
> + exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
> }
> }
>
> - /* need an output file */
> - if (argc != optind + 1) {
> + /* check necessary parameters */
> + if ((argc != optind + 1) || !file ||
> + ((privkey_file && !cert_file) ||
> + (!privkey_file && cert_file))) {
> print_usage();
> exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> }
>
> - /* need a fit image file or raw image file */
> - if (!file) {
> - print_usage();
> - exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
> - }
> -
> - if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance)
> - < 0) {
> + if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance,
> + mcount, privkey_file, cert_file) < 0) {
> printf("Creating firmware capsule failed\n");
> exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> }
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 02/12] tools: mkeficapsule: rework the code a little bit
2021-11-07 6:35 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
@ 2021-11-08 4:18 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-08 4:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Heinrich Schuchardt
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot, agraf, sjg
On Sun, Nov 07, 2021 at 07:35:04AM +0100, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
> On 11/2/21 01:55, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> > Abstract common routines to make the code easily understandable.
> > No functional change.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
> > ---
> > tools/mkeficapsule.c | 219 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
> > 1 file changed, 155 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
> > index 4995ba4e0c2a..8427fedd941c 100644
> > --- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c
> > +++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
> > @@ -61,17 +61,117 @@ static void print_usage(void)
> > tool_name);
> > }
> >
> > +/**
> > + * read_bin_file - read a firmware binary file
> > + * @bin: Path to a firmware binary file
> > + * @data: Pointer to pointer of allocated buffer
> > + * @bin_size: Size of allocated buffer
> > + *
> > + * Read out a content of binary, @bin, into @data.
> > + * A caller should free @data.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * * 0 - on success
> > + * * -1 - on failure
> > + */
> > +static int read_bin_file(char *bin, void **data, off_t *bin_size)
> > +{
> > + FILE *g;
> > + struct stat bin_stat;
> > + void *buf;
> > + size_t size;
> > + int ret = 0;
> > +
> > + g = fopen(bin, "r");
> > + if (!g) {
> > + printf("cannot open %s\n", bin);
> > + return -1;
> > + }
> > + if (stat(bin, &bin_stat) < 0) {
> > + printf("cannot determine the size of %s\n", bin);
> > + ret = -1;
> > + goto err;
> > + }
> > + buf = malloc(bin_stat.st_size);
>
> bin_stat.st_size is of type off_t which is a 64bit type if the operating
> system supports file sizes exceeding 4 GiB.
>
> malloc() expects a size_t argument. You should check for an overflow
> here before casting from 64bit to 32bit on a 32bit system.
OK, will fix it.
-Takahiro Akashi
> > + if (!buf) {
> > + printf("cannot allocate memory: %zx\n",
> > + (size_t)bin_stat.st_size);
> > + ret = -1;
> > + goto err;
> > + }
> > +
> > + size = fread(buf, 1, bin_stat.st_size, g);
> > + if (size < bin_stat.st_size) {
> > + printf("read failed (%zx)\n", size);
> > + ret = -1;
> > + goto err;
> > + }
> > +
> > + *data = buf;
> > + *bin_size = bin_stat.st_size;
> > +err:
> > + fclose(g);
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * write_capsule_file - write a capsule file
> > + * @bin: FILE stream
> > + * @data: Pointer to data
> > + * @bin_size: Size of data
> > + *
> > + * Write out data, @data, with the size @bin_size.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * * 0 - on success
> > + * * -1 - on failure
> > + */
> > +static int write_capsule_file(FILE *f, void *data, size_t size, const char *msg)
> > +{
> > + size_t size_written;
> > +
> > + size_written = fwrite(data, 1, size, f);
> > + if (size_written < size) {
> > + printf("%s: write failed (%zx != %zx)\n", msg,
> > + size_written, size);
> > + return -1;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * create_fwbin - create an uefi capsule file
> > + * @path: Path to a created capsule file
> > + * @bin: Path to a firmware binary to encapsulate
> > + * @guid: GUID of related FMP driver
> > + * @index: Index number in capsule
> > + * @instance: Instance number in capsule
> > + * @mcount: Monotonic count in authentication information
> > + * @private_file: Path to a private key file
> > + * @cert_file: Path to a certificate file
> > + *
> > + * This function actually does the job of creating an uefi capsule file.
> > + * All the arguments must be supplied.
> > + * If either @private_file ror @cert_file is NULL, the capsule file
> > + * won't be signed.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * * 0 - on success
> > + * * -1 - on failure
> > + */
> > static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> > unsigned long index, unsigned long instance)
> > {
> > struct efi_capsule_header header;
> > struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header capsule;
> > struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header image;
> > - FILE *f, *g;
> > - struct stat bin_stat;
> > - u8 *data;
> > - size_t size;
> > + FILE *f;
> > + void *data;
> > + off_t bin_size;
> > u64 offset;
> > + int ret;
> >
> > #ifdef DEBUG
> > printf("For output: %s\n", path);
> > @@ -79,25 +179,28 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> > printf("\tindex: %ld\n\tinstance: %ld\n", index, instance);
> > #endif
> >
> > - g = fopen(bin, "r");
> > - if (!g) {
> > - printf("cannot open %s\n", bin);
> > - return -1;
> > - }
> > - if (stat(bin, &bin_stat) < 0) {
> > - printf("cannot determine the size of %s\n", bin);
> > - goto err_1;
> > - }
> > - data = malloc(bin_stat.st_size);
>
> Please, check for overflow before casting from off_t to size_t.
>
> Best regards
>
> Heinrich
>
> > - if (!data) {
> > - printf("cannot allocate memory: %zx\n", (size_t)bin_stat.st_size);
> > - goto err_1;
> > - }
> > + f = NULL;
> > + data = NULL;
> > + ret = -1;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * read a firmware binary
> > + */
> > + if (read_bin_file(bin, &data, &bin_size))
> > + goto err;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * write a capsule file
> > + */
> > f = fopen(path, "w");
> > if (!f) {
> > printf("cannot open %s\n", path);
> > - goto err_2;
> > + goto err;
> > }
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * capsule file header
> > + */
> > header.capsule_guid = efi_guid_fm_capsule;
> > header.header_size = sizeof(header);
> > /* TODO: The current implementation ignores flags */
> > @@ -105,70 +208,58 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> > header.capsule_image_size = sizeof(header)
> > + sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64)
> > + sizeof(image)
> > - + bin_stat.st_size;
> > -
> > - size = fwrite(&header, 1, sizeof(header), f);
> > - if (size < sizeof(header)) {
> > - printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
> > - goto err_3;
> > - }
> > + + bin_size;
> > + if (write_capsule_file(f, &header, sizeof(header),
> > + "Capsule header"))
> > + goto err;
> >
> > + /*
> > + * firmware capsule header
> > + * This capsule has only one firmware capsule image.
> > + */
> > capsule.version = 0x00000001;
> > capsule.embedded_driver_count = 0;
> > capsule.payload_item_count = 1;
> > - size = fwrite(&capsule, 1, sizeof(capsule), f);
> > - if (size < (sizeof(capsule))) {
> > - printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
> > - goto err_3;
> > - }
> > + if (write_capsule_file(f, &capsule, sizeof(capsule),
> > + "Firmware capsule header"))
> > + goto err;
> > +
> > offset = sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64);
> > - size = fwrite(&offset, 1, sizeof(offset), f);
> > - if (size < sizeof(offset)) {
> > - printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
> > - goto err_3;
> > - }
> > + if (write_capsule_file(f, &offset, sizeof(offset),
> > + "Offset to capsule image"))
> > + goto err;
> >
> > + /*
> > + * firmware capsule image header
> > + */
> > image.version = 0x00000003;
> > memcpy(&image.update_image_type_id, guid, sizeof(*guid));
> > image.update_image_index = index;
> > image.reserved[0] = 0;
> > image.reserved[1] = 0;
> > image.reserved[2] = 0;
> > - image.update_image_size = bin_stat.st_size;
> > + image.update_image_size = bin_size;
> > image.update_vendor_code_size = 0; /* none */
> > image.update_hardware_instance = instance;
> > image.image_capsule_support = 0;
> > + if (write_capsule_file(f, &image, sizeof(image),
> > + "Firmware capsule image header"))
> > + goto err;
> >
> > - size = fwrite(&image, 1, sizeof(image), f);
> > - if (size < sizeof(image)) {
> > - printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
> > - goto err_3;
> > - }
> > - size = fread(data, 1, bin_stat.st_size, g);
> > - if (size < bin_stat.st_size) {
> > - printf("read failed (%zx)\n", size);
> > - goto err_3;
> > - }
> > - size = fwrite(data, 1, bin_stat.st_size, f);
> > - if (size < bin_stat.st_size) {
> > - printf("write failed (%zx)\n", size);
> > - goto err_3;
> > - }
> > -
> > - fclose(f);
> > - fclose(g);
> > - free(data);
> > -
> > - return 0;
> > + /*
> > + * firmware binary
> > + */
> > + if (write_capsule_file(f, data, bin_size, "Firmware binary"))
> > + goto err;
> >
> > -err_3:
> > - fclose(f);
> > -err_2:
> > + ret = 0;
> > +err:
> > + if (f)
> > + fclose(f);
> > + free_sig_data(&auth_context);
> > free(data);
> > -err_1:
> > - fclose(g);
> >
> > - return -1;
> > + return ret;
> > }
> >
> > /*
> >
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 03/12] tools: mkeficapsule: add firmwware image signing
2021-11-07 6:53 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
@ 2021-11-08 4:38 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2021-11-08 4:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Heinrich Schuchardt
Cc: ilias.apalodimas, sughosh.ganu, masami.hiramatsu, u-boot, agraf, sjg
On Sun, Nov 07, 2021 at 07:53:24AM +0100, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
> On 11/2/21 01:55, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> > With this enhancement, mkeficapsule will be able to sign a capsule
> > file when it is created. A signature added will be used later
> > in the verification at FMP's SetImage() call.
> >
> > To do that, We need specify additional command parameters:
> > -monotonic-cout <count> : monotonic count
> > -private-key <private key file> : private key file
> > -certificate <certificate file> : certificate file
> > Only when all of those parameters are given, a signature will be added
> > to a capsule file.
> >
> > Users are expected to maintain and increment the monotonic count at
> > every time of the update for each firmware image.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
>
> You licensed tools/mkeficapsule.c under GPL-2.0 which is imcompatible
> with OpenSSL (https://www.gnu.org/licenses/license-list.html#OpenSSL).
In fact, this is not a this-tool-specific issue, but other tools,
including mkimage, have it and that is why CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO was
introduced.
# I think that I have mentioned the issue in my past comment.
-Takahiro Akashi
> Either agree with all contributors of the tool to use a more liberal
> license or use another library.
>
> > ---
> > tools/Kconfig | 8 +
> > tools/Makefile | 8 +-
> > tools/mkeficapsule.c | 382 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> > 3 files changed, 376 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/tools/Kconfig b/tools/Kconfig
> > index 91ce8ae3e516..117c921da3fe 100644
> > --- a/tools/Kconfig
> > +++ b/tools/Kconfig
> > @@ -90,4 +90,12 @@ config TOOLS_SHA512
> > help
> > Enable SHA512 support in the tools builds
> >
> > +config TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE
> > + bool "Build efimkcapsule command"
> > + default y if EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK
> > + help
> > + This command allows users to create a UEFI capsule file and,
> > + optionally sign that file. If you want to enable UEFI capsule
> > + update feature on your target, you certainly need this.
> > +
> > endmenu
> > diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile
> > index b45219e2c30c..5a73cc4b363d 100644
> > --- a/tools/Makefile
> > +++ b/tools/Makefile
> > @@ -238,8 +238,12 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MIPS) += mips-relocs
> > hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1_COMPILER) += asn1_compiler
> > HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -idirafter $(srctree)/include
> >
> > -mkeficapsule-objs := mkeficapsule.o $(LIBFDT_OBJS)
> > -hostprogs-$(CONFIG_EFI_HAVE_CAPSULE_SUPPORT) += mkeficapsule
> > +HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += -luuid
> > +ifeq ($(CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO),y)
> > +HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += \
> > + $(shell pkg-config --libs libssl libcrypto 2> /dev/null || echo "-lssl -lcrypto")
> > +endif
> > +hostprogs-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE) += mkeficapsule
> >
> > # We build some files with extra pedantic flags to try to minimize things
> > # that won't build on some weird host compiler -- though there are lots of
> > diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
> > index 8427fedd941c..086757ee8ad7 100644
> > --- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c
> > +++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
> > @@ -15,6 +15,16 @@
> > #include <sys/stat.h>
> > #include <sys/types.h>
> >
> > +#include <linux/kconfig.h>
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
> > +#include <openssl/asn1.h>
> > +#include <openssl/bio.h>
> > +#include <openssl/evp.h>
> > +#include <openssl/err.h>
> > +#include <openssl/pem.h>
> > +#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
> > +#endif
> > +
> > typedef __u8 u8;
> > typedef __u16 u16;
> > typedef __u32 u32;
> > @@ -38,12 +48,25 @@ efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit =
> > EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_FIT_GUID;
> > efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw =
> > EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID;
> > +efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
> > +static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:p:c:m:dh";
> > +#else
> > +static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:h";
> > +#endif
> >
> > static struct option options[] = {
> > {"fit", required_argument, NULL, 'f'},
> > {"raw", required_argument, NULL, 'r'},
> > {"index", required_argument, NULL, 'i'},
> > {"instance", required_argument, NULL, 'I'},
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
> > + {"private-key", required_argument, NULL, 'p'},
> > + {"certificate", required_argument, NULL, 'c'},
> > + {"monotonic-count", required_argument, NULL, 'm'},
> > + {"dump-sig", no_argument, NULL, 'd'},
> > +#endif
> > {"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
> > {NULL, 0, NULL, 0},
> > };
> > @@ -57,10 +80,252 @@ static void print_usage(void)
> > "\t-r, --raw <raw image> new raw image file\n"
> > "\t-i, --index <index> update image index\n"
> > "\t-I, --instance <instance> update hardware instance\n"
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
> > + "\t-p, --private-key <privkey file> private key file\n"
> > + "\t-c, --certificate <cert file> signer's certificate file\n"
> > + "\t-m, --monotonic-count <count> monotonic count\n"
> > + "\t-d, --dump_sig dump signature (*.p7)\n"
> > +#endif
> > "\t-h, --help print a help message\n",
> > tool_name);
> > }
> >
> > +/**
> > + * auth_context - authentication context
> > + * @key_file: Path to a private key file
> > + * @cert_file: Path to a certificate file
> > + * @image_data: Pointer to firmware data
> > + * @image_size: Size of firmware data
> > + * @auth: Authentication header
> > + * @sig_data: Signature data
> > + * @sig_size: Size of signature data
> > + *
> > + * Data structure used in create_auth_data(). @key_file through
> > + * @image_size are input parameters. @auth, @sig_data and @sig_size
> > + * are filled in by create_auth_data().
> > + */
> > +struct auth_context {
> > + char *key_file;
> > + char *cert_file;
> > + u8 *image_data;
> > + size_t image_size;
> > + struct efi_firmware_image_authentication auth;
> > + u8 *sig_data;
> > + size_t sig_size;
> > +};
> > +
> > +static int dump_sig;
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
> > +/**
> > + * fileio-read_pkey - read out a private key
> > + * @filename: Path to a private key file
> > + *
> > + * Read out a private key file and parse it into "EVP_PKEY" structure.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * * Pointer to private key structure - on success
> > + * * NULL - on failure
> > + */
> > +static EVP_PKEY *fileio_read_pkey(const char *filename)
> > +{
> > + EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
> > + BIO *bio;
> > +
> > + bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
> > + if (!bio)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
> > +
> > +out:
> > + BIO_free_all(bio);
> > + if (!key) {
> > + printf("Can't load key from file '%s'\n", filename);
> > + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
> > + }
> > +
> > + return key;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * fileio-read_cert - read out a certificate
> > + * @filename: Path to a certificate file
> > + *
> > + * Read out a certificate file and parse it into "X509" structure.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * * Pointer to certificate structure - on success
> > + * * NULL - on failure
> > + */
> > +static X509 *fileio_read_cert(const char *filename)
> > +{
> > + X509 *cert = NULL;
> > + BIO *bio;
> > +
> > + bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
> > + if (!bio)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
> > +
> > +out:
> > + BIO_free_all(bio);
> > + if (!cert) {
> > + printf("Can't load certificate from file '%s'\n", filename);
> > + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
> > + }
> > +
> > + return cert;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * create_auth_data - compose authentication data in capsule
> > + * @auth_context: Pointer to authentication context
> > + *
> > + * Fill up an authentication header (.auth) and signature data (.sig_data)
> > + * in @auth_context, using library functions from openssl.
> > + * All the parameters in @auth_context must be filled in by a caller.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * * 0 - on success
> > + * * -1 - on failure
> > + */
> > +static int create_auth_data(struct auth_context *ctx)
> > +{
> > + EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
> > + X509 *cert = NULL;
> > + BIO *data_bio = NULL;
> > + const EVP_MD *md;
> > + PKCS7 *p7;
> > + int flags, ret = -1;
> > +
> > + OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
> > + OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
> > + ERR_load_crypto_strings();
> > +
> > + key = fileio_read_pkey(ctx->key_file);
> > + if (!key)
> > + goto err;
> > + cert = fileio_read_cert(ctx->cert_file);
> > + if (!cert)
> > + goto err;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * create a BIO, containing:
> > + * * firmware image
> > + * * monotonic count
> > + * in this order!
> > + * See EDK2's FmpAuthenticatedHandlerRsa2048Sha256()
> > + */
> > + data_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
> > + BIO_write(data_bio, ctx->image_data, ctx->image_size);
> > + BIO_write(data_bio, &ctx->auth.monotonic_count,
> > + sizeof(ctx->auth.monotonic_count));
> > +
> > + md = EVP_get_digestbyname("SHA256");
> > + if (!md)
> > + goto err;
> > +
> > + /* create signature */
> > + /* TODO: maybe add PKCS7_NOATTR and PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP */
> > + flags = PKCS7_BINARY | PKCS7_DETACHED;
> > + p7 = PKCS7_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, data_bio, flags | PKCS7_PARTIAL);
> > + if (!p7)
> > + goto err;
> > + if (!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, cert, key, md, flags))
> > + goto err;
> > + if (!PKCS7_final(p7, data_bio, flags))
> > + goto err;
> > +
> > + /* convert pkcs7 into DER */
> > + ctx->sig_data = NULL;
> > + ctx->sig_size = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)p7, &ctx->sig_data,
> > + ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7));
> > + if (!ctx->sig_size)
> > + goto err;
> > +
> > + /* fill auth_info */
> > + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.dwLength = sizeof(ctx->auth.auth_info)
> > + + ctx->sig_size;
> > + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wRevision = WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0;
> > + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;
> > + memcpy(&ctx->auth.auth_info.cert_type, &efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7,
> > + sizeof(efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7));
> > +
> > + ret = 0;
> > +err:
> > + BIO_free_all(data_bio);
> > + EVP_PKEY_free(key);
> > + X509_free(cert);
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * dump_signature - dump out a signature
> > + * @path: Path to a capsule file
> > + * @signature: Signature data
> > + * @sig_size: Size of signature data
> > + *
> > + * Signature data pointed to by @signature will be saved into
> > + * a file whose file name is @path with ".p7" suffix.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * * 0 - on success
> > + * * -1 - on failure
> > + */
> > +static int dump_signature(const char *path, u8 *signature, size_t sig_size)
> > +{
> > + char *sig_path;
> > + FILE *f;
> > + size_t size;
> > + int ret = -1;
> > +
> > + sig_path = malloc(strlen(path) + 3 + 1);
> > + if (!sig_path)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + sprintf(sig_path, "%s.p7", path);
> > + f = fopen(sig_path, "w");
> > + if (!f)
> > + goto err;
> > +
> > + size = fwrite(signature, 1, sig_size, f);
> > + if (size == sig_size)
> > + ret = 0;
> > +
> > + fclose(f);
> > +err:
> > + free(sig_path);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * free_sig_data - free out signature data
> > + * @ctx: Pointer to authentication context
> > + *
> > + * Free signature data allocated in create_auth_data().
> > + */
> > +static void free_sig_data(struct auth_context *ctx)
> > +{
> > + if (ctx->sig_size)
> > + OPENSSL_free(ctx->sig_data);
> > +}
> > +#else
> > +static int create_auth_data(struct auth_context *ctx)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int dump_signature(const char *path, u8 *signature, size_t sig_size)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void free_sig_data(struct auth_context *ctx) {}
> > +#endif
> > +
> > /**
> > * read_bin_file - read a firmware binary file
> > * @bin: Path to a firmware binary file
> > @@ -162,11 +427,13 @@ static int write_capsule_file(FILE *f, void *data, size_t size, const char *msg)
> > * * -1 - on failure
> > */
> > static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> > - unsigned long index, unsigned long instance)
> > + unsigned long index, unsigned long instance,
> > + uint64_t mcount, char *privkey_file, char *cert_file)
> > {
> > struct efi_capsule_header header;
> > struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header capsule;
> > struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header image;
> > + struct auth_context auth_context;
> > FILE *f;
> > void *data;
> > off_t bin_size;
> > @@ -176,9 +443,9 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> > #ifdef DEBUG
>
> scripts/checkpatch.pl gives the following warning for this file:
>
> Use 'if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG...))' instead of '#if or #ifdef' where possible.
>
> Best regards
>
> Heinrich
>
> > printf("For output: %s\n", path);
> > printf("\tbin: %s\n\ttype: %pUl\n", bin, guid);
> > - printf("\tindex: %ld\n\tinstance: %ld\n", index, instance);
> > + printf("\tindex: %lu\n\tinstance: %lu\n", index, instance);
> > #endif
> > -
> > + auth_context.sig_size = 0;
> > f = NULL;
> > data = NULL;
> > ret = -1;
> > @@ -189,6 +456,27 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> > if (read_bin_file(bin, &data, &bin_size))
> > goto err;
> >
> > + /* first, calculate signature to determine its size */
> > + if (privkey_file && cert_file) {
> > + auth_context.key_file = privkey_file;
> > + auth_context.cert_file = cert_file;
> > + auth_context.auth.monotonic_count = mcount;
> > + auth_context.image_data = data;
> > + auth_context.image_size = bin_size;
> > +
> > + if (create_auth_data(&auth_context)) {
> > + printf("Signing firmware image failed\n");
> > + goto err;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (dump_sig &&
> > + dump_signature(path, auth_context.sig_data,
> > + auth_context.sig_size)) {
> > + printf("Creating signature file failed\n");
> > + goto err;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > /*
> > * write a capsule file
> > */
> > @@ -209,6 +497,9 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> > + sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64)
> > + sizeof(image)
> > + bin_size;
> > + if (auth_context.sig_size)
> > + header.capsule_image_size += sizeof(auth_context.auth)
> > + + auth_context.sig_size;
> > if (write_capsule_file(f, &header, sizeof(header),
> > "Capsule header"))
> > goto err;
> > @@ -239,13 +530,32 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
> > image.reserved[1] = 0;
> > image.reserved[2] = 0;
> > image.update_image_size = bin_size;
> > + if (auth_context.sig_size)
> > + image.update_image_size += sizeof(auth_context.auth)
> > + + auth_context.sig_size;
> > image.update_vendor_code_size = 0; /* none */
> > image.update_hardware_instance = instance;
> > image.image_capsule_support = 0;
> > + if (auth_context.sig_size)
> > + image.image_capsule_support |= CAPSULE_SUPPORT_AUTHENTICATION;
> > if (write_capsule_file(f, &image, sizeof(image),
> > "Firmware capsule image header"))
> > goto err;
> >
> > + /*
> > + * signature
> > + */
> > + if (auth_context.sig_size) {
> > + if (write_capsule_file(f, &auth_context.auth,
> > + sizeof(auth_context.auth),
> > + "Authentication header"))
> > + goto err;
> > +
> > + if (write_capsule_file(f, auth_context.sig_data,
> > + auth_context.sig_size, "Signature"))
> > + goto err;
> > + }
> > +
> > /*
> > * firmware binary
> > */
> > @@ -262,23 +572,37 @@ err:
> > return ret;
> > }
> >
> > -/*
> > - * Usage:
> > - * $ mkeficapsule -f <firmware binary> <output file>
> > +/**
> > + * main - main entry function of mkeficapsule
> > + * @argc: Number of arguments
> > + * @argv: Array of pointers to arguments
> > + *
> > + * Create an uefi capsule file, optionally signing it.
> > + * Parse all the arguments and pass them on to create_fwbin().
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * * 0 - on success
> > + * * -1 - on failure
> > */
> > int main(int argc, char **argv)
> > {
> > char *file;
> > efi_guid_t *guid;
> > unsigned long index, instance;
> > + uint64_t mcount;
> > + char *privkey_file, *cert_file;
> > int c, idx;
> >
> > file = NULL;
> > guid = NULL;
> > index = 0;
> > instance = 0;
> > + mcount = 0;
> > + privkey_file = NULL;
> > + cert_file = NULL;
> > + dump_sig = 0;
> > for (;;) {
> > - c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "f:r:i:I:v:h", options, &idx);
> > + c = getopt_long(argc, argv, opts_short, options, &idx);
> > if (c == -1)
> > break;
> >
> > @@ -286,7 +610,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
> > case 'f':
> > if (file) {
> > printf("Image already specified\n");
> > - return -1;
> > + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> > }
> > file = optarg;
> > guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit;
> > @@ -294,7 +618,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
> > case 'r':
> > if (file) {
> > printf("Image already specified\n");
> > - return -1;
> > + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> > }
> > file = optarg;
> > guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw;
> > @@ -305,26 +629,44 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
> > case 'I':
> > instance = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0);
> > break;
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO
> > + case 'p':
> > + if (privkey_file) {
> > + printf("Private Key already specified\n");
> > + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> > + }
> > + privkey_file = optarg;
> > + break;
> > + case 'c':
> > + if (cert_file) {
> > + printf("Certificate file already specified\n");
> > + exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> > + }
> > + cert_file = optarg;
> > + break;
> > + case 'm':
> > + mcount = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0);
> > + break;
> > + case 'd':
> > + dump_sig = 1;
> > + break;
> > +#endif /* CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO */
> > case 'h':
> > print_usage();
> > - return 0;
> > + exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
> > }
> > }
> >
> > - /* need an output file */
> > - if (argc != optind + 1) {
> > + /* check necessary parameters */
> > + if ((argc != optind + 1) || !file ||
> > + ((privkey_file && !cert_file) ||
> > + (!privkey_file && cert_file))) {
> > print_usage();
> > exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> > }
> >
> > - /* need a fit image file or raw image file */
> > - if (!file) {
> > - print_usage();
> > - exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
> > - }
> > -
> > - if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance)
> > - < 0) {
> > + if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance,
> > + mcount, privkey_file, cert_file) < 0) {
> > printf("Creating firmware capsule failed\n");
> > exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> > }
> >
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-11-08 4:38 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2021-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v6 00/12] efi_loader: capsule: improve capsule authentication support AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 01/12] efi_loader: capsule: drop __weak from efi_get_public_key_data() AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 02/12] tools: mkeficapsule: rework the code a little bit AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:57 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-07 6:35 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2021-11-08 4:18 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 03/12] tools: mkeficapsule: add firmwware image signing AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-07 6:53 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2021-11-08 4:38 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 04/12] tools: mkeficapsule: add man page AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 05/12] doc: update UEFI document for usage of mkeficapsule AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 06/12] test/py: efi_capsule: add image authentication test AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-02 16:15 ` Ilias Apalodimas
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 07/12] tools: mkeficapsule: allow for specifying GUID explicitly AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-04 2:12 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-04 2:49 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 08/12] test/py: efi_capsule: align with the syntax change of mkeficapsule AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 09/12] test/py: efi_capsule: add a test for "--guid" option AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 10/12] test/py: efi_capsule: check the results in case of CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 11/12] (RFC) tools: add fdtsig.sh AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v6 12/12] (RFC) efi_loader, dts: add public keys for capsules to device tree AKASHI Takahiro
2021-11-02 14:58 ` Simon Glass
2021-11-04 2:17 ` AKASHI Takahiro
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