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From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
To: workflows@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Patch attestation RFC + proof of concept
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2020 21:23:46 -0400
Message-ID: <20200227012346.GF31668@ziepe.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200226211805.4whl5fnxy5ydhs4u@chatter.i7.local>

On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 04:18:05PM -0500, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 05:04:42PM -0400, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > > - developer does all their work on a remote VM that doesn't have 
> > > access to their PGP keys and submits actual attestation when they 
> > > get back to their workstation
> > 
> > Unfortunately this is a challenging work flow for a lot of reasons. :(
> 
> Can you describe why? I would expect that this is done fairly routinely 
> due to having more compute power on a remote VM to run various tests.

I've seen enough situations where people have a Linux server and a
Windows laptop. They don't have a Linux desktop, so mixing a local
'secure' PGP key in a windows environment with the remote Linux server
environment is challenging.

If you have a secure 'Linux desktop environment' then I'd imagine
always sending signed emails from there, and just using the server for
test/etc.

Certainly, exposing my email password (aka my cloud account password)
is of even greater risk to me (and my company!) than exposing my PGP
key. I want to keep it on my secure server, encrypted, etc. Actually
I'm trying hard to move all my email access to OAUTH to minimize risks
to my cloud accounts :\

> > > - developer submits a v1 of the patch that they don't expect to pass on
> > >   the first try and doesn't bother submitting attestation; shockingly,
> > >   the maintainer accepts it as-is and the developer can attest their 
> > >   patches post-fact *without* needing to collect all the acked-by's 
> > >   reviewed-by's etc from all others who have already responded to the v1 
> > >   submission
> > 
> > But there won't be tags in this case, so how do we learn the original
> > attestation-id to find the detatched signature?
> 
> The attestation would be performed before all the follow-up tags are 
> applied, so the attestation-id would be the same. After the patch is 
> applied to a git repository, we can still use the "i" hash to look it up 
> (see more below).

I'm not sure, if the '[PATCH xx v5]' is stripped then 'i' is not
unique any more?
 
> > > For example, a maintainer will almost certainly edit the message 
> > > content to add their own Signed-off-by, and may edit the patch for 
> > > minor nitpicking. 
> > 
> > The i/p/m will always change once in git:
> >    - The commit message is always changed, at least to add sign off
> >    - The email Subject is always changed to strip [PATCH xxx]
> 
> This is already done by "git mailinfo" so I would expect that the i:
> hash almost never changes, actually, unless the maintainer actually 
> edits the subject. Subject + Author + Email are sufficiently unique to 
> be able to locate the attestation data of the exact patch.

Ah, using git mailinfos is not how you described 'i':

$ egrep '^(Author|Email|Subject)' i | sha256sum
2a02abe02216f626105622aee2f26ab10c155b6442e23441d90fc5fe4071b86e  -

(also I do edit subjects a fair amount, again it would be interesting
 to see stats on how well this works)

> So, the goal is not really to perform attestation once the patches made 
> it into the git tree. I am specifically trying to address the following 
> cases:
> 
> - Someone poses as a trusted developer and submits a malicious patch
> - Someone bribes me to edit a patch on lore.kernel.org to introduce a 
>   backdoor

Okay, but then post-apply-attestation doesn't help this threat
model. post-apply-attestation is surely only useful if you can check
the signature from the git data?

Like I said it would be very interesting to see data on how well these
signatures could survive, if we could get, what, 80% coverage of git
commits this way then that seems like a powerful argument for this
approach, right?

Jason

  reply index

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-26 17:25 Konstantin Ryabitsev
2020-02-26 17:50 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:47   ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2020-02-26 20:11 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-02-26 20:42   ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2020-02-26 21:04     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-02-26 21:18       ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2020-02-27  1:23         ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2020-02-27  4:11 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-02-27 10:05   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2020-02-27 13:30     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-02-27 14:29   ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2020-02-28  1:57     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-02-28  2:30       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-02-28 18:33         ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2020-02-28 17:54       ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2020-03-06 16:53       ` Geert Uytterhoeven

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