From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
"Ian Jackson" <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>,
"Paul Durrant" <paul@xen.org>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/9] x86/hvm: Disable MPX by default
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2020 13:24:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <356b06c9-b176-8e72-a3bf-2be62f5cbdb5@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <76fabe81-3f2c-5c48-c2c0-879bc29f4fb7@citrix.com>
On 17.06.2020 13:16, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 17/06/2020 11:32, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 16.06.2020 18:15, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 16/06/2020 10:33, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 15.06.2020 16:15, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>>> @@ -479,6 +497,18 @@ int xc_cpuid_apply_policy(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, bool restore,
>>>>> goto out;
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> + /*
>>>>> + * Account for feature which have been disabled by default since Xen 4.13,
>>>>> + * so migrated-in VM's don't risk seeing features disappearing.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + if ( restore )
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + if ( di.hvm )
>>>>> + {
>>>>> + p->feat.mpx = test_bit(X86_FEATURE_MPX, host_featureset);
>>>> Why do you derive this from the host featureset instead of the max
>>>> one for the guest type?
>>> Because that is how the logic worked for 4.13.
>>>
>>> Also, because we don't have easy access to the actual guest max
>>> featureset at this point. I could add two new sysctl subops to
>>> get_featureset, but the reason for not doing so before are still
>>> applicable now.
>>>
>>> There is a theoretical case where host MPX is visible but guest max is
>>> hidden, and that is down to the vmentry controls. As this doesn't exist
>>> in real hardware, I'm not terribly concerned about it.
>> I'd also see us allow features to be kept for the host, but masked
>> off of the/some guest feature sets, by way of a to-be-introduced
>> command line option.
>
> What kind of usecase do you have in mind for this? We've got a load of
> features which are blanket disabled for guests. I suppose `ler` et al
> ought to have an impact, except for the fact that LBR at that level
> isn't architectural and always expected.
What I was thinking of was the kind of "none of my guests should use
AVX512 - let me disable it globally, rather than individually in
each guest's config" approach. Of course AVX512 is something we use
in Xen only to emulate guest insns, but I think the example still
serves the purpose.
Jan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-17 11:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-15 14:15 [PATCH for-4.14 0/9] XSA-320 follow for IvyBridge Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 1/9] tools/libx[cl]: Introduce struct xc_xend_cpuid for xc_cpuid_set() Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:51 ` Ian Jackson
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 2/9] tests/cpu-policy: Confirm that CPUID serialisation is sorted Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:52 ` Ian Jackson
2020-06-15 15:00 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 15:34 ` Ian Jackson
2020-06-15 16:12 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-16 6:51 ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-16 9:01 ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 3/9] tools/libx[cl]: Move processing loop down into xc_cpuid_set() Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:54 ` Ian Jackson
2020-06-16 9:16 ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-16 15:58 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 4/9] tools/libx[cl]: Merge xc_cpuid_set() into xc_cpuid_apply_policy() Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:55 ` Ian Jackson
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 5/9] tools/libx[cl]: Plumb bool restore down " Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:55 ` Ian Jackson
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86/gen-cpuid: Distinguish default vs max in feature annotations Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 7/9] x86/hvm: Disable MPX by default Andrew Cooper
2020-06-16 9:33 ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-16 16:15 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-17 10:32 ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-17 11:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-17 11:24 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2020-06-17 11:28 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-17 11:41 ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-17 11:47 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 8/9] x86/cpuid: Introduce missing feature adjustment in calculate_pv_def_policy() Andrew Cooper
2020-06-16 9:40 ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-16 16:17 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 9/9] x86/spec-ctrl: Hide RDRAND by default on IvyBridge Andrew Cooper
2020-06-16 10:00 ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-16 16:26 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-17 10:39 ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-17 11:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 17:04 ` [PATCH for-4.14 0/9] XSA-320 follow for IvyBridge Paul Durrant
2020-06-17 12:46 ` Paul Durrant
2020-06-18 7:18 ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-18 9:37 ` Andrew Cooper
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