[Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] x86/vLAPIC: avoid speculative out of bounds accesses

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] x86/vLAPIC: avoid speculative out of bounds accesses

[Jan Beulich]

Array indexes used in the MSR read/write emulation functions as well as
the direct VMX / APIC-V hook are derived from guest controlled values.
Restrict their ranges to limit the side effects of speculative
execution.

Along these lines also constrain the vlapic_lvt_mask[] access.

Remove the unused vlapic_lvt_{vector,dm}() instead of adjusting them.

This is part of the speculative hardening effort.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
v2: Drop changes to vlapic_mmio_{read,write}(). Drop
     VLAPIC_OFFSET_MASK(). Also tweak guest_wrmsr_x2apic().

--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
  #include <xen/domain.h>
  #include <xen/domain_page.h>
  #include <xen/event.h>
+#include <xen/nospec.h>
  #include <xen/trace.h>
  #include <xen/lib.h>
  #include <xen/sched.h>
@@ -65,12 +66,6 @@ static const unsigned int vlapic_lvt_mas
       LVT_MASK
  };
  
-#define vlapic_lvt_vector(vlapic, lvt_type)                     \
-    (vlapic_get_reg(vlapic, lvt_type) & APIC_VECTOR_MASK)
-
-#define vlapic_lvt_dm(vlapic, lvt_type)                         \
-    (vlapic_get_reg(vlapic, lvt_type) & APIC_MODE_MASK)
-
  #define vlapic_lvtt_period(vlapic)                              \
      ((vlapic_get_reg(vlapic, APIC_LVTT) & APIC_TIMER_MODE_MASK) \
       == APIC_TIMER_MODE_PERIODIC)
@@ -676,7 +671,7 @@ int guest_rdmsr_x2apic(const struct vcpu
      };
      const struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v);
      uint64_t high = 0;
-    uint32_t reg = msr - MSR_X2APIC_FIRST, offset = reg << 4;
+    uint32_t reg = msr - MSR_X2APIC_FIRST, offset;
  
      /*
       * The read side looks as if it might be safe to use outside of current
@@ -686,9 +681,14 @@ int guest_rdmsr_x2apic(const struct vcpu
      ASSERT(v == current);
  
      if ( !vlapic_x2apic_mode(vlapic) ||
-         (reg >= sizeof(readable) * 8) || !test_bit(reg, readable) )
+         (reg >= sizeof(readable) * 8) )
+        return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
+
+    reg = array_index_nospec(reg, sizeof(readable) * 8);
+    if ( !test_bit(reg, readable) )
          return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
  
+    offset = reg << 4;
      if ( offset == APIC_ICR )
          high = (uint64_t)vlapic_read_aligned(vlapic, APIC_ICR2) << 32;
  
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ void vlapic_reg_write(struct vcpu *v, un
      case APIC_LVTERR:       /* LVT Error Reg */
          if ( vlapic_sw_disabled(vlapic) )
              val |= APIC_LVT_MASKED;
-        val &= vlapic_lvt_mask[(reg - APIC_LVTT) >> 4];
+        val &= array_access_nospec(vlapic_lvt_mask, (reg - APIC_LVTT) >> 4);
          vlapic_set_reg(vlapic, reg, val);
          if ( reg == APIC_LVT0 )
          {
@@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ static int vlapic_mmio_write(struct vcpu
  int vlapic_apicv_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int offset)
  {
      struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v);
-    uint32_t val = vlapic_get_reg(vlapic, offset);
+    uint32_t val = vlapic_get_reg(vlapic, offset & ~0xf);
  
      if ( vlapic_x2apic_mode(vlapic) )
      {
@@ -1053,7 +1053,7 @@ int guest_wrmsr_x2apic(struct vcpu *v, u
          }
      }
  
-    vlapic_reg_write(v, offset, msr_content);
+    vlapic_reg_write(v, array_index_nospec(offset, PAGE_SIZE), msr_content);
  
      return X86EMUL_OKAY;
  }
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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] x86/vLAPIC: avoid speculative out of bounds accesses

[Andrew Cooper]

On 17/07/2019 17:02, Jan Beulich wrote:
> Array indexes used in the MSR read/write emulation functions as well as
> the direct VMX / APIC-V hook are derived from guest controlled values.
> Restrict their ranges to limit the side effects of speculative
> execution.
>
> Along these lines also constrain the vlapic_lvt_mask[] access.
>
> Remove the unused vlapic_lvt_{vector,dm}() instead of adjusting them.
>
> This is part of the speculative hardening effort.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

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