xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>
To: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>, Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 RFC 2/6] x86/MSI-X: track host and guest mask‑all requests separately
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2015 15:47:32 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <55883C240200007800087A24@mail.emea.novell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <558839ED02000078000879FE@mail.emea.novell.com>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2272 bytes --]

Host uses of the bits will be added subsequently, and must not be
overridden by guests (including Dom0, namely when acting on behalf of
a guest).

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
@@ -846,6 +846,12 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct p
 
     if ( !msix->used_entries )
     {
+        msix->host_maskall = 0;
+        if ( !msix->guest_maskall )
+            control &= ~PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL;
+        else
+            control |= PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL;
+
         if ( rangeset_add_range(mmio_ro_ranges, msix->table.first,
                                 msix->table.last) )
             WARN();
@@ -1114,6 +1120,36 @@ void pci_cleanup_msi(struct pci_dev *pde
 int pci_msi_conf_write_intercept(struct pci_dev *pdev, unsigned int reg,
                                  unsigned int size, uint32_t *data)
 {
+    u16 seg = pdev->seg;
+    u8 bus = pdev->bus;
+    u8 slot = PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn);
+    u8 func = PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn);
+    struct msi_desc *entry;
+    unsigned int pos;
+
+    if ( pdev->msix )
+    {
+        entry = find_msi_entry(pdev, -1, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+        pos = entry ? entry->msi_attrib.pos
+                    : pci_find_cap_offset(seg, bus, slot, func,
+                                          PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+        ASSERT(pos);
+
+        if ( reg < pos || reg >= msix_pba_offset_reg(pos) + 4 )
+            return 0;
+printk("%04x:%02x:%02x.%u: MSI-X %03x:%u->%04x (%d,%d)\n",//temp
+       seg, bus, slot, func, reg, size, *data, pdev->msix->host_maskall, pdev->msix->guest_maskall);//temp
+
+        if ( reg != msix_control_reg(pos) || size != 2 )
+            return -EACCES;
+
+        pdev->msix->guest_maskall = !!(*data & PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL);
+        if ( pdev->msix->host_maskall )
+            *data |= PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL;
+
+        return 1;
+    }
+
     return 0;
 }
 
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ struct arch_msix {
     int table_refcnt[MAX_MSIX_TABLE_PAGES];
     int table_idx[MAX_MSIX_TABLE_PAGES];
     spinlock_t table_lock;
+    bool_t host_maskall, guest_maskall;
     domid_t warned;
 };
 




[-- Attachment #2: x86-MSI-X-maskall.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 2330 bytes --]

x86/MSI-X: track host and guest mask-all requests separately

Host uses of the bits will be added subsequently, and must not be
overridden by guests (including Dom0, namely when acting on behalf of
a guest).

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
@@ -846,6 +846,12 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct p
 
     if ( !msix->used_entries )
     {
+        msix->host_maskall = 0;
+        if ( !msix->guest_maskall )
+            control &= ~PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL;
+        else
+            control |= PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL;
+
         if ( rangeset_add_range(mmio_ro_ranges, msix->table.first,
                                 msix->table.last) )
             WARN();
@@ -1114,6 +1120,36 @@ void pci_cleanup_msi(struct pci_dev *pde
 int pci_msi_conf_write_intercept(struct pci_dev *pdev, unsigned int reg,
                                  unsigned int size, uint32_t *data)
 {
+    u16 seg = pdev->seg;
+    u8 bus = pdev->bus;
+    u8 slot = PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn);
+    u8 func = PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn);
+    struct msi_desc *entry;
+    unsigned int pos;
+
+    if ( pdev->msix )
+    {
+        entry = find_msi_entry(pdev, -1, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+        pos = entry ? entry->msi_attrib.pos
+                    : pci_find_cap_offset(seg, bus, slot, func,
+                                          PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+        ASSERT(pos);
+
+        if ( reg < pos || reg >= msix_pba_offset_reg(pos) + 4 )
+            return 0;
+printk("%04x:%02x:%02x.%u: MSI-X %03x:%u->%04x (%d,%d)\n",//temp
+       seg, bus, slot, func, reg, size, *data, pdev->msix->host_maskall, pdev->msix->guest_maskall);//temp
+
+        if ( reg != msix_control_reg(pos) || size != 2 )
+            return -EACCES;
+
+        pdev->msix->guest_maskall = !!(*data & PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL);
+        if ( pdev->msix->host_maskall )
+            *data |= PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL;
+
+        return 1;
+    }
+
     return 0;
 }
 
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ struct arch_msix {
     int table_refcnt[MAX_MSIX_TABLE_PAGES];
     int table_idx[MAX_MSIX_TABLE_PAGES];
     spinlock_t table_lock;
+    bool_t host_maskall, guest_maskall;
     domid_t warned;
 };
 

[-- Attachment #3: Type: text/plain, Size: 126 bytes --]

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-06-22 14:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-06-22 14:38 [PATCH v4 RFC 0/6] x86/MSI: XSA-120, 126, 128-131 follow-up Jan Beulich
2015-06-22 14:46 ` [PATCH v4 RFC 1/6] x86/PCI: add config space write abstract intercept logic Jan Beulich
2015-06-22 19:31   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2015-06-23  7:21     ` Jan Beulich
2015-06-23 11:06       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2015-06-23 12:55         ` Jan Beulich
2015-06-24 17:09   ` Andrew Cooper
2015-06-22 14:47 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2015-06-24 17:15   ` [PATCH v4 RFC 2/6] x86/MSI-X: track host and guest mask‑all requests separately Andrew Cooper
2015-06-25  8:01     ` Jan Beulich
2015-06-25 14:25       ` Andrew Cooper
2015-06-22 14:49 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] x86/MSI-X: be more careful during teardown Jan Beulich
2015-06-22 14:50 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] x86/MSI-X: access MSI-X table only after having enabled MSI-X Jan Beulich
2015-06-22 14:51 ` [PATCH v4 RFC 5/6] x86/MSI-X: reduce fiddling with control register during restore Jan Beulich
2015-06-22 14:51 ` [PATCH v4 RFC 6/6] x86/MSI: properly track guest masking requests Jan Beulich
2015-06-24 17:24   ` Andrew Cooper
2015-06-25  8:04     ` Jan Beulich
2015-06-25 14:26       ` Andrew Cooper
2015-06-25 14:49         ` Jan Beulich
2015-07-13 11:42 ` [PATCH v4 RFC 0/6] x86/MSI: XSA-120, 126, 128-131 follow-up Jan Beulich

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=55883C240200007800087A24@mail.emea.novell.com \
    --to=jbeulich@suse.com \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=keir@xen.org \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body. 
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).