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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	"Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/traps: Rework #PF[Rsvd] bit handling
Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 10:14:07 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bf0d9e00-cb42-34b1-26ee-93628eea094c@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200518153820.18170-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

On 18.05.2020 17:38, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> The reserved_bit_page_fault() paths effectively turn reserved bit faults into
> a warning, but in the light of L1TF, the real impact is far more serious.
> 
> Xen does not have any reserved bits set in its pagetables, nor do we permit PV
> guests to write any.  An HVM shadow guest may have reserved bits via the MMIO
> fastpath, but those faults are handled in the VMExit #PF intercept, rather
> than Xen's #PF handler.
> 
> There is no need to disable interrupts (in spurious_page_fault()) for
> __page_fault_type() to look at the rsvd bit, nor should extable fixup be
> tolerated.

I'm afraid I don't understand the connection of the first half of this
to the patch - you don't alter spurious_page_fault() in this regard (at
all, actually).

As to extable fixup, I'm not sure: If a reserved bit ends up slipping
into the non-Xen parts of the page tables, and if guest accessors then
become able to trip a corresponding #PF, the bug will need an XSA with
the proposed change, while - afaict - it won't if the exception gets
recovered from. (There may then still be log spam issue, I admit.)

> @@ -1439,6 +1418,18 @@ void do_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>      if ( unlikely(fixup_page_fault(addr, regs) != 0) )
>          return;
>  
> +    /*
> +     * Xen have reserved bits in its pagetables, nor do we permit PV guests to
> +     * write any.  Such entries would be vulnerable to the L1TF sidechannel.
> +     *
> +     * The only logic which intentionally sets reserved bits is the shadow
> +     * MMIO fastpath (SH_L1E_MMIO_*), which is careful not to be
> +     * L1TF-vulnerable, and handled via the VMExit #PF intercept path, rather
> +     * than here.
> +     */
> +    if ( error_code & PFEC_reserved_bit )
> +        goto fatal;

Judging from the description, wouldn't this then better go even further
up, ahead of the fixup_page_fault() invocation? In fact the function
has two PFEC_reserved_bit checks to _avoid_ taking action, which look
like they could then be dropped.

Jan


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-05-19  8:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-18 15:38 [PATCH] x86/traps: Rework #PF[Rsvd] bit handling Andrew Cooper
2020-05-18 15:40 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-19  8:14 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2020-05-19 14:29   ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-19 14:55     ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-19 15:59       ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-19  8:34 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-19 14:11   ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-19 14:48     ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-19 15:33       ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-19 16:09         ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-19 18:00           ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-20  7:48             ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-20 15:48               ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-20  7:10           ` Tim Deegan
2020-05-21 15:43 ` [PATCH v2] " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-22 13:51   ` Jan Beulich

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