From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Cc: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>,
"xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/5] x86: suppress XPTI-related TLB flushes when possible
Date: Fri, 22 May 2020 12:58:09 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e6071bf3-360e-fd7d-849e-dfbd8ccbe142@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200522111337.GA54375@Air-de-Roger>
On 22/05/2020 12:13, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 12:00:14PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 25/09/2019 16:23, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> When there's no XPTI-enabled PV domain at all, there's no need to issue
>>> respective TLB flushes. Hardwire opt_xpti_* to false when !PV, and
>>> record the creation of PV domains by bumping opt_xpti_* accordingly.
>>>
>>> As to the sticky opt_xpti_domu vs increment/decrement of opt_xpti_hwdom,
>>> this is done this way to avoid
>>> (a) widening the former variable,
>>> (b) any risk of a missed flush, which would result in an XSA if a DomU
>>> was able to exercise it, and
>>> (c) any races updating the variable.
>>> Fundamentally the TLB flush done when context switching out the domain's
>>> vCPU-s the last time before destroying the domain ought to be
>>> sufficient, so in principle DomU handling could be made match hwdom's.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
>> I am still concerned about the added complexity for no obvious use case.
>>
>> Under what circumstances do we expect to XPTI-ness come and go on a
>> system, outside of custom dev-testing scenarios?
> XPTI-ness will be sticky, in the sense that once enabled cannot be
> disabled anymore.
I guess the question was a little too rhetorical, so lets spell it out.
You're either on Meltdown vulnerable hardware, or not. If not, none of
this logic is relevant (AFAICT).
If you're on Meltdown-vulnerable hardware and in a production
environment, your running with XPTI (at which point none of this
complexity is relevant).
The only plausible case I can see where this would make a difference is
a dev environment starting with a non-XPTI dom0, then booting an XPTI
guest, which which point can we seriously justify bizarre logic like:
opt_xpti_hwdom -= IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LATE_HWDOM) &&
!d->domain_id && opt_xpti_hwdom;
just for an alleged perf improvement in a development corner case?
~Andrew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-22 11:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-25 15:19 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 0/5] (remaining) XSA-292 follow-up Jan Beulich
2019-09-25 15:23 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 1/5] x86: suppress XPTI-related TLB flushes when possible Jan Beulich
2020-05-18 17:09 ` Roger Pau Monné
2020-05-19 7:55 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-19 9:15 ` Roger Pau Monné
2020-05-19 9:45 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-22 11:00 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-22 11:13 ` Roger Pau Monné
2020-05-22 11:58 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2020-05-22 11:42 ` Jan Beulich
2019-09-25 15:23 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 2/5] x86/mm: honor opt_pcid also for 32-bit PV domains Jan Beulich
2020-05-22 11:40 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-25 15:25 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 3/5] x86/HVM: move NOFLUSH handling out of hvm_set_cr3() Jan Beulich
2020-05-22 10:40 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-09-25 15:25 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 4/5] x86/HVM: refuse CR3 loads with reserved (upper) bits set Jan Beulich
2019-09-25 15:26 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 5/5] x86/HVM: cosmetics to hvm_set_cr3() Jan Beulich
2020-04-28 7:59 ` Ping: [PATCH v3 0/5] (remaining) XSA-292 follow-up Jan Beulich
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