From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] sysctl: Restore the selinux path based label lookup for sysctls. Date: Wed, 07 Feb 2007 13:24:14 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1170872654.11912.87.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> (raw) In-Reply-To: <m13b5jrngt.fsf_-_@ebiederm.dsl.xmission.com> On Tue, 2007-02-06 at 14:21 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > This time instead of generating the generating the paths from proc_dir_entries > generate the labels from the names in the sysctl ctl_tables themselves. This > removes an unnecessary layer of indirection, allows this to work even when > procfs support is not compiled into the kernel, and especially allows it > to work now that ctl_tables no longer have a proc_dir_entry field. Thanks, looks sane. > I continue passing "proc" into genfs sid although that is complete nonsense > to allow existing selinux policies to work without modification. > > Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > --- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 3a36057..c17a8dd 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -1424,6 +1424,41 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) > return task_has_capability(tsk,cap); > } > > +static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid) > +{ > + int buflen, rc; > + char *buffer, *path, *end; > + > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!buffer) > + goto out; > + > + buflen = PAGE_SIZE; > + end = buffer+buflen; > + *--end = '\0'; > + buflen--; > + path = end-1; > + *path = '/'; > + while (table) { > + const char *name = table->procname; > + size_t namelen = strlen(name); > + buflen -= namelen + 1; > + if (buflen < 0) > + goto out_free; > + end -= namelen; > + memcpy(end, name, namelen); > + *--end = '/'; > + path = end; > + table = table->parent; > + } > + rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); > +out_free: > + free_page((unsigned long)buffer); > +out: > + return rc; > +} > + > static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) > { > int error = 0; > @@ -1438,8 +1473,12 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) > > tsec = current->security; > > - /* Use the well-defined sysctl SID. */ > - tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL; > + rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ? > + SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid); > + if (rc) { > + /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */ > + tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL; > + } > > /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating > * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */ -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] sysctl: Restore the selinux path based label lookup for sysctls. Date: Wed, 07 Feb 2007 13:24:14 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1170872654.11912.87.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> (raw) In-Reply-To: <m13b5jrngt.fsf_-_@ebiederm.dsl.xmission.com> On Tue, 2007-02-06 at 14:21 -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > This time instead of generating the generating the paths from proc_dir_entries > generate the labels from the names in the sysctl ctl_tables themselves. This > removes an unnecessary layer of indirection, allows this to work even when > procfs support is not compiled into the kernel, and especially allows it > to work now that ctl_tables no longer have a proc_dir_entry field. Thanks, looks sane. > I continue passing "proc" into genfs sid although that is complete nonsense > to allow existing selinux policies to work without modification. > > Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > --- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 3a36057..c17a8dd 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -1424,6 +1424,41 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) > return task_has_capability(tsk,cap); > } > > +static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid) > +{ > + int buflen, rc; > + char *buffer, *path, *end; > + > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!buffer) > + goto out; > + > + buflen = PAGE_SIZE; > + end = buffer+buflen; > + *--end = '\0'; > + buflen--; > + path = end-1; > + *path = '/'; > + while (table) { > + const char *name = table->procname; > + size_t namelen = strlen(name); > + buflen -= namelen + 1; > + if (buflen < 0) > + goto out_free; > + end -= namelen; > + memcpy(end, name, namelen); > + *--end = '/'; > + path = end; > + table = table->parent; > + } > + rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); > +out_free: > + free_page((unsigned long)buffer); > +out: > + return rc; > +} > + > static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) > { > int error = 0; > @@ -1438,8 +1473,12 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) > > tsec = current->security; > > - /* Use the well-defined sysctl SID. */ > - tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL; > + rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ? > + SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid); > + if (rc) { > + /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */ > + tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL; > + } > > /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating > * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */ -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-02-07 18:28 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2007-01-28 1:05 + clocksource-add-verification-watchdog-helper-fix-3.patch added to -mm tree akpm [not found] ` <20070127172410.2b041952.akpm@osdl.org> [not found] ` <1169972718.17469.164.camel@localhost.localdomain> [not found] ` <20070128003549.2ca38dc8.akpm@osdl.org> [not found] ` <20070128093358.GA2071@elte.hu> [not found] ` <20070128095712.GA6485@elte.hu> [not found] ` <20070128100627.GA8416@elte.hu> [not found] ` <20070128104548.a835d859.akpm@osdl.org> 2007-01-28 19:21 ` [PATCH] sysctl selinux: Don't look at table->de Eric W. Biederman 2007-01-28 19:21 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-01-29 13:04 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-01-29 13:04 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-01-29 15:23 ` James Morris 2007-01-29 15:23 ` James Morris 2007-01-29 17:55 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-01-29 17:55 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-01-29 19:26 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-01-29 19:26 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-01-29 17:43 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-01-29 17:43 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-01-29 18:43 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-01-29 18:43 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-01-29 19:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2007-01-29 19:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2007-01-29 20:07 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-01-29 20:07 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-01-30 10:25 ` Christoph Hellwig 2007-01-30 17:19 ` Casey Schaufler 2007-01-30 17:19 ` Casey Schaufler 2007-01-29 19:16 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-01-29 19:16 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-01-29 23:28 ` Russell Coker 2007-01-29 23:28 ` Russell Coker 2007-02-06 21:16 ` [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: Add a parent entry to ctl_table and set the parent entry Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-06 21:16 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-06 21:21 ` [PATCH 2/2] sysctl: Restore the selinux path based label lookup for sysctls Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-06 21:21 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-07 18:24 ` Stephen Smalley [this message] 2007-02-07 18:24 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-07 21:12 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-07 21:12 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-07 21:54 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-07 21:54 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-07 22:21 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-07 22:21 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 15:07 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-08 15:07 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-08 1:57 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 1:57 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 15:01 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-08 15:01 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-08 17:53 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 17:53 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 18:13 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-08 18:13 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-08 22:17 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 22:17 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 22:51 ` [PATCH 0/5] sysctl cleanup selinux fixes Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 22:51 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 22:53 ` [PATCH 1/5] sysctl: Remove declaration of nonexistent sysctl_init() Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 22:53 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 22:54 ` [PATCH 2/5] sysctl: Set the parent field in the root sysctl table Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 22:54 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 22:55 ` [PATCH 3/5] sysctl: Fix the selinux_sysctl_get_sid Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 22:55 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 23:02 ` [PATCH 4/5] selinux: Enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 23:02 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 23:04 ` [PATCH 5/5] sysctl: Hide the sysctl proc inodes from selinux Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-08 23:04 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-09 12:26 ` [PATCH 4/5] selinux: Enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes Stephen Smalley 2007-02-09 12:26 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-09 12:24 ` [PATCH 3/5] sysctl: Fix the selinux_sysctl_get_sid Stephen Smalley 2007-02-09 12:24 ` Stephen Smalley 2007-02-09 11:05 ` [PATCH 0/5] sysctl cleanup selinux fixes Andrew Morton 2007-02-09 18:09 ` Eric W. Biederman 2007-02-09 18:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
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