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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
	Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
	George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>,
	Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
	Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Oliver O'Halloran" <oohall@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring
Date: Tue, 03 Sep 2019 18:54:51 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1567551291.4937.8.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1566825818-9731-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com>

On Mon, 2019-08-26 at 09:23 -0400, Nayna Jain wrote:
> The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as
> secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform
> keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This enables
> verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which
> are trusted by firmware.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>

Feel free to add my tag after addressing the formatting issues.

Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..359d5063d4da
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
> + * Author: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> + *
> + *      - loads keys and hashes stored and controlled by the firmware.
> + */
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/cred.h>
> +#include <linux/err.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <asm/secboot.h>
> +#include <asm/secvar.h>
> +#include "keyring_handler.h"
> +
> +/*
> + * Get a certificate list blob from the named secure variable.
> + */
> +static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, uint64_t *size)
> +{
> +	int rc;
> +	void *db;
> +
> +	rc = secvar_ops->get(key, keylen, NULL, size);
> +	if (rc) {
> +		pr_err("Couldn't get size: %d\n", rc);
> +		return NULL;
> +	}
> +
> +	db = kmalloc(*size, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!db)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	rc = secvar_ops->get(key, keylen, db, size);
> +	if (rc) {
> +		kfree(db);
> +		pr_err("Error reading db var: %d\n", rc);
> +		return NULL;
> +	}
> +
> +	return db;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Load the certs contained in the keys databases into the platform trusted
> + * keyring and the blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist
> + * keyring.
> + */
> +static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
> +{
> +	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL;
> +	uint64_t dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0;
> +	int rc = 0;
> +
> +	if (!secvar_ops)
> +		return -ENODEV;
> +
> +	/* Get db, and dbx.  They might not exist, so it isn't
> +	 * an error if we can't get them.
> +	 */
> +	db = get_cert_list("db", 3, &dbsize);
> +	if (!db) {
> +		pr_err("Couldn't get db list from firmware\n");
> +	} else {
> +		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:db",
> +				db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
> +		if (rc)
> +			pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n",
> +					rc);

There's no need to split this line.

> +		kfree(db);
> +	}
> +
> +	dbx = get_cert_list("dbx", 3,  &dbxsize);
> +	if (!dbx) {
> +		pr_info("Couldn't get dbx list from firmware\n");
> +	} else {
> +		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:dbx",
> +				dbx, dbxsize,
> +				get_handler_for_dbx);

Formatting of this line is off.

> +		if (rc)
> +			pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
> +		kfree(dbx);
> +	}
> +
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
	Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
	Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
	Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>,
	George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring
Date: Tue, 03 Sep 2019 18:54:51 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1567551291.4937.8.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1566825818-9731-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com>

On Mon, 2019-08-26 at 09:23 -0400, Nayna Jain wrote:
> The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as
> secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform
> keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This enables
> verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which
> are trusted by firmware.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>

Feel free to add my tag after addressing the formatting issues.

Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..359d5063d4da
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
> + * Author: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> + *
> + *      - loads keys and hashes stored and controlled by the firmware.
> + */
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/cred.h>
> +#include <linux/err.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <asm/secboot.h>
> +#include <asm/secvar.h>
> +#include "keyring_handler.h"
> +
> +/*
> + * Get a certificate list blob from the named secure variable.
> + */
> +static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, uint64_t *size)
> +{
> +	int rc;
> +	void *db;
> +
> +	rc = secvar_ops->get(key, keylen, NULL, size);
> +	if (rc) {
> +		pr_err("Couldn't get size: %d\n", rc);
> +		return NULL;
> +	}
> +
> +	db = kmalloc(*size, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!db)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	rc = secvar_ops->get(key, keylen, db, size);
> +	if (rc) {
> +		kfree(db);
> +		pr_err("Error reading db var: %d\n", rc);
> +		return NULL;
> +	}
> +
> +	return db;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Load the certs contained in the keys databases into the platform trusted
> + * keyring and the blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist
> + * keyring.
> + */
> +static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
> +{
> +	void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL;
> +	uint64_t dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0;
> +	int rc = 0;
> +
> +	if (!secvar_ops)
> +		return -ENODEV;
> +
> +	/* Get db, and dbx.  They might not exist, so it isn't
> +	 * an error if we can't get them.
> +	 */
> +	db = get_cert_list("db", 3, &dbsize);
> +	if (!db) {
> +		pr_err("Couldn't get db list from firmware\n");
> +	} else {
> +		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:db",
> +				db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
> +		if (rc)
> +			pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n",
> +					rc);

There's no need to split this line.

> +		kfree(db);
> +	}
> +
> +	dbx = get_cert_list("dbx", 3,  &dbxsize);
> +	if (!dbx) {
> +		pr_info("Couldn't get dbx list from firmware\n");
> +	} else {
> +		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:dbx",
> +				dbx, dbxsize,
> +				get_handler_for_dbx);

Formatting of this line is off.

> +		if (rc)
> +			pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc);
> +		kfree(dbx);
> +	}
> +
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);


  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-03 22:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-26 13:23 [PATCH v3 0/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 13:23 ` Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 13:23 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 13:23   ` Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 13:23 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 13:23   ` Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 14:01   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 14:01     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 14:12     ` Nayna
2019-08-26 14:12       ` Nayna
2019-08-26 15:01       ` [PATCH] sysfs: add BIN_ATTR_WO() macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 15:01         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-09-03  3:37         ` Michael Ellerman
2019-09-03  3:37           ` Michael Ellerman
2019-09-04 11:36           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-09-04 11:36             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-01 18:08         ` Nayna
2019-10-01 18:16           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-01 18:55             ` Nayna
2019-08-26 14:56   ` [PATCH v3 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 14:56     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 15:46     ` Nayna
2019-08-26 15:46       ` Nayna
2019-08-26 15:57       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 15:57         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 13:23 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 13:23   ` Nayna Jain
2019-09-02 11:55   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-09-02 11:55     ` Michael Ellerman
2019-09-03 22:51     ` Mimi Zohar
2019-09-03 22:51       ` Mimi Zohar
2019-09-05  3:59       ` Michael Ellerman
2019-09-05  3:59         ` Michael Ellerman
2019-08-26 13:23 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 13:23   ` Nayna Jain
2019-09-03 22:54   ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2019-09-03 22:54     ` Mimi Zohar

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