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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Piotr Luc <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	Reza Arbab <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 17:06:23 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170831150623.cljoy6rm72pn24wg@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170724190757.11278-18-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:57PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The guest physical memory area holding the struct pvclock_wall_clock and
> struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info are shared with the hypervisor. Hypervisor
> periodically updates the contents of the memory. When SEV is active, we
> must clear the encryption attributes from the shared memory pages so that
> both hypervisor and guest can access the data.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c  |  5 ++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
> index 726355c..ff50251 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
> @@ -114,10 +114,11 @@ static int vvar_fault(const struct vm_special_mapping *sm,
>  		struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *pvti =
>  			pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va();
>  		if (pvti && vclock_was_used(VCLOCK_PVCLOCK)) {
> -			ret = vm_insert_pfn(
> +			ret = vm_insert_pfn_prot(
>  				vma,
>  				vmf->address,
> -				__pa(pvti) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> +				__pa(pvti) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
> +				pgprot_decrypted(vma->vm_page_prot));
>  		}
>  	} else if (sym_offset == image->sym_hvclock_page) {
>  		struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page *tsc_pg = hv_get_tsc_page();

Yuck, that vvar_fault() function is one unreadable mess.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> index d889676..f3a8101 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
>  #include <linux/sched/clock.h>
>  
> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
>  #include <asm/x86_init.h>
>  #include <asm/reboot.h>
>  #include <asm/kvmclock.h>
> @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ early_param("no-kvmclock", parse_no_kvmclock);
>  
>  /* The hypervisor will put information about time periodically here */
>  static struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *hv_clock;
> -static struct pvclock_wall_clock wall_clock;
> +static struct pvclock_wall_clock *wall_clock;
>  
>  struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va(void)
>  {
> @@ -64,15 +65,18 @@ static void kvm_get_wallclock(struct timespec *now)
>  	int low, high;
>  	int cpu;
>  
> -	low = (int)__pa_symbol(&wall_clock);
> -	high = ((u64)__pa_symbol(&wall_clock) >> 32);
> +	if (!wall_clock)
> +		return;

Hmm, so if you return here, @now will remain unchanged so how is the
caller to know that ->get_wallclock() failed?

Maybe a WARN_ON_ONCE() at least...?

Dunno, what's the policy in kvm if the kvmclock init fails?

Paolo? Radim?

Because it does say:

        printk(KERN_INFO "kvm-clock: Using msrs %x and %x",
                msr_kvm_system_time, msr_kvm_wall_clock);

too early. We can error out later and users will still think it is using
kvmclock ...

Hmmm.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
-- 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
To: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini"
	<pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linuxppc-dev-uLR06cmDAlY/bJ5BZ2RsiQ@public.gmane.org,
	kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Piotr Luc <piotr.luc-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
	Reza Arbab
	<arbab-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Matt Fleming
	<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov"
	<kirill.shutemov-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel
	<ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Andrew Morton
	<akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>,
	Eric
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 17:06:23 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170831150623.cljoy6rm72pn24wg@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170724190757.11278-18-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>

On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:57PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The guest physical memory area holding the struct pvclock_wall_clock and
> struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info are shared with the hypervisor. Hypervisor
> periodically updates the contents of the memory. When SEV is active, we
> must clear the encryption attributes from the shared memory pages so that
> both hypervisor and guest can access the data.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c  |  5 ++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
> index 726355c..ff50251 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
> @@ -114,10 +114,11 @@ static int vvar_fault(const struct vm_special_mapping *sm,
>  		struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *pvti =
>  			pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va();
>  		if (pvti && vclock_was_used(VCLOCK_PVCLOCK)) {
> -			ret = vm_insert_pfn(
> +			ret = vm_insert_pfn_prot(
>  				vma,
>  				vmf->address,
> -				__pa(pvti) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> +				__pa(pvti) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
> +				pgprot_decrypted(vma->vm_page_prot));
>  		}
>  	} else if (sym_offset == image->sym_hvclock_page) {
>  		struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page *tsc_pg = hv_get_tsc_page();

Yuck, that vvar_fault() function is one unreadable mess.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> index d889676..f3a8101 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
>  #include <linux/sched/clock.h>
>  
> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
>  #include <asm/x86_init.h>
>  #include <asm/reboot.h>
>  #include <asm/kvmclock.h>
> @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ early_param("no-kvmclock", parse_no_kvmclock);
>  
>  /* The hypervisor will put information about time periodically here */
>  static struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *hv_clock;
> -static struct pvclock_wall_clock wall_clock;
> +static struct pvclock_wall_clock *wall_clock;
>  
>  struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va(void)
>  {
> @@ -64,15 +65,18 @@ static void kvm_get_wallclock(struct timespec *now)
>  	int low, high;
>  	int cpu;
>  
> -	low = (int)__pa_symbol(&wall_clock);
> -	high = ((u64)__pa_symbol(&wall_clock) >> 32);
> +	if (!wall_clock)
> +		return;

Hmm, so if you return here, @now will remain unchanged so how is the
caller to know that ->get_wallclock() failed?

Maybe a WARN_ON_ONCE() at least...?

Dunno, what's the policy in kvm if the kvmclock init fails?

Paolo? Radim?

Because it does say:

        printk(KERN_INFO "kvm-clock: Using msrs %x and %x",
                msr_kvm_system_time, msr_kvm_wall_clock);

too early. We can error out later and users will still think it is using
kvmclock ...

Hmmm.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
-- 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
To: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini"
	<pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linuxppc-dev-uLR06cmDAlY/bJ5BZ2RsiQ@public.gmane.org,
	kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Piotr Luc <piotr.luc-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
	Reza Arbab
	<arbab-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Matt Fleming
	<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov"
	<kirill.shutemov-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel
	<ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Andrew Morton
	<akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>,
	Eric Biederma
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 17:06:23 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170831150623.cljoy6rm72pn24wg@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170724190757.11278-18-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>

On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:57PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The guest physical memory area holding the struct pvclock_wall_clock and
> struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info are shared with the hypervisor. Hypervisor
> periodically updates the contents of the memory. When SEV is active, we
> must clear the encryption attributes from the shared memory pages so that
> both hypervisor and guest can access the data.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c  |  5 ++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
> index 726355c..ff50251 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
> @@ -114,10 +114,11 @@ static int vvar_fault(const struct vm_special_mapping *sm,
>  		struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *pvti =
>  			pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va();
>  		if (pvti && vclock_was_used(VCLOCK_PVCLOCK)) {
> -			ret = vm_insert_pfn(
> +			ret = vm_insert_pfn_prot(
>  				vma,
>  				vmf->address,
> -				__pa(pvti) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> +				__pa(pvti) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
> +				pgprot_decrypted(vma->vm_page_prot));
>  		}
>  	} else if (sym_offset == image->sym_hvclock_page) {
>  		struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page *tsc_pg = hv_get_tsc_page();

Yuck, that vvar_fault() function is one unreadable mess.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> index d889676..f3a8101 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
>  #include <linux/sched/clock.h>
>  
> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
>  #include <asm/x86_init.h>
>  #include <asm/reboot.h>
>  #include <asm/kvmclock.h>
> @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ early_param("no-kvmclock", parse_no_kvmclock);
>  
>  /* The hypervisor will put information about time periodically here */
>  static struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *hv_clock;
> -static struct pvclock_wall_clock wall_clock;
> +static struct pvclock_wall_clock *wall_clock;
>  
>  struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *pvclock_pvti_cpu0_va(void)
>  {
> @@ -64,15 +65,18 @@ static void kvm_get_wallclock(struct timespec *now)
>  	int low, high;
>  	int cpu;
>  
> -	low = (int)__pa_symbol(&wall_clock);
> -	high = ((u64)__pa_symbol(&wall_clock) >> 32);
> +	if (!wall_clock)
> +		return;

Hmm, so if you return here, @now will remain unchanged so how is the
caller to know that ->get_wallclock() failed?

Maybe a WARN_ON_ONCE() at least...?

Dunno, what's the policy in kvm if the kvmclock init fails?

Paolo? Radim?

Because it does say:

        printk(KERN_INFO "kvm-clock: Using msrs %x and %x",
                msr_kvm_system_time, msr_kvm_wall_clock);

too early. We can error out later and users will still think it is using
kvmclock ...

Hmmm.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
-- 

  reply	other threads:[~2017-08-31 21:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 226+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  5:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25  5:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25  5:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 14:59       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 14:59       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 10:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 10:26     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 10:26     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:36       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:36         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:36         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:58           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:58           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:13             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:13             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:29               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:29               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:33                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:33                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-09 18:17                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17  8:12                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17  8:12                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17  8:12                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26  4:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26  4:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26  4:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-26 16:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-26 16:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-27 13:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:39         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:39         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 14:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 14:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 16:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-10 13:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-10 13:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 13:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 14:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 14:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-27 14:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28  8:47     ` David Laight
2017-07-28  8:47       ` David Laight
2017-07-28  8:47       ` David Laight
2017-08-17 18:21       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:21         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 10:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 10:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 10:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 15:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 15:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31  8:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31  8:26     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31  8:26     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-31 22:19     ` Kees Cook
2017-07-31 22:19     ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-02  4:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-02  4:02     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-02  4:02     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07  3:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-07  3:48     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-07  3:48     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:35       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:35       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  9:51   ` David Laight
2017-07-25  9:51     ` David Laight
2017-07-25  9:51     ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 10:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 19:24       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:24         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26         ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 19:26           ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 19:26           ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 19:26           ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 20:07             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27  7:45             ` David Laight
2017-07-27  7:45               ` David Laight
2017-07-27  7:45               ` David Laight
2017-08-22 16:52             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-22 16:52               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:13                   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:40                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:48                       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:22                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:22                         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:27                         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:27                           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-23 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-23 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-24 18:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-24 18:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-25 12:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-25 12:54         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-25 12:54         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 10:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 10:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 11:49       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 11:49       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-29 10:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-29 10:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 16:18       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 16:18       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 17:46         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 17:46         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-01 22:52           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-01 22:52           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02  3:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-02  3:21             ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-02  3:21             ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-03  2:34             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-03  2:34               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-03  2:34               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:05           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:05             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:05             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:47               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:47               ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-31 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-08-31 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-31 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov

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