From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>, "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>, "Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>, "Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, "Lu Baolu" <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>, "Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, "David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>, "Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>, "Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>, "Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, "Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, "Eric Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, "Benjamin Herrenschmidt" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>, "Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>, "Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>, "Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>, "Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com> Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 13:17:54 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <b2aedd44-ebbc-b196-31d0-0b423f4fa632@amd.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20170725153329.GE26029@nazgul.tnic> On 7/25/2017 10:33 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 10:29:40AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: >> But early_identify_cpu() calls get_cpu_cap() which will check for cpuid >> leaf 0x80000008 support and set x86_phys_bits. > > Right, but it can't be less than 32, can it? And if it is more than 32 > bits, then it probably doesn't really matter on 32-bit. Unless it is > less than 36 bits and you do PAE... > >> I'll try to build and run a 32-bit kernel and see how this all flows. > > Yeah, that would be good. Ok, finally got around to running a 32-bit kernel and it reports x86_phys_bits as 48. Thanks, Tom > > Thanks. >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>, "David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>, "Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>, x86@kernel.org, "Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>, "Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>, "Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>, "Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>, "Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 13:17:54 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <b2aedd44-ebbc-b196-31d0-0b423f4fa632@amd.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20170725153329.GE26029@nazgul.tnic> On 7/25/2017 10:33 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 10:29:40AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: >> But early_identify_cpu() calls get_cpu_cap() which will check for cpuid >> leaf 0x80000008 support and set x86_phys_bits. > > Right, but it can't be less than 32, can it? And if it is more than 32 > bits, then it probably doesn't really matter on 32-bit. Unless it is > less than 36 bits and you do PAE... > >> I'll try to build and run a 32-bit kernel and see how this all flows. > > Yeah, that would be good. Ok, finally got around to running a 32-bit kernel and it reports x86_phys_bits as 48. Thanks, Tom > > Thanks. >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-09 18:23 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 226+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-09 18:17 ` Tom Lendacky [this message] 2017-08-09 18:17 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight 2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight 2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight 2017-08-17 18:21 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 18:21 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-28 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-28 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-28 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight 2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight 2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight 2017-07-26 10:45 ` Arnd Bergmann 2017-07-26 10:45 ` Arnd Bergmann 2017-07-26 19:24 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-26 19:24 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin 2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin 2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin 2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin 2017-07-26 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-26 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight 2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight 2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight 2017-08-22 16:52 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-22 16:52 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-09-15 12:24 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-09-15 12:24 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-09-15 14:13 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-15 14:13 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-15 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-09-15 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-09-15 14:48 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-15 14:48 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-15 16:22 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-09-15 16:22 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-09-15 16:27 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-15 16:27 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh 2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=b2aedd44-ebbc-b196-31d0-0b423f4fa632@amd.com \ --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \ --cc=airlied@redhat.com \ --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \ --cc=arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com \ --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \ --cc=arnd@arndb.de \ --cc=baolu.lu@linux.intel.com \ --cc=benh@kernel.crashing.org \ --cc=bp@suse.de \ --cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \ --cc=cl@linux.com \ --cc=corbet@lwn.net \ --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \ --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \ --cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \ --cc=hpa@zytor.com \ --cc=keescook@chromium.org \ --cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \ --cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \ --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=labbott@redhat.com \ --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \ --cc=luto@kernel.org \ --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \ --cc=mingo@redhat.com \ --cc=paulus@samba.org \ --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \ --cc=piotr.luc@intel.com \ --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \ --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \ --cc=tj@kernel.org \ --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \ --cc=x86@kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.