From: rgb@redhat.com (Richard Guy Briggs) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V3 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 02:57:23 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170904065723.GB24692@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20170902053732.GA7726@mail.hallyn.com> On 2017-09-02 00:37, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > On Fri, Sep 01, 2017 at 06:18:43AM -0400, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > On 2017-08-28 07:08, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > On 2017-08-28 05:19, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > > On 2017-08-24 12:06, Kees Cook wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Aug 24, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote: > > > > > > Quoting Richard Guy Briggs (rgb at redhat.com): > > > > > >> On 2017-08-24 11:03, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > > > >> > Quoting Richard Guy Briggs (rgb at redhat.com): > > > > > >> > > Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of the > > > > > >> > > negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse. > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > > > > > >> > > --- > > > > > >> > > security/commoncap.c | 16 ++++++++++------ > > > > > >> > > 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > > > > > >> > > index b7fbf77..6f05ec0 100644 > > > > > >> > > --- a/security/commoncap.c > > > > > >> > > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > > > > > >> > > @@ -513,6 +513,12 @@ void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap, bool *effec > > > > > >> > > *effective = true; > > > > > >> > > } > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > It's subjective and so might be just me, but I think I'd find it easier > > > > > >> > to read if it was cap_gained(source, target, field) and cap_grew(cred, source, target) > > > > > >> > > > > > >> In more than one place, I wanted to put the parameter that I was trying > > > > > >> to read aloud closest to the function name to make reading it flow > > > > > >> better, leaving the parameters less critical to comprehension towards > > > > > >> the end. > > > > > > > > > > > > And I see that in the final patch it looks nicer the way you have it. > > > > > > > > > > > >> > This looks correct though, so either way > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Thanks. Did you want to put this through, or send it through Paul's > > > > > >> audit tree? > > > > > > > > > > > > If Paul's around I'm happy to have it go through his tree. > > > > > > > > > > Is this series based against -next with the changes that touch commoncap.c? > > > > > > > > This series is against pcmoore's audit/next tree (I know I'm missing two > > > > commits but they pose no conflict.). > > > > > > > > Which -next tree are you talking about? I might guess > > > > linux-security/next or linux-next/master (I have at least a dozen "next" > > > > in my git repo config.) > > > > > > > > I did eventually find your patches in sfr's tree and in your for-next/kspp branch. > > > > > > > > I'll have a look at the commoncap.c changes including the elimination of cap_effective. > > > > > > > > > Also, did you validate this with the existing LTP tests and selftests? > > > > > > > > > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/commit/?h=for-next/secureexec&id=ee67ae7ef6ff499137292ac8a9dfe86096796283 > > > > > > > > No. I will look into doing that. Thanks for the suggestion. > > > > Ok, I'm running the kernel self-test > > > > make TARGETS="capabilities" kselftest > > > > and getting a good way through it and then hit this on an unmodified kernel: > > > > [RUN] +++ Tests with uid != 0 +++ > > [NOTE] Using global UIDs for tests > > [OK] Child succeeded > > test_execve: chdir to private tmpfs: Permission denied > > Hm, just a hunch, anything in syslog? The fact that you can mount the > private tmp but not chdir to it just sounds like selinux contexts. Nothing in journalctl -b, nothing in /var/log > Might run it under strace... strace reports: chdir("/root/rgb/git/linux-2.6/tools/testing/selftests/capabilities") = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) An audit rule only reports the previous success. Problem looks to be the nfs mount on which the test is run. Running it locally works fine. > Boy, that's an interesting testcase. > > > [FAIL] Child failed > > selftests: test_execve [FAIL] > > > > Is this a known limitation or have I got something weird in my runtime > > environment that is killing it at this part of the test? Ok, cleared that up... Next I'm trying to run the ltp and it hangs on several tests and eventually trashes my nfs mount and can't make further progress. Kees, what version of the LTP do you run and what subset of tests do you suggest to validate things? I'm running the upstream clone git. - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>, linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, linux-audit@redhat.com, James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2017 02:57:23 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170904065723.GB24692@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20170902053732.GA7726@mail.hallyn.com> On 2017-09-02 00:37, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > On Fri, Sep 01, 2017 at 06:18:43AM -0400, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > On 2017-08-28 07:08, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > On 2017-08-28 05:19, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > > On 2017-08-24 12:06, Kees Cook wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Aug 24, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote: > > > > > > Quoting Richard Guy Briggs (rgb@redhat.com): > > > > > >> On 2017-08-24 11:03, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > > > >> > Quoting Richard Guy Briggs (rgb@redhat.com): > > > > > >> > > Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of the > > > > > >> > > negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse. > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > > > > > >> > > --- > > > > > >> > > security/commoncap.c | 16 ++++++++++------ > > > > > >> > > 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > > > > > >> > > index b7fbf77..6f05ec0 100644 > > > > > >> > > --- a/security/commoncap.c > > > > > >> > > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > > > > > >> > > @@ -513,6 +513,12 @@ void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap, bool *effec > > > > > >> > > *effective = true; > > > > > >> > > } > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > It's subjective and so might be just me, but I think I'd find it easier > > > > > >> > to read if it was cap_gained(source, target, field) and cap_grew(cred, source, target) > > > > > >> > > > > > >> In more than one place, I wanted to put the parameter that I was trying > > > > > >> to read aloud closest to the function name to make reading it flow > > > > > >> better, leaving the parameters less critical to comprehension towards > > > > > >> the end. > > > > > > > > > > > > And I see that in the final patch it looks nicer the way you have it. > > > > > > > > > > > >> > This looks correct though, so either way > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Thanks. Did you want to put this through, or send it through Paul's > > > > > >> audit tree? > > > > > > > > > > > > If Paul's around I'm happy to have it go through his tree. > > > > > > > > > > Is this series based against -next with the changes that touch commoncap.c? > > > > > > > > This series is against pcmoore's audit/next tree (I know I'm missing two > > > > commits but they pose no conflict.). > > > > > > > > Which -next tree are you talking about? I might guess > > > > linux-security/next or linux-next/master (I have at least a dozen "next" > > > > in my git repo config.) > > > > > > > > I did eventually find your patches in sfr's tree and in your for-next/kspp branch. > > > > > > > > I'll have a look at the commoncap.c changes including the elimination of cap_effective. > > > > > > > > > Also, did you validate this with the existing LTP tests and selftests? > > > > > > > > > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/commit/?h=for-next/secureexec&id=ee67ae7ef6ff499137292ac8a9dfe86096796283 > > > > > > > > No. I will look into doing that. Thanks for the suggestion. > > > > Ok, I'm running the kernel self-test > > > > make TARGETS="capabilities" kselftest > > > > and getting a good way through it and then hit this on an unmodified kernel: > > > > [RUN] +++ Tests with uid != 0 +++ > > [NOTE] Using global UIDs for tests > > [OK] Child succeeded > > test_execve: chdir to private tmpfs: Permission denied > > Hm, just a hunch, anything in syslog? The fact that you can mount the > private tmp but not chdir to it just sounds like selinux contexts. Nothing in journalctl -b, nothing in /var/log > Might run it under strace... strace reports: chdir("/root/rgb/git/linux-2.6/tools/testing/selftests/capabilities") = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) An audit rule only reports the previous success. Problem looks to be the nfs mount on which the test is run. Running it locally works fine. > Boy, that's an interesting testcase. > > > [FAIL] Child failed > > selftests: test_execve [FAIL] > > > > Is this a known limitation or have I got something weird in my runtime > > environment that is killing it at this part of the test? Ok, cleared that up... Next I'm trying to run the ltp and it hangs on several tests and eventually trashes my nfs mount and can't make further progress. Kees, what version of the LTP do you run and what subset of tests do you suggest to validate things? I'm running the upstream clone git. - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-04 6:57 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 114+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-08-23 10:12 [PATCH V3 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 15:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 15:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 5:55 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 5:55 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 10:49 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-25 10:49 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:19 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:19 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 19:06 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-24 19:06 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-24 21:17 ` Paul Moore 2017-08-24 21:17 ` Paul Moore 2017-08-28 9:19 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-28 9:19 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-28 11:08 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-28 11:08 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-01 10:18 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-01 10:18 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-02 5:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-09-02 5:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-09-04 6:57 ` Richard Guy Briggs [this message] 2017-09-04 6:57 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:45 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:45 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-25 5:56 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 5:56 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 15:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-25 15:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-25 18:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 18:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 5:56 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 5:56 ` James Morris 2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 5:58 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 5:58 ` James Morris 2017-08-28 12:03 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-28 12:03 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-31 14:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-31 14:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 05/10] capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 5:59 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 5:59 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 15:06 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-25 15:06 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-25 18:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 18:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 19:45 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-25 19:45 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-25 20:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 20:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-28 1:32 ` James Morris 2017-08-28 1:32 ` James Morris 2017-08-28 9:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-28 9:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-28 20:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-28 20:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 6:01 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 6:01 ` James Morris 2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 07/10] capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 5:47 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 5:47 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 15:11 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-25 15:11 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-25 18:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 18:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 08/10] capabilities: invert logic for clarity Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 5:47 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 5:47 ` James Morris 2017-08-23 10:13 ` [PATCH V3 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:13 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:29 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:29 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:44 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:44 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 5:48 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 5:48 ` James Morris 2017-08-23 10:13 ` [PATCH V3 10/10] capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-23 10:13 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-08-24 16:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-24 16:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-08-25 5:50 ` James Morris 2017-08-25 5:50 ` James Morris
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