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From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
To: Tomasz Figa <tfiga@chromium.org>
Cc: "Dmitry Morozov" <dmitry.morozov@opensynergy.com>,
	stevensd@chromium.org, virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org,
	"Keiichi Watanabe" <keiichiw@chromium.org>,
	"Alexandre Courbot" <acourbot@chromium.org>,
	alexlau@chromium.org, dgreid@chromium.org,
	"Stéphane Marchesin" <marcheu@chromium.org>,
	"Pawel Osciak" <posciak@chromium.org>,
	"Hans Verkuil" <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>,
	"Linux Media Mailing List" <linux-media@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Daniel Vetter" <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Subject: Re: [virtio-dev] [PATCH] [RFC RESEND] vdec: Add virtio video decode device specification
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2019 09:19:52 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191017071952.s3dq2oxdiy3khp5w@sirius.home.kraxel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAAFQd5DuChujakwmhtQ8v2CSLFqVYjLz9eGHuqrQnJ7apft+3Q@mail.gmail.com>

  Hi,

> That said, Chrome OS would use a similar model, except that we don't
> use ION. We would likely use minigbm backed by virtio-gpu to allocate
> appropriate secure buffers for us and then import them to the V4L2
> driver.

What exactly is a "secure buffer"?  I guess a gem object where read
access is not allowed, only scanout to display?  Who enforces this?
The hardware?  Or the kernel driver?

It might make sense for virtio-gpu to know that concept, to allow guests
ask for secure buffers.

And of course we'll need some way to pass around identifiers for these
(and maybe other) buffers (from virtio-gpu device via guest drivers to
virtio-vdec device).  virtio-gpu guest driver could generate a uuid for
that, attach it to the dma-buf and also notify the host so qemu can
maintain a uuid -> buffer lookup table.

cheers,
  Gerd


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
To: Tomasz Figa <tfiga@chromium.org>
Cc: "Dmitry Morozov" <dmitry.morozov@opensynergy.com>,
	stevensd@chromium.org, virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org,
	"Keiichi Watanabe" <keiichiw@chromium.org>,
	"Alexandre Courbot" <acourbot@chromium.org>,
	alexlau@chromium.org, dgreid@chromium.org,
	"Stéphane Marchesin" <marcheu@chromium.org>,
	"Pawel Osciak" <posciak@chromium.org>,
	"Hans Verkuil" <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>,
	"Linux Media Mailing List" <linux-media@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Daniel Vetter" <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Subject: Re: [virtio-dev] [PATCH] [RFC RESEND] vdec: Add virtio video decode device specification
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2019 09:19:52 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191017071952.s3dq2oxdiy3khp5w@sirius.home.kraxel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAAFQd5DuChujakwmhtQ8v2CSLFqVYjLz9eGHuqrQnJ7apft+3Q@mail.gmail.com>

  Hi,

> That said, Chrome OS would use a similar model, except that we don't
> use ION. We would likely use minigbm backed by virtio-gpu to allocate
> appropriate secure buffers for us and then import them to the V4L2
> driver.

What exactly is a "secure buffer"?  I guess a gem object where read
access is not allowed, only scanout to display?  Who enforces this?
The hardware?  Or the kernel driver?

It might make sense for virtio-gpu to know that concept, to allow guests
ask for secure buffers.

And of course we'll need some way to pass around identifiers for these
(and maybe other) buffers (from virtio-gpu device via guest drivers to
virtio-vdec device).  virtio-gpu guest driver could generate a uuid for
that, attach it to the dma-buf and also notify the host so qemu can
maintain a uuid -> buffer lookup table.

cheers,
  Gerd


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  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-17  7:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-19  9:34 [PATCH] [RFC RESEND] vdec: Add virtio video decode device specification Keiichi Watanabe
2019-09-19  9:34 ` [virtio-dev] " Keiichi Watanabe
2019-09-19  9:52 ` Hans Verkuil
2019-09-19 11:15   ` Keiichi Watanabe
2019-09-19 11:15     ` [virtio-dev] " Keiichi Watanabe
2019-09-19 11:17     ` Keiichi Watanabe
2019-09-19 11:17       ` [virtio-dev] " Keiichi Watanabe
2019-09-23  8:56 ` [virtio-dev] " Gerd Hoffmann
2019-09-23  8:56   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-05  6:08   ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-05  6:08     ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-07 14:00     ` Dmitry Morozov
2019-10-07 14:00       ` Dmitry Morozov
2019-10-07 14:14       ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-07 14:14         ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-07 15:09         ` Dmitry Morozov
2019-10-07 15:09           ` Dmitry Morozov
2019-10-09  3:55           ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-09  3:55             ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-11  8:53             ` Dmitry Morozov
2019-10-11  8:53               ` Dmitry Morozov
2019-10-14 12:34               ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-14 12:34                 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-14 13:05                 ` Dmitry Morozov
2019-10-14 13:05                   ` Dmitry Morozov
2019-10-15  7:54                   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-15  7:54                     ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-15 14:06                     ` Dmitry Morozov
2019-10-15 14:06                       ` Dmitry Morozov
2019-10-17  8:06                       ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-17  8:06                         ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-17  6:40               ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-17  6:40                 ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-17  7:19                 ` Gerd Hoffmann [this message]
2019-10-17  7:19                   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-17  8:11                   ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-17  8:11                     ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-17 10:13                     ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-17 10:13                       ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-29  7:39                       ` David Stevens
2019-10-31  7:30                         ` Keiichi Watanabe
2019-10-31  7:30                           ` Keiichi Watanabe
2019-10-31  9:10                       ` David Stevens
2019-10-31  9:10                         ` David Stevens
2019-11-07  8:29                         ` Keiichi Watanabe
2019-11-07  8:29                           ` Keiichi Watanabe
2019-10-14 12:19     ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-14 12:19       ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-17  6:58       ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-17  6:58         ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-17  7:44         ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-17  7:44           ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-17  8:23           ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-17  8:23             ` Tomasz Figa
2019-10-17 10:22             ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-17 10:22               ` Gerd Hoffmann
2019-10-17 15:00         ` Frank Yang
2019-10-17 16:22           ` Frank Yang
2019-10-17  7:06       ` David Stevens

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