From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>, Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>, Valentin Rothberg <vrothber@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>, kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Hubertus Franke <frankeh@us.ibm.com>, Jack Chen <jianyan2@illinois.edu>, Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>, Josep Torrellas <torrella@illinois.edu>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, Tianyin Xu <tyxu@illinois.edu> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 seccomp 6/6] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 20:26:58 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <202009242021.B0FB41084@keescook> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CABqSeASrwXwSHHAsVwjG6vCLbfXpkp+42HWW27MUK2zgMnAu8w@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 10:11:17PM -0500, YiFei Zhu wrote: > On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 6:56 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > > > This file is guarded by CONFIG_PROC_SECCOMP_CACHE with a default > > The question of permissions is my central concern here: who should see > > this? Some contained processes have been intentionally blocked from > > self-introspection so even the "standard" high bar of "ptrace attach > > allowed?" can't always be sufficient. > > > > My compromise about filter visibility in the past was saying that > > CAP_SYS_ADMIN was required (see seccomp_get_filter()). I'm nervous to > > weaken this. (There is some work that hasn't been sent upstream yet that > > is looking to expose the filter _contents_ via /proc that has been > > nervous too.) > > > > Now full contents vs "allow"/"filter" are certainly different things, > > but I don't feel like I've got enough evidence to show that this > > introspection would help debugging enough to justify the partially > > imagined safety of not exposing it to potential attackers. > > Agreed. I'm inclined to make it CONFIG_DEBUG_SECCOMP_CACHE and guarded > by a CAP just to make it "debug only". Yeah; I just can't quite see what the best direction is here. I will ponder this more. As I mentioned, it does seem handy. :) > Is there something to stop a config from being enabled in an > allyesconfig? I remember seeing something like that. Else if someone > is manually selecting we can add a help text with a big banner... Yeah, allyesconfig and allmodconfig both effectively set CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST. Anyway, likely a caps test will end up being the way to do it. > > > But behavior-wise, yeah, I like it; I'm fine with human-readable and > > full AUDIT_ARCH values. (Though, as devil's advocate again, to repeat > > Jann's own words back: do we want to add this only to have a new UAPI to > > support going forward?) > > Is this something we want to keep stable? The Prime Directive of "never break userspace" is really "never break userspace in a way that someone notices". So if nothing ever parses that file, then we don't have to keep it stable, but if something does, and we change it, we have to fix it. So, a capability test means very few things will touch it, and if we decide it's not a big deal, we can relax permissions in the future. -- Kees Cook _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com> Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>, Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>, Hubertus Franke <frankeh@us.ibm.com>, Jack Chen <jianyan2@illinois.edu>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Josep Torrellas <torrella@illinois.edu>, Tianyin Xu <tyxu@illinois.edu>, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>, Valentin Rothberg <vrothber@redhat.com>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 seccomp 6/6] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 20:26:58 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <202009242021.B0FB41084@keescook> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CABqSeASrwXwSHHAsVwjG6vCLbfXpkp+42HWW27MUK2zgMnAu8w@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 10:11:17PM -0500, YiFei Zhu wrote: > On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 6:56 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > > > This file is guarded by CONFIG_PROC_SECCOMP_CACHE with a default > > The question of permissions is my central concern here: who should see > > this? Some contained processes have been intentionally blocked from > > self-introspection so even the "standard" high bar of "ptrace attach > > allowed?" can't always be sufficient. > > > > My compromise about filter visibility in the past was saying that > > CAP_SYS_ADMIN was required (see seccomp_get_filter()). I'm nervous to > > weaken this. (There is some work that hasn't been sent upstream yet that > > is looking to expose the filter _contents_ via /proc that has been > > nervous too.) > > > > Now full contents vs "allow"/"filter" are certainly different things, > > but I don't feel like I've got enough evidence to show that this > > introspection would help debugging enough to justify the partially > > imagined safety of not exposing it to potential attackers. > > Agreed. I'm inclined to make it CONFIG_DEBUG_SECCOMP_CACHE and guarded > by a CAP just to make it "debug only". Yeah; I just can't quite see what the best direction is here. I will ponder this more. As I mentioned, it does seem handy. :) > Is there something to stop a config from being enabled in an > allyesconfig? I remember seeing something like that. Else if someone > is manually selecting we can add a help text with a big banner... Yeah, allyesconfig and allmodconfig both effectively set CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST. Anyway, likely a caps test will end up being the way to do it. > > > But behavior-wise, yeah, I like it; I'm fine with human-readable and > > full AUDIT_ARCH values. (Though, as devil's advocate again, to repeat > > Jann's own words back: do we want to add this only to have a new UAPI to > > support going forward?) > > Is this something we want to keep stable? The Prime Directive of "never break userspace" is really "never break userspace in a way that someone notices". So if nothing ever parses that file, then we don't have to keep it stable, but if something does, and we change it, we have to fix it. So, a capability test means very few things will touch it, and if we decide it's not a big deal, we can relax permissions in the future. -- Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-25 3:27 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 302+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-09-21 5:35 [RFC PATCH seccomp 0/2] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of arg-independent filter results that allow syscalls YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 5:35 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH seccomp 1/2] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is arg-dependent YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 5:35 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 17:47 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-21 17:47 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-21 18:38 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-21 18:38 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-21 23:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 23:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-22 0:25 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-22 0:25 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-22 0:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-22 0:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH seccomp 2/2] seccomp/cache: Cache filter results that allow syscalls YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 5:35 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 18:08 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-21 18:08 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-21 22:50 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 22:50 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 22:57 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-21 22:57 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-21 23:08 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 23:08 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 2/6] asm/syscall.h: Add syscall_arches[] array Kees Cook 2020-09-25 0:01 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 0:15 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-25 0:15 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-25 0:18 ` Al Viro 2020-09-25 0:18 ` Al Viro 2020-09-25 0:24 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-25 0:24 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-25 1:27 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 1:27 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 3:09 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 3:09 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 3:28 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 3:28 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 16:39 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 16:39 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 5:48 ` [RFC PATCH seccomp 0/2] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of arg-independent filter results that allow syscalls Sargun Dhillon 2020-09-21 5:48 ` Sargun Dhillon 2020-09-21 7:13 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 7:13 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 8:30 ` Christian Brauner 2020-09-21 8:30 ` Christian Brauner 2020-09-21 8:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 8:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 13:51 ` Tycho Andersen 2020-09-21 13:51 ` Tycho Andersen 2020-09-21 15:27 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 15:27 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 16:39 ` Tycho Andersen 2020-09-21 16:39 ` Tycho Andersen 2020-09-21 22:57 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 22:57 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 19:16 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-21 19:16 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-21 19:35 ` Hubertus Franke 2020-09-21 19:45 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-21 19:45 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-23 19:26 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-23 19:26 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-23 22:54 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-23 22:54 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 6:52 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 6:52 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 0/6] " YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 1/6] seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 2/6] asm/syscall.h: Add syscall_arches[] array YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 3/6] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is arg-dependent YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 4/6] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist for fast path YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 5/6] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 6/6] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 0/6] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of arg-independent filter results that allow syscalls YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 1/6] seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 19:11 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 19:11 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-27 9:52 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-10-27 9:52 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-10-27 19:08 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-27 19:08 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-28 0:06 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-28 0:06 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-28 8:18 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-10-28 8:18 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-10-28 9:34 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-28 9:34 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 2/6] asm/syscall.h: Add syscall_arches[] array YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 13:47 ` David Laight 2020-09-24 13:47 ` David Laight 2020-09-24 14:16 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 14:16 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 14:20 ` David Laight 2020-09-24 14:20 ` David Laight 2020-09-24 14:37 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 14:37 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 16:02 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 16:02 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 3/6] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is arg-dependent YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 23:25 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 23:25 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 3:04 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 3:04 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 16:45 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 16:45 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 19:42 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 19:42 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 19:51 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-25 19:51 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-25 20:37 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 20:37 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 21:07 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-25 21:07 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-25 23:49 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 23:49 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-26 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-26 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-26 1:23 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-26 1:23 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-26 2:47 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-26 2:47 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-26 4:35 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-26 4:35 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 4/6] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist for fast path YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 23:46 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 23:46 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 1:55 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 1:55 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 5/6] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 23:47 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 23:47 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 1:35 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 1:35 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 6/6] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 23:56 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 23:56 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 3:11 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 3:11 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 3:26 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2020-09-25 3:26 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 0/5] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of constant allow filter results YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 1/5] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 21:21 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 21:21 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 21:33 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-30 21:33 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-30 22:53 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 22:53 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 23:15 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-30 23:15 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 2/5] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 22:24 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-30 22:24 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-30 22:49 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 22:49 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-01 11:28 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 11:28 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 21:08 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-01 21:08 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-30 22:40 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 22:40 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-01 11:52 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 11:52 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 21:05 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-01 21:05 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-02 11:08 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-02 11:08 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 4:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 4:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 5:41 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 5:41 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 3/5] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist for fast path YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 21:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 21:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 0:17 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 0:17 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 5:35 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 5:35 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 4/5] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 5/5] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 22:00 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-30 22:00 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-30 23:12 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 23:12 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-01 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 16:05 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-01 16:05 ` Jann Horn 2020-10-01 16:18 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 16:18 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 22:59 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 22:59 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 23:08 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-30 23:08 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-30 23:21 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 23:21 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 0/5] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of constant allow filter results YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 1/5] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist bitmap for fast path YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 21:30 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-09 21:30 ` Jann Horn 2020-10-09 23:18 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 23:18 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 2/5] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 21:30 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-09 21:30 ` Jann Horn 2020-10-09 22:47 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 22:47 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 3/5] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-10-09 17:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-10-09 18:32 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 18:32 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 20:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-10-09 20:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 4/5] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 5/5] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 21:24 ` kernel test robot 2020-10-09 21:24 ` kernel test robot 2020-10-09 21:24 ` kernel test robot 2020-10-09 21:45 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-09 21:45 ` Jann Horn 2020-10-09 23:14 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 23:14 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-10 13:26 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-10 13:26 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-12 22:57 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-12 22:57 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-13 0:31 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-13 0:31 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-22 20:52 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-22 20:52 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-22 22:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-22 22:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-22 23:40 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-22 23:40 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-24 2:51 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-24 2:51 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-30 12:18 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-30 12:18 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-11-03 13:00 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-11-03 13:00 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-11-04 0:29 ` Kees Cook 2020-11-04 0:29 ` Kees Cook 2020-11-04 11:40 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-11-04 11:40 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-11-04 18:57 ` Kees Cook 2020-11-04 18:57 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 0/5]seccomp: Add bitmap cache of constant allow filter results YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 1/5] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist bitmap for fast path YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-12 6:42 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-12 6:42 ` Jann Horn 2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 2/5] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-12 6:46 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-12 6:46 ` Jann Horn 2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 3/5] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 4/5] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 5/5] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-12 6:49 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-12 6:49 ` Jann Horn 2020-12-17 12:14 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-12-17 12:14 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-12-17 18:34 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-12-17 18:34 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-12-18 12:35 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-12-18 12:35 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-10-27 19:14 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 0/5]seccomp: Add bitmap cache of constant allow filter results Kees Cook 2020-10-27 19:14 ` Kees Cook
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