From: Jann Horn via Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org> To: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>, Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>, Valentin Rothberg <vrothber@redhat.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>, kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Hubertus Franke <frankeh@us.ibm.com>, David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>, Jack Chen <jianyan2@illinois.edu>, Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>, Josep Torrellas <torrella@illinois.edu>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, Tianyin Xu <tyxu@illinois.edu> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 seccomp 5/5] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 23:45:00 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAG48ez1zQkoFMpFaxnL-xmzdkJZ+KN-CcEnyvB6ZpPCfwb4=bg@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <c2077b8a86c6d82d611007d81ce81d32f718ec59.1602263422.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu> On Fri, Oct 9, 2020 at 7:15 PM YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com> wrote: > Currently the kernel does not provide an infrastructure to translate > architecture numbers to a human-readable name. Translating syscall > numbers to syscall names is possible through FTRACE_SYSCALL > infrastructure but it does not provide support for compat syscalls. > > This will create a file for each PID as /proc/pid/seccomp_cache. > The file will be empty when no seccomp filters are loaded, or be > in the format of: > <arch name> <decimal syscall number> <ALLOW | FILTER> > where ALLOW means the cache is guaranteed to allow the syscall, > and filter means the cache will pass the syscall to the BPF filter. > > For the docker default profile on x86_64 it looks like: > x86_64 0 ALLOW > x86_64 1 ALLOW > x86_64 2 ALLOW > x86_64 3 ALLOW > [...] > x86_64 132 ALLOW > x86_64 133 ALLOW > x86_64 134 FILTER > x86_64 135 FILTER > x86_64 136 FILTER > x86_64 137 ALLOW > x86_64 138 ALLOW > x86_64 139 FILTER > x86_64 140 ALLOW > x86_64 141 ALLOW > [...] > > This file is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG with a default > of N because I think certain users of seccomp might not want the > application to know which syscalls are definitely usable. For > the same reason, it is also guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. > > Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3Ofqp4crXGksLmZY6=fGrF_tWyUCg7PBkAetvbbOPeOA@mail.gmail.com/ > Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu> [...] > diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig [...] > +config SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG > + bool "Show seccomp filter cache status in /proc/pid/seccomp_cache" > + depends on SECCOMP > + depends on SECCOMP_FILTER > + depends on PROC_FS > + help > + This is enables /proc/pid/seccomp_cache interface to monitor nit: s/This is enables/This enables the/ > + seccomp cache data. The file format is subject to change. Reading > + the file requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. > + > + This option is for debugging only. Enabling present the risk that nit: *presents > + an adversary may be able to infer the seccomp filter logic. [...] > +int proc_pid_seccomp_cache(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, > + struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) > +{ > + struct seccomp_filter *f; > + unsigned long flags; > + > + /* > + * We don't want some sandboxed process know what their seccomp s/know/to know/ > + * filters consist of. > + */ > + if (!file_ns_capable(m->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + return -EACCES; > + > + if (!lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) > + return 0; maybe return -ESRCH here so that userspace can distinguish between an exiting process and a process with no filters? > + f = READ_ONCE(task->seccomp.filter); > + if (!f) { > + unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); > + return 0; > + } [...] _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> To: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com> Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>, Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>, Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>, Hubertus Franke <frankeh@us.ibm.com>, Jack Chen <jianyan2@illinois.edu>, Josep Torrellas <torrella@illinois.edu>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Tianyin Xu <tyxu@illinois.edu>, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>, Valentin Rothberg <vrothber@redhat.com>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 seccomp 5/5] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 23:45:00 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAG48ez1zQkoFMpFaxnL-xmzdkJZ+KN-CcEnyvB6ZpPCfwb4=bg@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <c2077b8a86c6d82d611007d81ce81d32f718ec59.1602263422.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu> On Fri, Oct 9, 2020 at 7:15 PM YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com> wrote: > Currently the kernel does not provide an infrastructure to translate > architecture numbers to a human-readable name. Translating syscall > numbers to syscall names is possible through FTRACE_SYSCALL > infrastructure but it does not provide support for compat syscalls. > > This will create a file for each PID as /proc/pid/seccomp_cache. > The file will be empty when no seccomp filters are loaded, or be > in the format of: > <arch name> <decimal syscall number> <ALLOW | FILTER> > where ALLOW means the cache is guaranteed to allow the syscall, > and filter means the cache will pass the syscall to the BPF filter. > > For the docker default profile on x86_64 it looks like: > x86_64 0 ALLOW > x86_64 1 ALLOW > x86_64 2 ALLOW > x86_64 3 ALLOW > [...] > x86_64 132 ALLOW > x86_64 133 ALLOW > x86_64 134 FILTER > x86_64 135 FILTER > x86_64 136 FILTER > x86_64 137 ALLOW > x86_64 138 ALLOW > x86_64 139 FILTER > x86_64 140 ALLOW > x86_64 141 ALLOW > [...] > > This file is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG with a default > of N because I think certain users of seccomp might not want the > application to know which syscalls are definitely usable. For > the same reason, it is also guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. > > Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3Ofqp4crXGksLmZY6=fGrF_tWyUCg7PBkAetvbbOPeOA@mail.gmail.com/ > Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu> [...] > diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig [...] > +config SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG > + bool "Show seccomp filter cache status in /proc/pid/seccomp_cache" > + depends on SECCOMP > + depends on SECCOMP_FILTER > + depends on PROC_FS > + help > + This is enables /proc/pid/seccomp_cache interface to monitor nit: s/This is enables/This enables the/ > + seccomp cache data. The file format is subject to change. Reading > + the file requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. > + > + This option is for debugging only. Enabling present the risk that nit: *presents > + an adversary may be able to infer the seccomp filter logic. [...] > +int proc_pid_seccomp_cache(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, > + struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) > +{ > + struct seccomp_filter *f; > + unsigned long flags; > + > + /* > + * We don't want some sandboxed process know what their seccomp s/know/to know/ > + * filters consist of. > + */ > + if (!file_ns_capable(m->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + return -EACCES; > + > + if (!lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) > + return 0; maybe return -ESRCH here so that userspace can distinguish between an exiting process and a process with no filters? > + f = READ_ONCE(task->seccomp.filter); > + if (!f) { > + unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); > + return 0; > + } [...]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-09 21:45 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 302+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-09-21 5:35 [RFC PATCH seccomp 0/2] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of arg-independent filter results that allow syscalls YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 5:35 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH seccomp 1/2] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is arg-dependent YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 5:35 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 17:47 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-21 17:47 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-21 18:38 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-21 18:38 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-21 23:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 23:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-22 0:25 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-22 0:25 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-22 0:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-22 0:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH seccomp 2/2] seccomp/cache: Cache filter results that allow syscalls YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 5:35 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 18:08 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-21 18:08 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-21 22:50 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 22:50 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 22:57 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-21 22:57 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-21 23:08 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 23:08 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 2/6] asm/syscall.h: Add syscall_arches[] array Kees Cook 2020-09-25 0:01 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 0:15 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-25 0:15 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-25 0:18 ` Al Viro 2020-09-25 0:18 ` Al Viro 2020-09-25 0:24 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-25 0:24 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-25 1:27 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 1:27 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 3:09 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 3:09 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 3:28 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 3:28 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 16:39 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 16:39 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 5:48 ` [RFC PATCH seccomp 0/2] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of arg-independent filter results that allow syscalls Sargun Dhillon 2020-09-21 5:48 ` Sargun Dhillon 2020-09-21 7:13 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 7:13 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 8:30 ` Christian Brauner 2020-09-21 8:30 ` Christian Brauner 2020-09-21 8:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 8:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 13:51 ` Tycho Andersen 2020-09-21 13:51 ` Tycho Andersen 2020-09-21 15:27 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 15:27 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 16:39 ` Tycho Andersen 2020-09-21 16:39 ` Tycho Andersen 2020-09-21 22:57 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 22:57 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-21 19:16 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-21 19:16 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-21 19:35 ` Hubertus Franke 2020-09-21 19:45 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-21 19:45 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-23 19:26 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-23 19:26 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-23 22:54 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-23 22:54 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 6:52 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 6:52 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 0/6] " YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 1/6] seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 2/6] asm/syscall.h: Add syscall_arches[] array YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 3/6] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is arg-dependent YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 4/6] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist for fast path YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 5/6] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` [PATCH seccomp 6/6] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 0/6] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of arg-independent filter results that allow syscalls YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 1/6] seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 19:11 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 19:11 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-27 9:52 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-10-27 9:52 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-10-27 19:08 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-27 19:08 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-28 0:06 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-28 0:06 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-28 8:18 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-10-28 8:18 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-10-28 9:34 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-28 9:34 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 2/6] asm/syscall.h: Add syscall_arches[] array YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 13:47 ` David Laight 2020-09-24 13:47 ` David Laight 2020-09-24 14:16 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 14:16 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 14:20 ` David Laight 2020-09-24 14:20 ` David Laight 2020-09-24 14:37 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 14:37 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 16:02 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 16:02 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 3/6] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is arg-dependent YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 23:25 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 23:25 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 3:04 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 3:04 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 16:45 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 16:45 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 19:42 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 19:42 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 19:51 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-25 19:51 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-25 20:37 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 20:37 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 21:07 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-25 21:07 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-25 23:49 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 23:49 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-26 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-26 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-26 1:23 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-26 1:23 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-26 2:47 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-26 2:47 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-09-26 4:35 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-26 4:35 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 4/6] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist for fast path YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 23:46 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 23:46 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 1:55 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 1:55 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 5/6] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 23:47 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 23:47 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 1:35 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 1:35 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` [PATCH v2 seccomp 6/6] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 12:44 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-24 23:56 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-24 23:56 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 3:11 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 3:11 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-25 3:26 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-25 3:26 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 0/5] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of constant allow filter results YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 1/5] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 21:21 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 21:21 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 21:33 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-30 21:33 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-30 22:53 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 22:53 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 23:15 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-30 23:15 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 2/5] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 22:24 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-30 22:24 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-30 22:49 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 22:49 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-01 11:28 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 11:28 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 21:08 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-01 21:08 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-30 22:40 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 22:40 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-01 11:52 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 11:52 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 21:05 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-01 21:05 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-02 11:08 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-02 11:08 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 4:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 4:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 5:41 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 5:41 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 3/5] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist for fast path YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 21:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 21:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 0:17 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 0:17 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 5:35 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 5:35 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 4/5] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 seccomp 5/5] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 15:19 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 22:00 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-30 22:00 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-30 23:12 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 23:12 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-01 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 12:06 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 16:05 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-01 16:05 ` Jann Horn 2020-10-01 16:18 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-01 16:18 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-09-30 22:59 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 22:59 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 23:08 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-09-30 23:08 ` Jann Horn 2020-09-30 23:21 ` Kees Cook 2020-09-30 23:21 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 0/5] seccomp: Add bitmap cache of constant allow filter results YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 1/5] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist bitmap for fast path YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 21:30 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-09 21:30 ` Jann Horn 2020-10-09 23:18 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 23:18 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 2/5] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 21:30 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-09 21:30 ` Jann Horn 2020-10-09 22:47 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 22:47 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 3/5] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-10-09 17:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-10-09 18:32 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 18:32 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 20:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-10-09 20:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 4/5] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` [PATCH v4 seccomp 5/5] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 17:14 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-09 21:24 ` kernel test robot 2020-10-09 21:24 ` kernel test robot 2020-10-09 21:24 ` kernel test robot 2020-10-09 21:45 ` Jann Horn via Containers [this message] 2020-10-09 21:45 ` Jann Horn 2020-10-09 23:14 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-09 23:14 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-10 13:26 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-10 13:26 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-12 22:57 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-12 22:57 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-13 0:31 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-13 0:31 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-22 20:52 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-22 20:52 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-22 22:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-22 22:32 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-22 23:40 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-22 23:40 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-24 2:51 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-24 2:51 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-30 12:18 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-30 12:18 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-11-03 13:00 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-11-03 13:00 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-11-04 0:29 ` Kees Cook 2020-11-04 0:29 ` Kees Cook 2020-11-04 11:40 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-11-04 11:40 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-11-04 18:57 ` Kees Cook 2020-11-04 18:57 ` Kees Cook 2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 0/5]seccomp: Add bitmap cache of constant allow filter results YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 1/5] seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist bitmap for fast path YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-12 6:42 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-12 6:42 ` Jann Horn 2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 2/5] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-12 6:46 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-12 6:46 ` Jann Horn 2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 3/5] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 4/5] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 5/5] seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache YiFei Zhu 2020-10-11 15:47 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-10-12 6:49 ` Jann Horn via Containers 2020-10-12 6:49 ` Jann Horn 2020-12-17 12:14 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-12-17 12:14 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-12-17 18:34 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-12-17 18:34 ` YiFei Zhu 2020-12-18 12:35 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-12-18 12:35 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2020-10-27 19:14 ` [PATCH v5 seccomp 0/5]seccomp: Add bitmap cache of constant allow filter results Kees Cook 2020-10-27 19:14 ` Kees Cook
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