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From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: pebenito@ieee.org, honli@redhat.com, refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] networkmanager: Grant access to unlabeled PKeys
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 14:04:19 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6ced2e0c-e6a3-9481-f20d-ca81027e6d2f@mellanox.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhRqB4DxRjR=ceaJuc12M5R4ZAXgmBrEKws4BQMGVeASzw@mail.gmail.com>

On 11/27/2017 10:19 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:03 AM, Dan Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> wrote:
>> From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
>>
>> For controlling IPoIB VLANs
>>
>> Reported-by: Honggang LI <honli@redhat.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
>> Tested-by: Honggang LI <honli@redhat.com>
>> ---
>>  networkmanager.te |    2 ++
>>  1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> [NOTE: resending due to a typo in the refpol mailing list address]
>
> We obviously need something like this now so we don't break IPoIB, but
> I wonder if we should make the IB access controls dynamic like the
> per-packet network access controls.  We could key off the presence of
> the IB pkey and endport definitions: if there are any objects defined
> in the loaded policy we enable the controls, otherwise we disable
> them.

I think I understand what you're saying Paul, but I'm not clear on the mechanism.  Are you referring to the netlabel/IPSEC enable checks? They are wrapped up in selinux_peerlbl_enabled.

>
>> diff --git a/networkmanager.te b/networkmanager.te
>> index 76d0106..5e881f4 100644
>> --- a/networkmanager.te
>> +++ b/networkmanager.te
>> @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ userdom_write_user_tmp_sockets(NetworkManager_t)
>>  userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(NetworkManager_t)
>>  userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ttys(NetworkManager_t)
>>
>> +corenet_ib_access_unlabeled_pkeys(NetworkManager_t)
>> +
>>  optional_policy(`
>>         avahi_domtrans(NetworkManager_t)
>>         avahi_kill(NetworkManager_t)
>> --
>> 1.7.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: danielj@mellanox.com (Daniel Jurgens)
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH 1/1] networkmanager: Grant access to unlabeled PKeys
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 14:04:19 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6ced2e0c-e6a3-9481-f20d-ca81027e6d2f@mellanox.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhRqB4DxRjR=ceaJuc12M5R4ZAXgmBrEKws4BQMGVeASzw@mail.gmail.com>

On 11/27/2017 10:19 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:03 AM, Dan Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> wrote:
>> From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
>>
>> For controlling IPoIB VLANs
>>
>> Reported-by: Honggang LI <honli@redhat.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
>> Tested-by: Honggang LI <honli@redhat.com>
>> ---
>>  networkmanager.te |    2 ++
>>  1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> [NOTE: resending due to a typo in the refpol mailing list address]
>
> We obviously need something like this now so we don't break IPoIB, but
> I wonder if we should make the IB access controls dynamic like the
> per-packet network access controls.  We could key off the presence of
> the IB pkey and endport definitions: if there are any objects defined
> in the loaded policy we enable the controls, otherwise we disable
> them.

I think I understand what you're saying Paul, but I'm not clear on the mechanism.? Are you referring to the netlabel/IPSEC enable checks? They are wrapped up in selinux_peerlbl_enabled.

>
>> diff --git a/networkmanager.te b/networkmanager.te
>> index 76d0106..5e881f4 100644
>> --- a/networkmanager.te
>> +++ b/networkmanager.te
>> @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ userdom_write_user_tmp_sockets(NetworkManager_t)
>>  userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(NetworkManager_t)
>>  userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ttys(NetworkManager_t)
>>
>> +corenet_ib_access_unlabeled_pkeys(NetworkManager_t)
>> +
>>  optional_policy(`
>>         avahi_domtrans(NetworkManager_t)
>>         avahi_kill(NetworkManager_t)
>> --
>> 1.7.1

  reply	other threads:[~2017-11-28  9:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <1511791439-15957-1-git-send-email-danielj@mellanox.com>
2017-11-27 16:17 ` [PATCH 1/1] networkmanager: Grant access to unlabeled PKeys Paul Moore
2017-11-27 16:19 ` Paul Moore
2017-11-27 16:19   ` [refpolicy] " Paul Moore
2017-11-27 20:04   ` Daniel Jurgens [this message]
2017-11-27 20:04     ` Daniel Jurgens
2017-11-27 22:50     ` Paul Moore
2017-11-27 22:50       ` [refpolicy] " Paul Moore
2017-11-29  1:25       ` Chris PeBenito
2017-11-29  1:25         ` [refpolicy] " Chris PeBenito

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