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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Dan Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: pebenito@ieee.org, honli@redhat.com, refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] networkmanager: Grant access to unlabeled PKeys
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 11:19:38 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRqB4DxRjR=ceaJuc12M5R4ZAXgmBrEKws4BQMGVeASzw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1511791439-15957-1-git-send-email-danielj@mellanox.com>

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:03 AM, Dan Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> wrote:
> From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
>
> For controlling IPoIB VLANs
>
> Reported-by: Honggang LI <honli@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> Tested-by: Honggang LI <honli@redhat.com>
> ---
>  networkmanager.te |    2 ++
>  1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

[NOTE: resending due to a typo in the refpol mailing list address]

We obviously need something like this now so we don't break IPoIB, but
I wonder if we should make the IB access controls dynamic like the
per-packet network access controls.  We could key off the presence of
the IB pkey and endport definitions: if there are any objects defined
in the loaded policy we enable the controls, otherwise we disable
them.

> diff --git a/networkmanager.te b/networkmanager.te
> index 76d0106..5e881f4 100644
> --- a/networkmanager.te
> +++ b/networkmanager.te
> @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ userdom_write_user_tmp_sockets(NetworkManager_t)
>  userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(NetworkManager_t)
>  userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ttys(NetworkManager_t)
>
> +corenet_ib_access_unlabeled_pkeys(NetworkManager_t)
> +
>  optional_policy(`
>         avahi_domtrans(NetworkManager_t)
>         avahi_kill(NetworkManager_t)
> --
> 1.7.1

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: paul@paul-moore.com (Paul Moore)
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH 1/1] networkmanager: Grant access to unlabeled PKeys
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 11:19:38 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRqB4DxRjR=ceaJuc12M5R4ZAXgmBrEKws4BQMGVeASzw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1511791439-15957-1-git-send-email-danielj@mellanox.com>

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:03 AM, Dan Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> wrote:
> From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
>
> For controlling IPoIB VLANs
>
> Reported-by: Honggang LI <honli@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> Tested-by: Honggang LI <honli@redhat.com>
> ---
>  networkmanager.te |    2 ++
>  1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

[NOTE: resending due to a typo in the refpol mailing list address]

We obviously need something like this now so we don't break IPoIB, but
I wonder if we should make the IB access controls dynamic like the
per-packet network access controls.  We could key off the presence of
the IB pkey and endport definitions: if there are any objects defined
in the loaded policy we enable the controls, otherwise we disable
them.

> diff --git a/networkmanager.te b/networkmanager.te
> index 76d0106..5e881f4 100644
> --- a/networkmanager.te
> +++ b/networkmanager.te
> @@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ userdom_write_user_tmp_sockets(NetworkManager_t)
>  userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(NetworkManager_t)
>  userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ttys(NetworkManager_t)
>
> +corenet_ib_access_unlabeled_pkeys(NetworkManager_t)
> +
>  optional_policy(`
>         avahi_domtrans(NetworkManager_t)
>         avahi_kill(NetworkManager_t)
> --
> 1.7.1

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-11-27 21:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <1511791439-15957-1-git-send-email-danielj@mellanox.com>
2017-11-27 16:17 ` [PATCH 1/1] networkmanager: Grant access to unlabeled PKeys Paul Moore
2017-11-27 16:19 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2017-11-27 16:19   ` [refpolicy] " Paul Moore
2017-11-27 20:04   ` Daniel Jurgens
2017-11-27 20:04     ` [refpolicy] " Daniel Jurgens
2017-11-27 22:50     ` Paul Moore
2017-11-27 22:50       ` [refpolicy] " Paul Moore
2017-11-29  1:25       ` Chris PeBenito
2017-11-29  1:25         ` [refpolicy] " Chris PeBenito

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