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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, alan@linux.intel.com,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation
Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 09:42:59 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <729b6b10-500b-3002-4051-8a1d8fe31d27@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151632015123.21271.9060883997507739532.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

On 19/01/2018 01:02, Dan Williams wrote:
> Commit 75f139aaf896 "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup"
> added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of
> 'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'. This does not work for some AMD cpus, see
> the 'ifence' helper,

The code never runs on AMD cpus (it's for Intel virtualization
extensions), so it'd be nice if you could fix up the commit message.

Apart from this, obviously

Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Thanks!

Paolo

> and it otherwise does not use the common
> 'array_ptr' helper designed for these types of fixes. Convert this to
> use 'array_ptr'.
> 
> Cc: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |   19 +++++++------------
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index c829d89e2e63..20b9b0b5e336 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
>  #include <linux/tboot.h>
>  #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
>  #include <linux/frame.h>
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
>  #include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
>  #include "x86.h"
>  
> @@ -898,21 +899,15 @@ static const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = {
>  
>  static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field)
>  {
> -	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
> -
> -	if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table))
> -		return -ENOENT;
> +	const unsigned short *offset;
>  
> -	/*
> -	 * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753.  To be replaced with a
> -	 * generic mechanism.
> -	 */
> -	asm("lfence");
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
>  
> -	if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
> +	offset = array_ptr(vmcs_field_to_offset_table, field,
> +			ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table));
> +	if (!offset || *offset == 0)
>  		return -ENOENT;
> -
> -	return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
> +	return *offset;
>  }
>  
>  static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, alan@linux.intel.com,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation
Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 09:42:59 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <729b6b10-500b-3002-4051-8a1d8fe31d27@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151632015123.21271.9060883997507739532.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

On 19/01/2018 01:02, Dan Williams wrote:
> Commit 75f139aaf896 "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup"
> added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of
> 'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'. This does not work for some AMD cpus, see
> the 'ifence' helper,

The code never runs on AMD cpus (it's for Intel virtualization
extensions), so it'd be nice if you could fix up the commit message.

Apart from this, obviously

Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Thanks!

Paolo

> and it otherwise does not use the common
> 'array_ptr' helper designed for these types of fixes. Convert this to
> use 'array_ptr'.
> 
> Cc: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |   19 +++++++------------
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index c829d89e2e63..20b9b0b5e336 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
>  #include <linux/tboot.h>
>  #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
>  #include <linux/frame.h>
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
>  #include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
>  #include "x86.h"
>  
> @@ -898,21 +899,15 @@ static const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = {
>  
>  static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field)
>  {
> -	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
> -
> -	if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table))
> -		return -ENOENT;
> +	const unsigned short *offset;
>  
> -	/*
> -	 * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753.  To be replaced with a
> -	 * generic mechanism.
> -	 */
> -	asm("lfence");
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
>  
> -	if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
> +	offset = array_ptr(vmcs_field_to_offset_table, field,
> +			ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table));
> +	if (!offset || *offset == 0)
>  		return -ENOENT;
> -
> -	return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
> +	return *offset;
>  }
>  
>  static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-19  8:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-19  0:01 [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19 10:20   ` Jann Horn
2018-01-19 17:48     ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 18:12       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 18:18         ` Will Deacon
2018-01-19 18:18           ` Will Deacon
2018-01-19 18:26           ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19 18:18     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-19 18:18       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-19 20:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-25  7:09   ` Cyril Novikov
2018-01-25  7:09     ` [kernel-hardening] " Cyril Novikov
2018-01-25 22:37     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-25 22:37       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-24 14:40   ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-24 14:40     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jiri Slaby
2018-02-06 19:29   ` Luis Henriques
2018-02-06 19:48     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 20:26       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:37         ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 20:42           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:43             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:49             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-06 20:58               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 21:37                 ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 22:52                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07  0:33                     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-07  1:23                       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 22:51       ` Luis Henriques
2018-02-06 22:51         ` Luis Henriques
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  8:42   ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2018-01-19  8:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-21 10:37   ` Johannes Berg
2018-01-21 10:37     ` [kernel-hardening] " Johannes Berg
2018-01-21 10:37     ` Johannes Berg
2018-01-20  6:58 ` [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-20  6:58   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-20  6:58   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-20 16:56   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 16:56     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 16:56     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07       ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07       ` Alexei Starovoitov

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