From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>, stable@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, tglx@linutronix.de, alan@linux.intel.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 09:42:59 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <729b6b10-500b-3002-4051-8a1d8fe31d27@redhat.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <151632015123.21271.9060883997507739532.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> On 19/01/2018 01:02, Dan Williams wrote: > Commit 75f139aaf896 "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup" > added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of > 'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'. This does not work for some AMD cpus, see > the 'ifence' helper, The code never runs on AMD cpus (it's for Intel virtualization extensions), so it'd be nice if you could fix up the commit message. Apart from this, obviously Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Thanks! Paolo > and it otherwise does not use the common > 'array_ptr' helper designed for these types of fixes. Convert this to > use 'array_ptr'. > > Cc: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> > Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> > --- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 19 +++++++------------ > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > index c829d89e2e63..20b9b0b5e336 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ > #include <linux/tboot.h> > #include <linux/hrtimer.h> > #include <linux/frame.h> > +#include <linux/nospec.h> > #include "kvm_cache_regs.h" > #include "x86.h" > > @@ -898,21 +899,15 @@ static const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = { > > static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field) > { > - BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX); > - > - if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table)) > - return -ENOENT; > + const unsigned short *offset; > > - /* > - * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a > - * generic mechanism. > - */ > - asm("lfence"); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX); > > - if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0) > + offset = array_ptr(vmcs_field_to_offset_table, field, > + ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table)); > + if (!offset || *offset == 0) > return -ENOENT; > - > - return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field]; > + return *offset; > } > > static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>, stable@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, tglx@linutronix.de, alan@linux.intel.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 09:42:59 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <729b6b10-500b-3002-4051-8a1d8fe31d27@redhat.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <151632015123.21271.9060883997507739532.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> On 19/01/2018 01:02, Dan Williams wrote: > Commit 75f139aaf896 "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup" > added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of > 'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'. This does not work for some AMD cpus, see > the 'ifence' helper, The code never runs on AMD cpus (it's for Intel virtualization extensions), so it'd be nice if you could fix up the commit message. Apart from this, obviously Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Thanks! Paolo > and it otherwise does not use the common > 'array_ptr' helper designed for these types of fixes. Convert this to > use 'array_ptr'. > > Cc: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> > Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> > --- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 19 +++++++------------ > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > index c829d89e2e63..20b9b0b5e336 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ > #include <linux/tboot.h> > #include <linux/hrtimer.h> > #include <linux/frame.h> > +#include <linux/nospec.h> > #include "kvm_cache_regs.h" > #include "x86.h" > > @@ -898,21 +899,15 @@ static const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = { > > static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field) > { > - BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX); > - > - if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table)) > - return -ENOENT; > + const unsigned short *offset; > > - /* > - * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a > - * generic mechanism. > - */ > - asm("lfence"); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX); > > - if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0) > + offset = array_ptr(vmcs_field_to_offset_table, field, > + ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table)); > + if (!offset || *offset == 0) > return -ENOENT; > - > - return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field]; > + return *offset; > } > > static inline struct vmcs12 *get_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-19 8:43 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-01-19 0:01 [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:01 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:01 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:01 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-19 10:20 ` Jann Horn 2018-01-19 17:48 ` Adam Sampson 2018-01-19 17:48 ` Adam Sampson 2018-01-19 17:48 ` Adam Sampson 2018-01-19 17:48 ` Adam Sampson 2018-01-19 18:12 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-19 18:18 ` Will Deacon 2018-01-19 18:18 ` Will Deacon 2018-01-19 18:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-19 18:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-19 18:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-19 20:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-25 7:09 ` Cyril Novikov 2018-01-25 7:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Cyril Novikov 2018-01-25 22:37 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-25 22:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:01 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:01 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:02 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:02 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:02 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-24 14:40 ` Jiri Slaby 2018-01-24 14:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jiri Slaby 2018-02-06 19:29 ` Luis Henriques 2018-02-06 19:48 ` Dan Williams 2018-02-06 20:26 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-02-06 20:37 ` Dan Williams 2018-02-06 20:42 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-02-06 20:43 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-02-06 20:49 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-02-06 20:58 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-02-06 21:37 ` Dan Williams 2018-02-06 22:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-02-07 0:33 ` Dan Williams 2018-02-07 1:23 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-02-06 22:51 ` Luis Henriques 2018-02-06 22:51 ` Luis Henriques 2018-01-19 0:02 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:02 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-19 8:42 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message] 2018-01-19 8:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini 2018-01-19 0:02 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-19 0:02 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-21 10:37 ` Johannes Berg 2018-01-21 10:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Johannes Berg 2018-01-21 10:37 ` Johannes Berg 2018-01-20 6:58 ` [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams 2018-01-20 6:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-20 6:58 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-20 16:56 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2018-01-20 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2018-01-20 16:56 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2018-01-20 17:07 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2018-01-20 17:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2018-01-20 17:07 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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