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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 28/28] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 10:05:00 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7e6c308f-3caf-5531-3cb2-9b6986f4288e@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170301184055.gl3iic3gir6zzb23@pd.tnic>

On 3/1/2017 12:40 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 09:48:25AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> This patch adds the support to check if SME has been enabled and if
>> memory encryption should be activated (checking of command line option
>> based on the configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption
>> is to be activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is
>> encrypted "in place."
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S          |    1 +
>>  arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c |   71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |    2 +
>>  3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
>> index edd2f14..e6820e7 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
>> @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ startup_64:
>>  	 * Save the returned mask in %r12 for later use.
>>  	 */
>>  	push	%rsi
>> +	movq	%rsi, %rdi
>>  	call	sme_enable
>>  	pop	%rsi
>>  	movq	%rax, %r12
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c
>> index 07cbb90..35c5e3d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c
>> @@ -19,6 +19,12 @@
>>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>>
>>  #include <asm/sections.h>
>> +#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
>> +#include <asm/msr.h>
>> +#include <asm/cmdline.h>
>> +
>> +static char sme_cmdline_arg_on[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt=on";
>> +static char sme_cmdline_arg_off[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt=off";
>>
>>  extern void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long,
>>  				void *, pgd_t *);
>> @@ -217,8 +223,71 @@ unsigned long __init sme_get_me_mask(void)
>>  	return sme_me_mask;
>>  }
>>
>> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)
>> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(void *boot_data)
>
> unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>
> works too.

Ok, will do.

>
> And then you need to correct the function signature in the
> !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT case, at the end of this file, too:
>
> unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)		{ return 0; }

Yup, missed that.  I'll make it match.

>
>>  {
>> +	struct boot_params *bp = boot_data;
>> +	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
>> +	unsigned long cmdline_ptr;
>> +	bool enable_if_found;
>> +	void *cmdline_arg;
>> +	u64 msr;
>> +
>> +	/* Check for an AMD processor */
>> +	eax = 0;
>> +	ecx = 0;
>> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>> +	if ((ebx != 0x68747541) || (edx != 0x69746e65) || (ecx != 0x444d4163))
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
>> +	eax = 0x80000000;
>> +	ecx = 0;
>> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>> +	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Check for the SME feature:
>> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
>> +	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
>> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
>> +	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
>> +	 */
>> +	eax = 0x8000001f;
>> +	ecx = 0;
>> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>> +	if (!(eax & 1))
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/* Check if SME is enabled */
>> +	msr = native_read_msr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
>
> This native_read_msr() wankery is adding this check:
>
> 	if (msr_tracepoint_active(__tracepoint_read_msr))
>
> and here it is clearly too early for tracepoints. Please use __rdmsr()
> which is purely doing the MSR operation. (... and exception handling for

Ah, good catch.  I'll switch to __rdmsr().

> when the RDMSR itself raises an exception but we're very early here too
> so the MSR better be there, otherwise we'll blow up).

Yes, it will be there if SME support is indicated in the CPUID result.

>
>> +	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Fixups have not been to applied phys_base yet, so we must obtain
>
> 		...    not been applied to phys_base yet ...

Yup.

>
>> +	 * the address to the SME command line option in the following way.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT)) {
>> +		asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg_off(%%rip), %0"
>> +		     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
>> +		     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg_off));
>> +		enable_if_found = false;
>> +	} else {
>> +		asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg_on(%%rip), %0"
>> +		     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
>> +		     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg_on));
>> +		enable_if_found = true;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	cmdline_ptr = bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
>> +
>> +	if (cmdline_find_option_bool((char *)cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg))
>> +		sme_me_mask = enable_if_found ? 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f) : 0;
>> +	else
>> +		sme_me_mask = enable_if_found ? 0 : 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
>
> I have a better idea: you can copy __cmdline_find_option() +
> cmdline_find_option() to arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c in a pre-patch. Then,
> pass in a buffer and check for "on" and "off". This way you don't
> have to misuse the _bool() variant for something which is actually
> "option=argument".

I can do that.  Because phys_base hasn't been updated yet, I'll have to
create "on" and "off" constants and get their address in a similar way
to the command line option so that I can do the strncmp properly.

Thanks,
Tom

>
> Thanks.
>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@li>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 28/28] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 10:05:00 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7e6c308f-3caf-5531-3cb2-9b6986f4288e@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170301184055.gl3iic3gir6zzb23@pd.tnic>

On 3/1/2017 12:40 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 09:48:25AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> This patch adds the support to check if SME has been enabled and if
>> memory encryption should be activated (checking of command line option
>> based on the configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption
>> is to be activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is
>> encrypted "in place."
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S          |    1 +
>>  arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c |   71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |    2 +
>>  3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
>> index edd2f14..e6820e7 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
>> @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ startup_64:
>>  	 * Save the returned mask in %r12 for later use.
>>  	 */
>>  	push	%rsi
>> +	movq	%rsi, %rdi
>>  	call	sme_enable
>>  	pop	%rsi
>>  	movq	%rax, %r12
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c
>> index 07cbb90..35c5e3d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c
>> @@ -19,6 +19,12 @@
>>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>>
>>  #include <asm/sections.h>
>> +#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
>> +#include <asm/msr.h>
>> +#include <asm/cmdline.h>
>> +
>> +static char sme_cmdline_arg_on[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt=on";
>> +static char sme_cmdline_arg_off[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt=off";
>>
>>  extern void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long,
>>  				void *, pgd_t *);
>> @@ -217,8 +223,71 @@ unsigned long __init sme_get_me_mask(void)
>>  	return sme_me_mask;
>>  }
>>
>> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)
>> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(void *boot_data)
>
> unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>
> works too.

Ok, will do.

>
> And then you need to correct the function signature in the
> !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT case, at the end of this file, too:
>
> unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)		{ return 0; }

Yup, missed that.  I'll make it match.

>
>>  {
>> +	struct boot_params *bp = boot_data;
>> +	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
>> +	unsigned long cmdline_ptr;
>> +	bool enable_if_found;
>> +	void *cmdline_arg;
>> +	u64 msr;
>> +
>> +	/* Check for an AMD processor */
>> +	eax = 0;
>> +	ecx = 0;
>> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>> +	if ((ebx != 0x68747541) || (edx != 0x69746e65) || (ecx != 0x444d4163))
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
>> +	eax = 0x80000000;
>> +	ecx = 0;
>> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>> +	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Check for the SME feature:
>> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
>> +	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
>> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
>> +	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
>> +	 */
>> +	eax = 0x8000001f;
>> +	ecx = 0;
>> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>> +	if (!(eax & 1))
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/* Check if SME is enabled */
>> +	msr = native_read_msr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
>
> This native_read_msr() wankery is adding this check:
>
> 	if (msr_tracepoint_active(__tracepoint_read_msr))
>
> and here it is clearly too early for tracepoints. Please use __rdmsr()
> which is purely doing the MSR operation. (... and exception handling for

Ah, good catch.  I'll switch to __rdmsr().

> when the RDMSR itself raises an exception but we're very early here too
> so the MSR better be there, otherwise we'll blow up).

Yes, it will be there if SME support is indicated in the CPUID result.

>
>> +	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Fixups have not been to applied phys_base yet, so we must obtain
>
> 		...    not been applied to phys_base yet ...

Yup.

>
>> +	 * the address to the SME command line option in the following way.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT)) {
>> +		asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg_off(%%rip), %0"
>> +		     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
>> +		     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg_off));
>> +		enable_if_found = false;
>> +	} else {
>> +		asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg_on(%%rip), %0"
>> +		     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
>> +		     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg_on));
>> +		enable_if_found = true;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	cmdline_ptr = bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
>> +
>> +	if (cmdline_find_option_bool((char *)cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg))
>> +		sme_me_mask = enable_if_found ? 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f) : 0;
>> +	else
>> +		sme_me_mask = enable_if_found ? 0 : 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
>
> I have a better idea: you can copy __cmdline_find_option() +
> cmdline_find_option() to arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c in a pre-patch. Then,
> pass in a buffer and check for "on" and "off". This way you don't
> have to misuse the _bool() variant for something which is actually
> "option=argument".

I can do that.  Because phys_base hasn't been updated yet, I'll have to
create "on" and "off" constants and get their address in a similar way
to the command line option so that I can do the strncmp properly.

Thanks,
Tom

>
> Thanks.
>

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 28/28] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 10:05:00 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7e6c308f-3caf-5531-3cb2-9b6986f4288e@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170301184055.gl3iic3gir6zzb23@pd.tnic>

On 3/1/2017 12:40 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 09:48:25AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> This patch adds the support to check if SME has been enabled and if
>> memory encryption should be activated (checking of command line option
>> based on the configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption
>> is to be activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is
>> encrypted "in place."
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S          |    1 +
>>  arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c |   71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |    2 +
>>  3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
>> index edd2f14..e6820e7 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
>> @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ startup_64:
>>  	 * Save the returned mask in %r12 for later use.
>>  	 */
>>  	push	%rsi
>> +	movq	%rsi, %rdi
>>  	call	sme_enable
>>  	pop	%rsi
>>  	movq	%rax, %r12
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c
>> index 07cbb90..35c5e3d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt_init.c
>> @@ -19,6 +19,12 @@
>>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>>
>>  #include <asm/sections.h>
>> +#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
>> +#include <asm/msr.h>
>> +#include <asm/cmdline.h>
>> +
>> +static char sme_cmdline_arg_on[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt=on";
>> +static char sme_cmdline_arg_off[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt=off";
>>
>>  extern void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long,
>>  				void *, pgd_t *);
>> @@ -217,8 +223,71 @@ unsigned long __init sme_get_me_mask(void)
>>  	return sme_me_mask;
>>  }
>>
>> -unsigned long __init sme_enable(void)
>> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(void *boot_data)
>
> unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>
> works too.

Ok, will do.

>
> And then you need to correct the function signature in the
> !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT case, at the end of this file, too:
>
> unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)		{ return 0; }

Yup, missed that.  I'll make it match.

>
>>  {
>> +	struct boot_params *bp = boot_data;
>> +	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
>> +	unsigned long cmdline_ptr;
>> +	bool enable_if_found;
>> +	void *cmdline_arg;
>> +	u64 msr;
>> +
>> +	/* Check for an AMD processor */
>> +	eax = 0;
>> +	ecx = 0;
>> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>> +	if ((ebx != 0x68747541) || (edx != 0x69746e65) || (ecx != 0x444d4163))
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
>> +	eax = 0x80000000;
>> +	ecx = 0;
>> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>> +	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Check for the SME feature:
>> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
>> +	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
>> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
>> +	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
>> +	 */
>> +	eax = 0x8000001f;
>> +	ecx = 0;
>> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>> +	if (!(eax & 1))
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/* Check if SME is enabled */
>> +	msr = native_read_msr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
>
> This native_read_msr() wankery is adding this check:
>
> 	if (msr_tracepoint_active(__tracepoint_read_msr))
>
> and here it is clearly too early for tracepoints. Please use __rdmsr()
> which is purely doing the MSR operation. (... and exception handling for

Ah, good catch.  I'll switch to __rdmsr().

> when the RDMSR itself raises an exception but we're very early here too
> so the MSR better be there, otherwise we'll blow up).

Yes, it will be there if SME support is indicated in the CPUID result.

>
>> +	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Fixups have not been to applied phys_base yet, so we must obtain
>
> 		...    not been applied to phys_base yet ...

Yup.

>
>> +	 * the address to the SME command line option in the following way.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT)) {
>> +		asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg_off(%%rip), %0"
>> +		     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
>> +		     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg_off));
>> +		enable_if_found = false;
>> +	} else {
>> +		asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg_on(%%rip), %0"
>> +		     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
>> +		     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg_on));
>> +		enable_if_found = true;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	cmdline_ptr = bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
>> +
>> +	if (cmdline_find_option_bool((char *)cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg))
>> +		sme_me_mask = enable_if_found ? 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f) : 0;
>> +	else
>> +		sme_me_mask = enable_if_found ? 0 : 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
>
> I have a better idea: you can copy __cmdline_find_option() +
> cmdline_find_option() to arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c in a pre-patch. Then,
> pass in a buffer and check for "on" and "off". This way you don't
> have to misuse the _bool() variant for something which is actually
> "option=argument".

I can do that.  Because phys_base hasn't been updated yet, I'll have to
create "on" and "off" constants and get their address in a similar way
to the command line option so that I can do the strncmp properly.

Thanks,
Tom

>
> Thanks.
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-03-07 16:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 355+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-02-16 15:41 [RFC PATCH v4 00/28] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/28] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 17:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 17:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 19:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 19:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 19:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/28] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 11:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 11:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 15:56     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:56       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:56       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/28] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 18:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 18:13     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 19:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 19:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 19:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 20:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 20:06         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/28] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 11:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 11:04     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/28] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 12:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 12:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 15:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 15:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 15:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:01     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:01       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:01       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/28] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 12:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 12:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 14:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 14:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 14:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 15:10       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 15:10         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/28] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 15:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 15:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 17:18     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 17:18       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 17:18       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 12:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 12:08         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 18:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 18:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 16:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 16:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 16:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:13   ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-22 18:13     ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-23 23:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 23:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 23:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 23:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:13   ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-22 18:13     ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/28] x86: Extend the early_memremap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 15:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 15:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 15:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 15:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 15:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/28] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 18:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 18:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 15:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 15:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 15:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/28] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 19:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 19:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 18:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/28] x86: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 20:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 20:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 22:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 22:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 22:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-03  9:52       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03  9:52         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03  9:52         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/28] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/28] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return defined EFI mem types Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 12:05   ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-21 12:05     ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-21 12:05     ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-23 17:27     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 17:27       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 17:27       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-24  9:57         ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-24  9:57         ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/28] Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-23 21:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 21:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 21:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 10:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 10:21         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 15:04         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 15:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 15:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 15:22           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 15:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 15:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08  6:55   ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  6:55     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  6:55     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  6:55     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  6:55     ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 19:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 19:50       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 19:50       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/28] Add support to access persistent memory " Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 22:58   ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-03-17 22:58     ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-03-23 21:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-23 21:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/28] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 18:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 18:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 22:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 22:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 22:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/28] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/28] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-25 17:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 17:10     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 17:10     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 17:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 17:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 17:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/28] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:59   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 15:59     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 15:59     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 16:51     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 16:51       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 16:51       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 17:01       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 17:01         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 17:01         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-02-27 17:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-27 17:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-27 17:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 11:17       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 11:17         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 11:17         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/28] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/28] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-27 18:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-27 18:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:28     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:28       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:28       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 11:17       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 11:17         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/28] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/28] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/28] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs decrypted Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  7:04   ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  7:04     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  7:04     ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 19:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 19:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 19:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/28] x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  7:09   ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  7:09     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  7:09     ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 20:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 20:09       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 20:09       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/28] x86: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:57   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 15:57     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 15:57     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 16:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 16:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 16:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01  9:25       ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:25         ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:25         ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27         ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27           ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27           ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27           ` Dave Young
2017-03-06 17:58         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 17:58           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 17:58           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  8:12           ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  8:12             ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  8:12             ` Dave Young
2017-02-28 10:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 10:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 10:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 15:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 15:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 15:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 15:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/28] x86: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 17:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 17:36     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 18:30     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 18:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 18:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 18:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 18:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 18:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 28/28] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 18:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 18:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 18:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 16:05     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-03-07 16:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 16:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 17:42       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 17:42         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 17:42         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:05       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:05         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:05         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-18 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/28] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Borislav Petkov
2017-02-18 18:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 15:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 15:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 17:42   ` Rik van Riel
2017-02-21 17:42     ` Rik van Riel
2017-02-21 17:53     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 17:53       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01  9:17 ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:17   ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:17   ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:17   ` Dave Young
2017-03-01 17:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 17:51     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 17:51     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 17:51     ` Tom Lendacky

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