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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/28] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2017 12:34:39 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7e9fa3ee-b120-998c-9752-53f7bc3d1d0f@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170220194529.7dekuruclq7hfyhk@pd.tnic>

On 2/20/2017 1:45 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 09:44:11AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
>> state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early page fault
>> support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
>> them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.
>>
>> For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of the
>> initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed properly.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> index 182a4c7..03f8e74 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> @@ -46,13 +46,18 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
>>  	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>>  }
>>
>> +void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void)
>> +{
>> +	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>> +}
>
> Move that to mem_encrypt.c where it is used and make it static. The diff
> below, ontop of this patch, seems to build fine here.

Ok, I can do that.

>
> Also, aren't those mappings global so that you need to toggle CR4.PGE
> for that?
>
> PAGE_KERNEL at least has _PAGE_GLOBAL set.

The early_pmd_flags has _PAGE_GLOBAL cleared:

pmdval_t early_pmd_flags = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE & ~(_PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_NX);

so I didn't do the CR4.PGE toggle. I could always add it to be safe in
case that is ever changed. It only happens twice, on the map and on the
unmap, so it shouldn't be a big deal.

>
>> +
>>  /* Create a new PMD entry */
>> -int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
>> +int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
>
> __early_make_pmd() then, since it creates a PMD entry.
>
>>  	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
>>  	pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
>>  	pudval_t pud, *pud_p;
>> -	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
>> +	pmdval_t *pmd_p;
>>
>>  	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
>>  	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
>
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> index ac3565c..ec548e9 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> @@ -16,8 +16,12 @@
>>
>>  #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>>  #include <asm/fixmap.h>
>> +#include <asm/setup.h>
>> +#include <asm/bootparam.h>
>>
>>  extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>> +int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long, pmdval_t);
>> +void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void);
>
> What's with the forward declarations?
>
> Those should be in some header AFAICT.

I can add them to a header, probably arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h.

Thanks,
Tom

>
>>   * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
>> @@ -103,6 +107,76 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
>>  	__sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
>>  }
>
> ...
>
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
> index 03f8e74c7223..c47500d72330 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
> @@ -46,11 +46,6 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
>  	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>  }
>
> -void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void)
> -{
> -	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
> -}
> -
>  /* Create a new PMD entry */
>  int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
>  {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index ec548e9a76f1..0af020b36232 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
>
>  extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>  int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long, pmdval_t);
> -void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void);
> +extern pgd_t early_level4_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
>
>  /*
>   * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
> @@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
>  /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
>  static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
>
> +static void __init early_pgtable_flush(void)
> +{
> +	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
>   * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
> @@ -158,7 +163,7 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
>  	 */
>  	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, false);
>
> -	__early_pgtable_flush();
> +	early_pgtable_flush();
>  }
>
>  void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
> @@ -174,7 +179,7 @@ void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
>  	 */
>  	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, true);
>
> -	__early_pgtable_flush();
> +	early_pgtable_flush();
>  }
>
>  void __init sme_early_init(void)
>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@li>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/28] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2017 12:34:39 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7e9fa3ee-b120-998c-9752-53f7bc3d1d0f@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170220194529.7dekuruclq7hfyhk@pd.tnic>

On 2/20/2017 1:45 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 09:44:11AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
>> state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early page fault
>> support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
>> them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.
>>
>> For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of the
>> initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed properly.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> index 182a4c7..03f8e74 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> @@ -46,13 +46,18 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
>>  	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>>  }
>>
>> +void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void)
>> +{
>> +	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>> +}
>
> Move that to mem_encrypt.c where it is used and make it static. The diff
> below, ontop of this patch, seems to build fine here.

Ok, I can do that.

>
> Also, aren't those mappings global so that you need to toggle CR4.PGE
> for that?
>
> PAGE_KERNEL at least has _PAGE_GLOBAL set.

The early_pmd_flags has _PAGE_GLOBAL cleared:

pmdval_t early_pmd_flags = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE & ~(_PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_NX);

so I didn't do the CR4.PGE toggle. I could always add it to be safe in
case that is ever changed. It only happens twice, on the map and on the
unmap, so it shouldn't be a big deal.

>
>> +
>>  /* Create a new PMD entry */
>> -int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
>> +int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
>
> __early_make_pmd() then, since it creates a PMD entry.
>
>>  	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
>>  	pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
>>  	pudval_t pud, *pud_p;
>> -	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
>> +	pmdval_t *pmd_p;
>>
>>  	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
>>  	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
>
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> index ac3565c..ec548e9 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> @@ -16,8 +16,12 @@
>>
>>  #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>>  #include <asm/fixmap.h>
>> +#include <asm/setup.h>
>> +#include <asm/bootparam.h>
>>
>>  extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>> +int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long, pmdval_t);
>> +void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void);
>
> What's with the forward declarations?
>
> Those should be in some header AFAICT.

I can add them to a header, probably arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h.

Thanks,
Tom

>
>>   * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
>> @@ -103,6 +107,76 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
>>  	__sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
>>  }
>
> ...
>
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
> index 03f8e74c7223..c47500d72330 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
> @@ -46,11 +46,6 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
>  	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>  }
>
> -void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void)
> -{
> -	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
> -}
> -
>  /* Create a new PMD entry */
>  int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
>  {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index ec548e9a76f1..0af020b36232 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
>
>  extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>  int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long, pmdval_t);
> -void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void);
> +extern pgd_t early_level4_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
>
>  /*
>   * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
> @@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
>  /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
>  static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
>
> +static void __init early_pgtable_flush(void)
> +{
> +	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
>   * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
> @@ -158,7 +163,7 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
>  	 */
>  	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, false);
>
> -	__early_pgtable_flush();
> +	early_pgtable_flush();
>  }
>
>  void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
> @@ -174,7 +179,7 @@ void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
>  	 */
>  	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, true);
>
> -	__early_pgtable_flush();
> +	early_pgtable_flush();
>  }
>
>  void __init sme_early_init(void)
>

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/28] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2017 12:34:39 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7e9fa3ee-b120-998c-9752-53f7bc3d1d0f@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170220194529.7dekuruclq7hfyhk@pd.tnic>

On 2/20/2017 1:45 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 16, 2017 at 09:44:11AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
>> state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early page fault
>> support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
>> them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.
>>
>> For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of the
>> initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed properly.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> index 182a4c7..03f8e74 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
>> @@ -46,13 +46,18 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
>>  	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>>  }
>>
>> +void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void)
>> +{
>> +	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>> +}
>
> Move that to mem_encrypt.c where it is used and make it static. The diff
> below, ontop of this patch, seems to build fine here.

Ok, I can do that.

>
> Also, aren't those mappings global so that you need to toggle CR4.PGE
> for that?
>
> PAGE_KERNEL at least has _PAGE_GLOBAL set.

The early_pmd_flags has _PAGE_GLOBAL cleared:

pmdval_t early_pmd_flags = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE & ~(_PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_NX);

so I didn't do the CR4.PGE toggle. I could always add it to be safe in
case that is ever changed. It only happens twice, on the map and on the
unmap, so it shouldn't be a big deal.

>
>> +
>>  /* Create a new PMD entry */
>> -int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
>> +int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
>
> __early_make_pmd() then, since it creates a PMD entry.
>
>>  	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
>>  	pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
>>  	pudval_t pud, *pud_p;
>> -	pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
>> +	pmdval_t *pmd_p;
>>
>>  	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
>>  	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3() != __sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
>
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> index ac3565c..ec548e9 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
>> @@ -16,8 +16,12 @@
>>
>>  #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>>  #include <asm/fixmap.h>
>> +#include <asm/setup.h>
>> +#include <asm/bootparam.h>
>>
>>  extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>> +int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long, pmdval_t);
>> +void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void);
>
> What's with the forward declarations?
>
> Those should be in some header AFAICT.

I can add them to a header, probably arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h.

Thanks,
Tom

>
>>   * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
>> @@ -103,6 +107,76 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
>>  	__sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
>>  }
>
> ...
>
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
> index 03f8e74c7223..c47500d72330 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
> @@ -46,11 +46,6 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
>  	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
>  }
>
> -void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void)
> -{
> -	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
> -}
> -
>  /* Create a new PMD entry */
>  int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
>  {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index ec548e9a76f1..0af020b36232 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
>
>  extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
>  int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long, pmdval_t);
> -void __init __early_pgtable_flush(void);
> +extern pgd_t early_level4_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
>
>  /*
>   * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
> @@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
>  /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
>  static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
>
> +static void __init early_pgtable_flush(void)
> +{
> +	write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt));
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
>   * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
> @@ -158,7 +163,7 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
>  	 */
>  	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, false);
>
> -	__early_pgtable_flush();
> +	early_pgtable_flush();
>  }
>
>  void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
> @@ -174,7 +179,7 @@ void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
>  	 */
>  	__sme_map_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data, true);
>
> -	__early_pgtable_flush();
> +	early_pgtable_flush();
>  }
>
>  void __init sme_early_init(void)
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-02-22 18:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 355+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-02-16 15:41 [RFC PATCH v4 00/28] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/28] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 17:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 17:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 19:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 19:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 19:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/28] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 11:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 11:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 15:56     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:56       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:56       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/28] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 18:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 18:13     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 19:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 19:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 19:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 20:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 20:06         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/28] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 11:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 11:04     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/28] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 12:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-17 12:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 15:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 15:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 15:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:01     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:01       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:01       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/28] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 12:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 12:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 14:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 14:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 14:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 15:10       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 15:10         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/28] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 15:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 15:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 17:18     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 17:18       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 17:18       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 12:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 12:08         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 18:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 18:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 16:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 16:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 16:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:13   ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-22 18:13     ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-23 23:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 23:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 23:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 23:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:13   ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-22 18:13     ` Dave Hansen
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/28] x86: Extend the early_memremap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 15:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 15:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 15:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 15:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 15:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/28] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 18:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 18:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 15:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 15:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 15:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/28] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 19:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 19:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 18:34     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-02-22 18:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/28] x86: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-20 20:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-20 20:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 22:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 22:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 22:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-03  9:52       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03  9:52         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03  9:52         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/28] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/28] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return defined EFI mem types Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 12:05   ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-21 12:05     ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-21 12:05     ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-23 17:27     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 17:27       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 17:27       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-24  9:57         ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-24  9:57         ` Matt Fleming
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/28] Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 15:06     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-23 21:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 21:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-23 21:34       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 10:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 10:21         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 15:04         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 15:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 15:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-24 15:22           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 15:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-24 15:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08  6:55   ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  6:55     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  6:55     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  6:55     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  6:55     ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 19:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 19:50       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 19:50       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/28] Add support to access persistent memory " Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 22:58   ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-03-17 22:58     ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2017-03-23 21:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-23 21:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/28] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-22 18:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 18:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-22 18:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 22:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 22:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 22:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/28] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:45   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/28] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-25 17:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 17:10     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-25 17:10     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 17:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 17:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 17:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/28] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:59   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 15:59     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 15:59     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 16:51     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 16:51       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 16:51       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 17:01       ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 17:01         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 17:01         ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-02-27 17:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-27 17:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-27 17:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 11:17       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 11:17         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 11:17         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/28] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/28] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-27 18:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-27 18:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 23:28     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:28       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-28 23:28       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 11:17       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 11:17         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/28] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/28] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/28] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs decrypted Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  7:04   ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  7:04     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  7:04     ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 19:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 19:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 19:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/28] x86: Access the setup data through sysfs decrypted Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  7:09   ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  7:09     ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  7:09     ` Dave Young
2017-03-17 20:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 20:09       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 20:09       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/28] x86: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 15:57   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 15:57     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 15:57     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-02-17 16:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 16:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-17 16:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01  9:25       ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:25         ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:25         ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27         ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27           ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27           ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:27           ` Dave Young
2017-03-06 17:58         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 17:58           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 17:58           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-06 18:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-08  8:12           ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  8:12             ` Dave Young
2017-03-08  8:12             ` Dave Young
2017-02-28 10:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 10:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-28 10:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 15:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 15:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 15:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 15:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/28] x86: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 17:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 17:36     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 18:30     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 18:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 18:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 18:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 18:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 18:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-16 15:48 ` [RFC PATCH v4 28/28] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-16 15:48   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 18:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 18:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01 18:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 16:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 16:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 16:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 17:42       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 17:42         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-07 17:42         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:05       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:05         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:05         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-18 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/28] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Borislav Petkov
2017-02-18 18:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 15:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 15:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 15:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-02-21 17:42   ` Rik van Riel
2017-02-21 17:42     ` Rik van Riel
2017-02-21 17:53     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-02-21 17:53       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-01  9:17 ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:17   ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:17   ` Dave Young
2017-03-01  9:17   ` Dave Young
2017-03-01 17:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 17:51     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 17:51     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-01 17:51     ` Tom Lendacky

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