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From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
	Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 07/12] kasan, mm: remove krealloc side-effect
Date: Mon,  1 Feb 2021 20:43:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <884e37ddff31b671725f4d83106111c7dcf8fb9b.1612208222.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1612208222.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

Currently, if krealloc() is called on a freed object with KASAN enabled,
it allocates and returns a new object, but doesn't copy any memory from
the old one as ksize() returns 0. This makes a caller believe that
krealloc() succeeded (KASAN report is printed though).

This patch adds an accessibility check into __do_krealloc(). If the check
fails, krealloc() returns NULL. This check duplicates the one in ksize();
this is fixed in the following patch.

This patch also adds a KASAN-KUnit test to check krealloc() behaviour
when it's called on a freed object.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
 lib/test_kasan.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/slab_common.c |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
index 2bb52853f341..61bc894d9f7e 100644
--- a/lib/test_kasan.c
+++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
@@ -359,6 +359,25 @@ static void krealloc_pagealloc_less_oob(struct kunit *test)
 					KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 201);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check that krealloc() detects a use-after-free, returns NULL,
+ * and doesn't unpoison the freed object.
+ */
+static void krealloc_uaf(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr1, *ptr2;
+	int size1 = 201;
+	int size2 = 235;
+
+	ptr1 = kmalloc(size1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr1);
+	kfree(ptr1);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2 = krealloc(ptr1, size2, GFP_KERNEL));
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_PTR_EQ(test, (void *)ptr2, NULL);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)ptr1);
+}
+
 static void kmalloc_oob_16(struct kunit *test)
 {
 	struct {
@@ -1056,6 +1075,7 @@ static struct kunit_case kasan_kunit_test_cases[] = {
 	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_less_oob),
 	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_pagealloc_more_oob),
 	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_pagealloc_less_oob),
+	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_uaf),
 	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_16),
 	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_uaf_16),
 	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_in_memset),
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 39d1a8ff9bb8..dad70239b54c 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1140,6 +1140,9 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size,
 	void *ret;
 	size_t ks;
 
+	if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p)) && !kasan_check_byte(p))
+		return NULL;
+
 	ks = ksize(p);
 
 	if (ks >= new_size) {
-- 
2.30.0.365.g02bc693789-goog


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	 Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
	Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 07/12] kasan, mm: remove krealloc side-effect
Date: Mon,  1 Feb 2021 20:43:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <884e37ddff31b671725f4d83106111c7dcf8fb9b.1612208222.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1612208222.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

Currently, if krealloc() is called on a freed object with KASAN enabled,
it allocates and returns a new object, but doesn't copy any memory from
the old one as ksize() returns 0. This makes a caller believe that
krealloc() succeeded (KASAN report is printed though).

This patch adds an accessibility check into __do_krealloc(). If the check
fails, krealloc() returns NULL. This check duplicates the one in ksize();
this is fixed in the following patch.

This patch also adds a KASAN-KUnit test to check krealloc() behaviour
when it's called on a freed object.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
 lib/test_kasan.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/slab_common.c |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
index 2bb52853f341..61bc894d9f7e 100644
--- a/lib/test_kasan.c
+++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
@@ -359,6 +359,25 @@ static void krealloc_pagealloc_less_oob(struct kunit *test)
 					KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE + 201);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check that krealloc() detects a use-after-free, returns NULL,
+ * and doesn't unpoison the freed object.
+ */
+static void krealloc_uaf(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	char *ptr1, *ptr2;
+	int size1 = 201;
+	int size2 = 235;
+
+	ptr1 = kmalloc(size1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr1);
+	kfree(ptr1);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr2 = krealloc(ptr1, size2, GFP_KERNEL));
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_PTR_EQ(test, (void *)ptr2, NULL);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)ptr1);
+}
+
 static void kmalloc_oob_16(struct kunit *test)
 {
 	struct {
@@ -1056,6 +1075,7 @@ static struct kunit_case kasan_kunit_test_cases[] = {
 	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_less_oob),
 	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_pagealloc_more_oob),
 	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_pagealloc_less_oob),
+	KUNIT_CASE(krealloc_uaf),
 	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_16),
 	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_uaf_16),
 	KUNIT_CASE(kmalloc_oob_in_memset),
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 39d1a8ff9bb8..dad70239b54c 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1140,6 +1140,9 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size,
 	void *ret;
 	size_t ks;
 
+	if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p)) && !kasan_check_byte(p))
+		return NULL;
+
 	ks = ksize(p);
 
 	if (ks >= new_size) {
-- 
2.30.0.365.g02bc693789-goog


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-02-01 19:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-01 19:43 [PATCH 00/12] kasan: optimizations and fixes for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43 ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43 ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43 ` [PATCH 01/12] kasan, mm: don't save alloc stacks twice Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 16:06   ` Marco Elver
2021-02-02 16:06     ` Marco Elver
2021-02-02 18:01     ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 18:01       ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 18:01       ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 18:40       ` Marco Elver
2021-02-02 18:40         ` Marco Elver
2021-02-02 18:40         ` Marco Elver
2021-02-01 19:43 ` [PATCH 02/12] kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoning Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 16:25   ` Marco Elver
2021-02-02 16:25     ` Marco Elver
2021-02-02 17:15     ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 17:15       ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 17:15       ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 17:39       ` Marco Elver
2021-02-02 17:39         ` Marco Elver
2021-02-02 17:39         ` Marco Elver
2021-02-01 19:43 ` [PATCH 03/12] kasan: optimize large " Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 16:57   ` Marco Elver
2021-02-02 16:57     ` Marco Elver
2021-02-01 19:43 ` [PATCH 04/12] kasan: clean up setting free info in kasan_slab_free Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 17:03   ` Marco Elver
2021-02-02 17:03     ` Marco Elver
2021-02-01 19:43 ` [PATCH 05/12] kasan: unify large kfree checks Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-03 12:13   ` Marco Elver
2021-02-03 12:13     ` Marco Elver
2021-02-01 19:43 ` [PATCH 06/12] kasan: rework krealloc tests Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-03 14:48   ` Marco Elver
2021-02-03 14:48     ` Marco Elver
2021-02-01 19:43 ` Andrey Konovalov [this message]
2021-02-01 19:43   ` [PATCH 07/12] kasan, mm: remove krealloc side-effect Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-03 15:10   ` Marco Elver
2021-02-03 15:10     ` Marco Elver
2021-02-01 19:43 ` [PATCH 08/12] kasan, mm: optimize krealloc poisoning Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-03 14:34   ` Marco Elver
2021-02-03 14:34     ` Marco Elver
2021-02-01 19:43 ` [PATCH 09/12] kasan: ensure poisoning size alignment Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-03 15:31   ` Marco Elver
2021-02-03 15:31     ` Marco Elver
2021-02-01 19:43 ` [PATCH 10/12] arm64: kasan: simplify and inline MTE functions Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 22:44   ` Andrew Morton
2021-02-01 22:44     ` Andrew Morton
2021-02-04 12:39     ` Vincenzo Frascino
2021-02-04 12:39       ` Vincenzo Frascino
2021-02-02 15:42   ` Catalin Marinas
2021-02-02 15:42     ` Catalin Marinas
2021-02-02 18:04     ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 18:04       ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 18:04       ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-04 12:37   ` Vincenzo Frascino
2021-02-04 12:37     ` Vincenzo Frascino
2021-02-01 19:43 ` [PATCH 11/12] kasan: always inline HW_TAGS helper functions Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-03 15:51   ` Marco Elver
2021-02-03 15:51     ` Marco Elver
2021-02-01 19:43 ` [PATCH 12/12] arm64: kasan: export MTE symbols for KASAN tests Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-01 19:43   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 10:46   ` Will Deacon
2021-02-02 10:46     ` Will Deacon
2021-02-02 13:42     ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 13:42       ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 13:42       ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-02-02 15:43   ` Catalin Marinas
2021-02-02 15:43     ` Catalin Marinas

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