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From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
To: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
	kpsingh@kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] New BPF map and BTF security LSM hooks
Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2023 13:03:26 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87leiv4nb5.fsf@meer.lwn.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEf4BzaRkAtyigmu9fybW0_+TZJJX2i93BXjiNUfazt2dFDFbQ@mail.gmail.com>

Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com> writes:

> Why do you prefer such
> an approach instead of going with no extra permissions by default, but
> allowing custom LSM policy to grant few exceptions for known and
> trusted use cases?

Should you be curious, you can find some of the history of the "no
authoritative hooks" policy at:

  https://lwn.net/2001/1108/kernel.php3

It was fairly heatedly discussed at the time.

jon

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-04-13 19:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-04-12  4:32 [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] New BPF map and BTF security LSM hooks Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12  4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/8] bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load() Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 17:49   ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13  0:22     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12  4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/8] bpf: inline map creation logic in map_create() function Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 17:53   ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13  0:22     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12  4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 3/8] bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:01   ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13  0:23     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12  4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 4/8] bpf, lsm: implement bpf_map_create_security LSM hook Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:20   ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13  0:23     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12  4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 5/8] selftests/bpf: validate new " Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:23   ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13  0:23     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12  4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 6/8] bpf: drop unnecessary bpf_capable() check in BPF_MAP_FREEZE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 18:24   ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13  0:17     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12  4:32 ` [PATCH bpf-next 7/8] bpf, lsm: implement bpf_btf_load_security LSM hook Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 16:52   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13  1:43     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13  2:47       ` Paul Moore
2023-04-12  4:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 8/8] selftests/bpf: enhance lsm_map_create test with BTF LSM control Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-12 16:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] New BPF map and BTF security LSM hooks Paul Moore
2023-04-12 17:47   ` Kees Cook
2023-04-12 18:06     ` Paul Moore
2023-04-12 18:28       ` Kees Cook
2023-04-12 19:06         ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13  1:43           ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13  2:56             ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13  5:16               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 15:11                 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 23:29                   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-18  0:47                     ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21  0:00                       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-18 14:21                     ` Paul Moore
2023-04-21  0:00                       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-21 18:57                         ` Kees Cook
2023-04-13 16:54                 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-17 23:31                   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 19:03                 ` Jonathan Corbet [this message]
2023-04-17 23:28                   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-13 16:27             ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-17 23:31               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-17 23:53                 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-18  0:28                   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-18  0:52                     ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-12 18:38       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-14 20:23     ` Dr. Greg
2023-04-17 23:31       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-04-19 10:53         ` Dr. Greg

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