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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v10 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 15:07:31 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200429220732.31602-26-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200429220732.31602-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

The kernel allocates (and frees on thread exit) a new shadow stack for a
pthread child.

    It is possible for the kernel to complete the clone syscall and set the
    child's shadow stack pointer to NULL and let the child thread allocate
    a shadow stack for itself.  There are two issues in this approach: It
    is not compatible with existing code that does inline syscall and it
    cannot handle signals before the child can successfully allocate a
    shadow stack.

A 64-bit shadow stack has a size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB).  A compat-mode
thread shadow stack has a size of 1/4 min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB).  This allows
more threads to run in a 32-bit address space.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
v10:
- Limit shadow stack size to 4 GB.

 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h         |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c              | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |  7 +++++
 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index 56fe08eebae6..71dc92acd2f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -18,11 +18,13 @@ struct cet_status {
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
 int cet_setup_shstk(void);
+int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
 void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
 int cet_verify_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *new_ssp);
 void cet_restore_signal(struct sc_ext *sc);
 int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, struct sc_ext *sc);
 #else
+static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p) { return 0; }
 static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline void cet_restore_signal(struct sc_ext *sc) { return; }
 static inline int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor,
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 4e55370e48e8..bb7a4a2d6923 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/paravirt.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
 
 extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id;
@@ -155,6 +156,8 @@ do {						\
 #else
 #define deactivate_mm(tsk, mm)			\
 do {						\
+	if (!tsk->vfork_done)			\
+		cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk);	\
 	load_gs_index(0);			\
 	loadsegment(fs, 0);			\
 } while (0)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
index 274fecdd9669..121552047b86 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -169,6 +169,47 @@ int cet_setup_shstk(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, size;
+	struct cet_user_state *state;
+	struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
+
+	if (!cet->shstk_size)
+		return 0;
+
+	state = get_xsave_addr(&tsk->thread.fpu.state.xsave,
+			       XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+
+	if (!state)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Cap shadow stack size to 4 GB */
+	size = min(rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), 1UL << 32);
+
+	/*
+	 * Compat-mode pthreads share a limited address space.
+	 * If each function call takes an average of four slots
+	 * stack space, we need 1/4 of stack size for shadow stack.
+	 */
+	if (in_compat_syscall())
+		size /= 4;
+	size = round_up(size, PAGE_SIZE);
+	addr = alloc_shstk(size);
+
+	if (IS_ERR((void *)addr)) {
+		cet->shstk_base = 0;
+		cet->shstk_size = 0;
+		return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
+	}
+
+	fpu__prepare_write(&tsk->thread.fpu);
+	state->user_ssp = (u64)(addr + size);
+	cet->shstk_base = addr;
+	cet->shstk_size = size;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 9d9cff2c1018..ef1c2b8086a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 	free_vm86(t);
 
+	cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk);
 	fpu__drop(fpu);
 }
 
@@ -179,6 +180,12 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
 	if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
 		ret = set_new_tls(p, tls);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */
+	if (!ret && (clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM)
+		ret = cet_setup_thread_shstk(p);
+#endif
+
 	if (!ret && unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_IO_BITMAP)))
 		io_bitmap_share(p);
 
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-04-29 22:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-29 22:07 [PATCH v10 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:53   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-29 23:02     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-12 23:20       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-15 18:39         ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-15 21:33           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-15 22:43             ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-15 23:29               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-15 23:56                 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-16  2:51                   ` H.J. Lu
2020-05-17 23:09                     ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-16  2:53                   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-18 13:41                     ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-18 14:01                       ` H.J. Lu
2020-05-18 14:26                         ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-18 14:21                       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-18 23:47                     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-19  0:38                       ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-19  1:35                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-20  1:04                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-29  2:08                             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-16  0:13               ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-16  2:37                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-05-16 14:09                   ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-22 16:49                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-05-22 17:48                       ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-07-23 16:10   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-23 16:21     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 04/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-07 15:55   ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-07 16:59     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 19/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 21/26] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 22/26] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 26/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-21 22:42   ` Kees Cook
2020-05-22 17:17     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-22 17:29       ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2020-05-22 18:13         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-21 15:15 ` [PATCH v10 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-21 15:57   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-21 18:50     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-21 19:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-07-23 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-23 16:41   ` Dave Hansen
2020-07-23 16:56     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-23 18:41       ` Dave Hansen
2020-07-24  3:40         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-07-24  4:50           ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-24  4:59         ` Sean Christopherson

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