From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 09:25:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200723162531.GF21891@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200429220732.31602-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 03:07:06PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks
> return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details can be found in "Intel
> 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
>
> This series depends on the XSAVES supervisor state series that was split
> out and submitted earlier [2].
...
> Yu-cheng Yu (25):
> x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow
> Enforcement Technology (CET)
> x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states
How would people feel about taking the above two patches (02 and 03 in the
series) through the KVM tree to enable KVM virtualization of CET before the
kernel itself gains CET support? I.e. add the MSR and feature bits, along
with the XSAVES context switching. The feature definitons could use "" to
suppress displaying them in /proc/cpuinfo to avoid falsely advertising CET
to userspace.
AIUI, there are ABI issues that need to be sorted out, and that is likely
going to drag on for some time.
Is this a "hell no" sort of idea, or something that would be feasible if we
can show that there are no negative impacts to the kernel?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-23 16:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-29 22:07 [PATCH v10 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:53 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-29 23:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-12 23:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-15 18:39 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-15 21:33 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-15 22:43 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-15 23:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-15 23:56 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-16 2:51 ` H.J. Lu
2020-05-17 23:09 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-16 2:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-18 13:41 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-18 14:01 ` H.J. Lu
2020-05-18 14:26 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-18 14:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-18 23:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-19 0:38 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-19 1:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-20 1:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-29 2:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-16 0:13 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-16 2:37 ` H.J. Lu
2020-05-16 14:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-22 16:49 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-05-22 17:48 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-07-23 16:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-23 16:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 04/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-07 15:55 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-07 16:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 19/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 21/26] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 22/26] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 26/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-21 22:42 ` Kees Cook
2020-05-22 17:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-22 17:29 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2020-05-22 18:13 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-21 15:15 ` [PATCH v10 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-21 15:57 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-21 18:50 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-21 19:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-07-23 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2020-07-23 16:41 ` Dave Hansen
2020-07-23 16:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-23 18:41 ` Dave Hansen
2020-07-24 3:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-07-24 4:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-24 4:59 ` Sean Christopherson
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20200723162531.GF21891@linux.intel.com \
--to=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
--cc=Dave.Martin@arm.com \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=esyr@redhat.com \
--cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
--cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \
--cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
--cc=oleg@redhat.com \
--cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=ravi.v.shankar@intel.com \
--cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com \
--cc=weijiang.yang@intel.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).