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From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [RFC PATCH 03/12] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2020 15:43:08 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200325194317.526492-4-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200325194317.526492-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>

The SHA algorithms are necessary to measure configuration information into
the TPM as early as possible before using the values. This implementation
uses the established approach of #including the SHA libraries directly in
the code since the compressed kernel is not uncompressed at this point.

The SHA1 code here has its origins in the code in
include/crypto/sha1_base.h. That code could not be pulled directly into
the setup portion of the compressed kernel because of other dependencies
it pulls in. So this is a modified copy of that code that still leverages
the core SHA1 algorithm.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                        |  24 +++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile       |   4 +
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.c   | 104 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.h   |  17 ++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha256.c |   6 +
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha512.c |   6 +
 include/linux/sha512.h                  |  21 +++
 lib/sha1.c                              |   4 +
 lib/sha512.c                            | 209 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 9 files changed, 395 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha256.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha512.c
 create mode 100644 include/linux/sha512.h
 create mode 100644 lib/sha512.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 7f3406a9948b..f37057d3ce9f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2025,6 +2025,30 @@ config SECURE_LAUNCH
 	  of all the modules and configuration information used for
 	  boooting the operating system.
 
+choice
+	prompt "Select Secure Launch Algorithm for TPM2"
+	depends on SECURE_LAUNCH
+
+config SECURE_LAUNCH_SHA1
+	bool "Secure Launch TPM2 SHA1"
+	help
+	  When using Secure Launch and TPM2 is present, use SHA1 hash
+	  algorithm for measurements.
+
+config SECURE_LAUNCH_SHA256
+	bool "Secure Launch TPM2 SHA256"
+	help
+	  When using Secure Launch and TPM2 is present, use SHA256 hash
+	  algorithm for measurements.
+
+config SECURE_LAUNCH_SHA512
+	bool "Secure Launch TPM2 SHA512"
+	help
+	  When using Secure Launch and TPM2 is present, use SHA512 hash
+	  algorithm for measurements.
+
+endchoice
+
 config SECCOMP
 	def_bool y
 	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 1dac210f7d44..1f25bbdd72fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += $(obj)/eboot.o $(obj)/efi_stub_$(BITS).o \
 	$(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
 vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_thunk_$(BITS).o
 
+vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o
+vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH_SHA256) += $(obj)/early_sha256.o
+vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH_SHA512) += $(obj)/early_sha512.o
+
 # The compressed kernel is built with -fPIC/-fPIE so that a boot loader
 # can place it anywhere in memory and it will still run. However, since
 # it is executed as-is without any ELF relocation processing performed
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..605c984ca5cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Apertus Solutions, LLC.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <asm/boot.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+#include "early_sha1.h"
+
+#define SHA1_DISABLE_EXPORT
+#include "../../../../lib/sha1.c"
+
+/* The SHA1 implementation in lib/sha1.c was written to get the workspace
+ * buffer as a parameter. This wrapper function provides a container
+ * around a temporary workspace that is cleared after the transform completes.
+ */
+static void __sha_transform(u32 *digest, const char *data)
+{
+	u32 ws[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+
+	sha_transform(digest, data, ws);
+
+	memset(ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+	/*
+	 * As this is cryptographic code, prevent the memset 0 from being
+	 * optimized out potentially leaving secrets in memory.
+	 */
+	wmb();
+
+}
+
+void early_sha1_init(struct sha1_state *sctx)
+{
+	sha_init(sctx->state);
+	sctx->count = 0;
+}
+
+void early_sha1_update(struct sha1_state *sctx,
+		       const u8 *data,
+		       unsigned int len)
+{
+	unsigned int partial = sctx->count % SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+	sctx->count += len;
+
+	if (likely((partial + len) >= SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
+		int blocks;
+
+		if (partial) {
+			int p = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE - partial;
+
+			memcpy(sctx->buffer + partial, data, p);
+			data += p;
+			len -= p;
+
+			__sha_transform(sctx->state, sctx->buffer);
+		}
+
+		blocks = len / SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		len %= SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+		if (blocks) {
+			while (blocks--) {
+				__sha_transform(sctx->state, data);
+				data += SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
+			}
+		}
+		partial = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (len)
+		memcpy(sctx->buffer + partial, data, len);
+}
+
+void early_sha1_final(struct sha1_state *sctx, u8 *out)
+{
+	const int bit_offset = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE - sizeof(__be64);
+	__be64 *bits = (__be64 *)(sctx->buffer + bit_offset);
+	__be32 *digest = (__be32 *)out;
+	unsigned int partial = sctx->count % SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	int i;
+
+	sctx->buffer[partial++] = 0x80;
+	if (partial > bit_offset) {
+		memset(sctx->buffer + partial, 0x0, SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE - partial);
+		partial = 0;
+
+		__sha_transform(sctx->state, sctx->buffer);
+	}
+
+	memset(sctx->buffer + partial, 0x0, bit_offset - partial);
+	*bits = cpu_to_be64(sctx->count << 3);
+	__sha_transform(sctx->state, sctx->buffer);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(__be32); i++)
+		put_unaligned_be32(sctx->state[i], digest++);
+
+	*sctx = (struct sha1_state){};
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..58e2404fb301
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef BOOT_COMPRESSED_EARLY_SHA1_H
+#define BOOT_COMPRESSED_EARLY_SHA1_H
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+
+void early_sha1_init(struct sha1_state *sctx);
+void early_sha1_update(struct sha1_state *sctx,
+		       const u8 *data,
+		       unsigned int len);
+void early_sha1_final(struct sha1_state *sctx, u8 *out);
+
+#endif /* BOOT_COMPRESSED_EARLY_SHA1_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha256.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha256.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..81e863296ee8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha256.c
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Apertus Solutions, LLC
+ */
+
+#include "../../../../lib/crypto/sha256.c"
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha512.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha512.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a5e34cc0382f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha512.c
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Apertus Solutions, LLC
+ */
+
+#include "../../../../lib/sha512.c"
diff --git a/include/linux/sha512.h b/include/linux/sha512.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bbf6609a50bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/sha512.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/*
+ *  Copyright (C) 2019 Apertus Solutions, LLC
+ *
+ *  Author: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+ *
+ * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
+ * Version 2.  See the file COPYING for more details.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SHA512_H
+#define SHA512_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+
+extern int sha512_init(struct sha512_state *sctx);
+extern int sha512_update(struct sha512_state *sctx, const u8 *input,
+			 unsigned int length);
+extern int sha512_final(struct sha512_state *sctx, u8 *hash);
+
+#endif /* SHA512_H */
diff --git a/lib/sha1.c b/lib/sha1.c
index 1d96d2c02b82..a33fb8d42b9a 100644
--- a/lib/sha1.c
+++ b/lib/sha1.c
@@ -185,7 +185,9 @@ void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
 	digest[3] += D;
 	digest[4] += E;
 }
+#ifndef SHA1_DISABLE_EXPORT
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(sha_transform);
+#endif
 
 /**
  * sha_init - initialize the vectors for a SHA1 digest
@@ -199,4 +201,6 @@ void sha_init(__u32 *buf)
 	buf[3] = 0x10325476;
 	buf[4] = 0xc3d2e1f0;
 }
+#ifndef SHA1_DISABLE_EXPORT
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(sha_init);
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/sha512.c b/lib/sha512.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ce98d127ea6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/sha512.c
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+/* SHA-512 code by Jean-Luc Cooke <jlcooke@certainkey.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) Jean-Luc Cooke <jlcooke@certainkey.com>
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew McDonald <andrew@mcdonald.org.uk>
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Kyle McMartin <kyle@debian.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Apertus Solutions, LLC <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) any
+ * later version.
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/sha512.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+static inline u64 Ch(u64 x, u64 y, u64 z)
+{
+        return z ^ (x & (y ^ z));
+}
+
+static inline u64 Maj(u64 x, u64 y, u64 z)
+{
+        return (x & y) | (z & (x | y));
+}
+
+static const u64 sha512_K[80] = {
+        0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL, 0x7137449123ef65cdULL, 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL,
+        0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL, 0x3956c25bf348b538ULL, 0x59f111f1b605d019ULL,
+        0x923f82a4af194f9bULL, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL, 0xd807aa98a3030242ULL,
+        0x12835b0145706fbeULL, 0x243185be4ee4b28cULL, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL,
+        0x72be5d74f27b896fULL, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL, 0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL,
+        0xc19bf174cf692694ULL, 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL, 0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL,
+        0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL, 0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL,
+        0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL, 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL, 0x76f988da831153b5ULL,
+        0x983e5152ee66dfabULL, 0xa831c66d2db43210ULL, 0xb00327c898fb213fULL,
+        0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL, 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL, 0xd5a79147930aa725ULL,
+        0x06ca6351e003826fULL, 0x142929670a0e6e70ULL, 0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL,
+        0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL, 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL, 0x53380d139d95b3dfULL,
+        0x650a73548baf63deULL, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL, 0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL,
+        0x92722c851482353bULL, 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL, 0xa81a664bbc423001ULL,
+        0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL, 0xc76c51a30654be30ULL, 0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL,
+        0xd69906245565a910ULL, 0xf40e35855771202aULL, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL,
+        0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL, 0x1e376c085141ab53ULL, 0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL,
+        0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL, 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL,
+        0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL, 0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL,
+        0x78a5636f43172f60ULL, 0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL, 0x8cc702081a6439ecULL,
+        0x90befffa23631e28ULL, 0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL, 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL,
+        0xc67178f2e372532bULL, 0xca273eceea26619cULL, 0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL,
+        0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL, 0x06f067aa72176fbaULL,
+        0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL, 0x113f9804bef90daeULL, 0x1b710b35131c471bULL,
+        0x28db77f523047d84ULL, 0x32caab7b40c72493ULL, 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL,
+        0x431d67c49c100d4cULL, 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL, 0x597f299cfc657e2aULL,
+        0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL, 0x6c44198c4a475817ULL,
+};
+
+#define e0(x)       (ror64(x,28) ^ ror64(x,34) ^ ror64(x,39))
+#define e1(x)       (ror64(x,14) ^ ror64(x,18) ^ ror64(x,41))
+#define s0(x)       (ror64(x, 1) ^ ror64(x, 8) ^ (x >> 7))
+#define s1(x)       (ror64(x,19) ^ ror64(x,61) ^ (x >> 6))
+
+static inline void LOAD_OP(int I, u64 *W, const u8 *input)
+{
+	W[I] = get_unaligned_be64((__u64 *)input + I);
+}
+
+static inline void BLEND_OP(int I, u64 *W)
+{
+	W[I & 15] += s1(W[(I-2) & 15]) + W[(I-7) & 15] + s0(W[(I-15) & 15]);
+}
+
+static void sha512_transform(u64 *state, const u8 *input)
+{
+	u64 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, t1, t2;
+
+	int i;
+	u64 W[16];
+
+	/* load the state into our registers */
+	a=state[0];   b=state[1];   c=state[2];   d=state[3];
+	e=state[4];   f=state[5];   g=state[6];   h=state[7];
+
+	/* now iterate */
+	for (i=0; i<80; i+=8) {
+		if (!(i & 8)) {
+			int j;
+
+			if (i < 16) {
+				/* load the input */
+				for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
+					LOAD_OP(i + j, W, input);
+			} else {
+				for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
+					BLEND_OP(i + j, W);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + sha512_K[i  ] + W[(i & 15)];
+		t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a,b,c);    d+=t1;    h=t1+t2;
+		t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d,e,f) + sha512_K[i+1] + W[(i & 15) + 1];
+		t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h,a,b);    c+=t1;    g=t1+t2;
+		t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c,d,e) + sha512_K[i+2] + W[(i & 15) + 2];
+		t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g,h,a);    b+=t1;    f=t1+t2;
+		t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b,c,d) + sha512_K[i+3] + W[(i & 15) + 3];
+		t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f,g,h);    a+=t1;    e=t1+t2;
+		t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a,b,c) + sha512_K[i+4] + W[(i & 15) + 4];
+		t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e,f,g);    h+=t1;    d=t1+t2;
+		t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h,a,b) + sha512_K[i+5] + W[(i & 15) + 5];
+		t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d,e,f);    g+=t1;    c=t1+t2;
+		t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g,h,a) + sha512_K[i+6] + W[(i & 15) + 6];
+		t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c,d,e);    f+=t1;    b=t1+t2;
+		t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f,g,h) + sha512_K[i+7] + W[(i & 15) + 7];
+		t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b,c,d);    e+=t1;    a=t1+t2;
+	}
+
+	state[0] += a; state[1] += b; state[2] += c; state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e; state[5] += f; state[6] += g; state[7] += h;
+
+	/* erase our data */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = t1 = t2 = 0;
+}
+
+int sha512_init(struct sha512_state *sctx)
+{
+	sctx->state[0] = SHA512_H0;
+	sctx->state[1] = SHA512_H1;
+	sctx->state[2] = SHA512_H2;
+	sctx->state[3] = SHA512_H3;
+	sctx->state[4] = SHA512_H4;
+	sctx->state[5] = SHA512_H5;
+	sctx->state[6] = SHA512_H6;
+	sctx->state[7] = SHA512_H7;
+	sctx->count[0] = sctx->count[1] = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int sha512_update(struct sha512_state *sctx, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
+{
+	unsigned int partial = sctx->count[0] % SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+	sctx->count[0] += len;
+	if (sctx->count[0] < len)
+		sctx->count[1]++;
+
+	if (likely((partial + len) >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
+		int blocks;
+
+		if (partial) {
+			int p = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE - partial;
+
+			memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, data, p);
+			data += p;
+			len -= p;
+
+			sha512_transform(sctx->state, sctx->buf);
+		}
+
+		blocks = len / SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		len %= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+		if (blocks) {
+			while (blocks--) {
+				sha512_transform(sctx->state, data);
+				data += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE;
+			}
+		}
+		partial = 0;
+	}
+	if (len)
+		memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, data, len);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int sha512_final(struct sha512_state *sctx, u8 *out)
+{
+	const int bit_offset = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE - sizeof(__be64[2]);
+	__be64 *bits = (__be64 *)(sctx->buf + bit_offset);
+	__be64 *digest = (__be64 *)out;
+	unsigned int partial = sctx->count[0] % SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	unsigned int digest_size = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	int i;
+
+	sctx->buf[partial++] = 0x80;
+	if (partial > bit_offset) {
+		memset(sctx->buf + partial, 0x0, SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE - partial);
+		partial = 0;
+
+		sha512_transform(sctx->state, sctx->buf);
+	}
+
+	memset(sctx->buf + partial, 0x0, bit_offset - partial);
+	bits[0] = cpu_to_be64(sctx->count[1] << 3 | sctx->count[0] >> 61);
+	bits[1] = cpu_to_be64(sctx->count[0] << 3);
+	sha512_transform(sctx->state, sctx->buf);
+
+	for (i = 0; digest_size > 0; i++, digest_size -= sizeof(__be64))
+		put_unaligned_be64(sctx->state[i], digest++);
+
+	*sctx = (struct sha512_state){};
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-03-25 19:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-25 19:43 [RFC PATCH 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure late launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2020-03-26 18:06   ` Daniel Kiper
2020-03-26 19:42     ` Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2020-03-26 19:00   ` Daniel Kiper
2020-03-25 19:43 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2020-03-26  3:44   ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 22:49     ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] x86: Add early TPM TIS/CRB interface support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] x86: Add early TPM1.2/TPM2.0 " Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] x86: Add early general TPM " Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] x86: Secure Launch adding event log securityfs Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 20:21   ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-25 21:43     ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 11/12] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 20:29 ` [RFC PATCH 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure late launch Linux kernel support Matthew Garrett
2020-03-25 22:51   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 20:50     ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 23:13       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-11 19:00         ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 13:40   ` Daniel Kiper
2020-03-26 20:19     ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 20:33       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 20:40         ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 20:59           ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 21:07           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 21:28             ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 22:52               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 22:59                 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 23:04                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-27  0:01                     ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 23:50                 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-05-11 19:00       ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 20:50   ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 20:54     ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 22:37       ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 22:41         ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 23:55           ` Daniel P. Smith

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