From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure late launch Linux kernel support
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2020 15:51:52 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUshiLMHyf4DShgDRtCvnzUVyRQgmgCiudvhuhw05cDxg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJut56WuqO=uLff0qy1Jp=C6f_sRxLpRBsrzb6byBsFYdCg@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 1:29 PM Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 12:43 PM Ross Philipson
> <ross.philipson@oracle.com> wrote:
> > To enable the kernel to be launched by GETSEC or SKINIT, a stub must be
> > built into the setup section of the compressed kernel to handle the
> > specific state that the late launch process leaves the BSP. This is a
> > lot like the EFI stub that is found in the same area. Also this stub
> > must measure everything that is going to be used as early as possible.
> > This stub code and subsequent code must also deal with the specific
> > state that the late launch leaves the APs in.
>
> How does this integrate with the EFI entry point? That's the expected
> entry point on most modern x86. What's calling ExitBootServices() in
> this flow, and does the secure launch have to occur after it? It'd be
> a lot easier if you could still use the firmware's TPM code rather
> than carrying yet another copy.
I was wondering why the bootloader was involved at all. In other
words, could you instead hand off control to the kernel just like
normal and have the kernel itself (in normal code, the EFI stub, or
wherever it makes sense) do the DRTM launch all by itself? This would
avoid needing to patch bootloaders, to implement this specially for
QEMU -kernel, to get the exact right buy-in from all the cloud
vendors, etc. It would also give you more flexibility to evolve
exactly what configuration maps to exactly what PCRs in the future.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-25 22:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-25 19:43 [RFC PATCH 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure late launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2020-03-26 18:06 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-03-26 19:42 ` Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2020-03-26 19:00 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2020-03-26 3:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 22:49 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] x86: Add early TPM TIS/CRB interface support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] x86: Add early TPM1.2/TPM2.0 " Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] x86: Add early general TPM " Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] x86: Secure Launch adding event log securityfs Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 20:21 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-25 21:43 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 11/12] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 20:29 ` [RFC PATCH 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure late launch Linux kernel support Matthew Garrett
2020-03-25 22:51 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2020-03-26 20:50 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 23:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-11 19:00 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 13:40 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-03-26 20:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 20:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 20:40 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 20:59 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 21:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 21:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 22:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 23:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-27 0:01 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 23:50 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-05-11 19:00 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 20:50 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 20:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 22:37 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 22:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 23:55 ` Daniel P. Smith
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