From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Cc: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
leif@nuviainc.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com,
piotr.krol@3mdeb.com, krystian.hebel@3mdeb.com,
michal.zygowski@3mdeb.com,
James Bottomley <james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure late launch Linux kernel support
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 15:00:24 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e8908622-cf20-b2a4-672f-9072f5ea806b@apertussolutions.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJutT1F7YJ5KFkyuaZv=nj8GqC+mrnoAsHZfMP1ZRNUQg3Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 3/26/20 4:19 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> How does Windows manage this? Retaining access to EFI runtime services
> is necessary, and the areas in the memory map marked as runtime
> services code or data should be considered part of the TCB and
> measured - they're very much not part of the gap.
>
Dave Weston was kind enough to speak at PSEC specifically on how they
are leveraging DRTM.
https://www.platformsecuritysummit.com/2019/speaker/weston/
V/r,
DPS
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-11 19:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-25 19:43 [RFC PATCH 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure late launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2020-03-26 18:06 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-03-26 19:42 ` Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2020-03-26 19:00 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2020-03-26 3:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 22:49 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] x86: Add early TPM TIS/CRB interface support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] x86: Add early TPM1.2/TPM2.0 " Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] x86: Add early general TPM " Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] x86: Secure Launch adding event log securityfs Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 20:21 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-25 21:43 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 11/12] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 20:29 ` [RFC PATCH 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure late launch Linux kernel support Matthew Garrett
2020-03-25 22:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 20:50 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 23:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-11 19:00 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 13:40 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-03-26 20:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 20:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 20:40 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 20:59 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 21:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 21:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 22:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 23:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-27 0:01 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 23:50 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-05-11 19:00 ` Daniel P. Smith [this message]
2020-03-26 20:50 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 20:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 22:37 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 22:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 23:55 ` Daniel P. Smith
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