From: peterz@infradead.org (Peter Zijlstra)
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] x86: Allow breakpoints to emulate call functions
Date: Fri, 3 May 2019 11:29:59 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190503092959.GB2623@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
Message-ID: <20190503092959.2pFllVzEy2z7TdFn8_1Et8rgvzIHyAAk7h5gna_eJtI@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190502195052.0af473cf@gandalf.local.home>
On Thu, May 02, 2019@07:50:52PM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Thu, 2 May 2019 19:31:29 -0400
> Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> wrote:
>
> > Digging a little further, I pinpointed it out to being kretprobes. The
> > problem I believe is the use of kernel_stack_pointer() which does some
> > magic on x86_32. kretprobes uses this to hijack the return address of
> > the function (much like the function graph tracer does). I do have code
> > that would allow kretprobes to use the function graph tracer instead,
> > but that's still in progress (almost done!). But still, we should not
> > have this break the use of kernel_stack_pointer() either.
> >
> > Adding some printks in that code, it looks to be returning "®s->sp"
> > which I think we changed.
> >
>
> This appears to fix it!
>
> -- Steve
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
> index 4b8ee05dd6ad..600ead178bf4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -171,8 +171,12 @@ unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
> unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)®s->sp;
> u32 *prev_esp;
>
> - if (context == (sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)))
> + if (context == (sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1))) {
> + /* int3 code adds a gap */
> + if (sp == regs->sp - 5*4)
> + return regs->sp;
> return sp;
> + }
>
> prev_esp = (u32 *)(context);
> if (*prev_esp)
OMG, WTF, ARGH... That code is fsck'ing horrible. I'd almost argue to
always do the INT3 thing, just to avoid games like that.
That said; for normal traps ®s->sp is indeed the previous context --
if it doesn't fall off the stack. Your hack detects the regular INT3
frame. Howver if regs->sp has been modified (int3_emulate_push, for
example) your detectoring comes unstuck.
Now, it is rather unlikely these two code paths interact, but just to be
safe, something like so might be more reliable:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
index 4b8ee05dd6ad..aceaad0cc9a9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ static inline bool invalid_selector(u16 value)
* stack pointer we fall back to regs as stack if no previous stack
* exists.
*
+ * There is a special case for INT3, there we construct a full pt_regs
+ * environment. We can detect this case by a high bit in regs->cs
+ *
* This is valid only for kernel mode traps.
*/
unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
@@ -171,6 +174,9 @@ unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)®s->sp;
u32 *prev_esp;
+ if (regs->__csh & (1 << 13)) /* test CS_FROM_INT3 */
+ return regs->sp;
+
if (context == (sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)))
return sp;
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@
#define CS_FROM_ENTRY_STACK (1 << 31)
#define CS_FROM_USER_CR3 (1 << 30)
+#define CS_FROM_INT3 (1 << 29)
.macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_STACK
@@ -1515,6 +1516,9 @@ ENTRY(int3)
add $16, 12(%esp) # point sp back at the previous context
+ andl $0x0000ffff, 4(%esp)
+ orl $CS_FROM_INT3, 4(%esp)
+
pushl $-1 # orig_eax; mark as interrupt
SAVE_ALL
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-03 9:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 204+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190501202830.347656894@goodmis.org>
2019-05-01 20:28 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/2] x86: Allow breakpoints to emulate call functions rostedt
2019-05-01 20:28 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-02 3:24 ` rostedt
2019-05-02 3:24 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-02 16:21 ` peterz
2019-05-02 16:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-02 16:29 ` peterz
2019-05-02 16:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-02 18:02 ` torvalds
2019-05-02 18:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-02 18:18 ` peterz
2019-05-02 18:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-02 18:30 ` peterz
2019-05-02 18:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-02 18:43 ` torvalds
2019-05-02 18:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-02 19:28 ` jikos
2019-05-02 19:28 ` Jiri Kosina
2019-05-02 20:25 ` luto
2019-05-02 20:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-02 20:21 ` peterz
2019-05-02 20:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-02 20:49 ` torvalds
2019-05-02 20:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-02 21:32 ` peterz
2019-05-02 21:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-03 19:24 ` rostedt
2019-05-03 19:24 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 21:46 ` torvalds
2019-05-03 21:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-03 22:49 ` rostedt
2019-05-03 22:49 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 23:07 ` torvalds
2019-05-03 23:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-04 4:17 ` rostedt
2019-05-04 4:17 ` Steven Rostedt
[not found] ` <CAHk-=wiuSFbv_rELND-BLWcP0GSZ0yF=xOAEcf61GE3bU9d=yg@mail.gmail.com>
2019-05-04 18:59 ` torvalds
2019-05-04 18:59 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-04 20:12 ` luto
2019-05-04 20:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-04 20:28 ` torvalds
2019-05-04 20:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-04 20:36 ` torvalds
2019-05-04 20:36 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-03 22:55 ` luto
2019-05-03 22:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-03 23:16 ` torvalds
2019-05-03 23:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-03 23:32 ` luto
2019-05-03 23:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-02 22:52 ` rostedt
2019-05-02 22:52 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-02 23:31 ` rostedt
2019-05-02 23:31 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-02 23:50 ` rostedt
2019-05-02 23:50 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 1:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/2 v2] " rostedt
2019-05-03 1:51 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 9:29 ` peterz [this message]
2019-05-03 9:29 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/2] " Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-03 13:22 ` rostedt
2019-05-03 13:22 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 16:20 ` luto
2019-05-03 16:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-03 16:31 ` rostedt
2019-05-03 16:31 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 16:35 ` peterz
2019-05-03 16:35 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-03 16:44 ` luto
2019-05-03 16:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-03 16:49 ` rostedt
2019-05-03 16:49 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 16:32 ` peterz
2019-05-03 16:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-03 18:57 ` torvalds
2019-05-03 18:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 8:19 ` peterz
2019-05-06 8:19 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-06 13:56 ` rostedt
2019-05-06 13:56 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-06 16:17 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 16:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 16:19 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 17:06 ` rostedt
2019-05-06 17:06 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-06 18:06 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 18:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 18:57 ` rostedt
2019-05-06 18:57 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-06 19:46 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 19:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 20:29 ` rostedt
2019-05-06 20:29 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-06 20:42 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 20:42 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 20:44 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 20:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 21:45 ` rostedt
2019-05-06 21:45 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-06 22:06 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 22:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 22:31 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 22:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 0:10 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 0:10 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 1:06 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 1:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 1:04 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 1:04 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 1:34 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 1:34 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 1:34 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 1:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 1:53 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 1:53 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 2:22 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 2:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 2:58 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 2:58 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 3:05 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 3:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 3:21 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 3:21 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 3:28 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 3:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 14:54 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 14:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 15:12 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 15:12 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 15:25 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 15:25 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 16:25 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 16:25 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 15:31 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 15:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 15:45 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 15:45 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 16:34 ` peterz
2019-05-07 16:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 17:08 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 17:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 17:21 ` jpoimboe
2019-05-07 17:21 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-05-07 21:24 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 21:24 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-08 4:50 ` torvalds
2019-05-08 4:50 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-08 16:37 ` rostedt
2019-05-08 16:37 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 17:38 ` peterz
2019-05-07 17:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 9:51 ` peterz
2019-05-07 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 14:48 ` luto
2019-05-07 14:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-07 14:57 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 14:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 14:13 ` mhiramat
2019-05-07 14:13 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-05-07 17:15 ` mhiramat
2019-05-07 17:15 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-05-06 14:22 ` peterz
2019-05-06 14:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 8:57 ` peterz
2019-05-07 8:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 9:18 ` David.Laight
2019-05-07 9:18 ` David Laight
2019-05-07 11:30 ` peterz
2019-05-07 11:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 12:57 ` David.Laight
2019-05-07 12:57 ` David Laight
2019-05-07 13:14 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 13:14 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 14:50 ` David.Laight
2019-05-07 14:50 ` David Laight
2019-05-07 14:57 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 14:57 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 15:46 ` David.Laight
2019-05-07 15:46 ` David Laight
2019-05-07 13:32 ` peterz
2019-05-07 13:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 9:27 ` peterz
2019-05-07 9:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 12:27 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 12:27 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 12:41 ` peterz
2019-05-07 12:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 12:54 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 12:54 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 17:22 ` masami.hiramatsu
2019-05-07 17:22 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-05-07 14:28 ` peterz
2019-05-07 14:28 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-02 20:48 ` rostedt
2019-05-02 20:48 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-06 15:14 ` jpoimboe
2019-05-06 15:14 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-05-01 20:28 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/2] ftrace/x86: Emulate call function while updating in breakpoint handler rostedt
2019-05-01 20:28 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 10:22 ` [RFC][PATCH 1.5/2] x86: Add int3_emulate_call() selftest peterz
2019-05-03 10:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-03 18:46 ` rostedt
2019-05-03 18:46 ` Steven Rostedt
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