From: luto@amacapital.net (Andy Lutomirski)
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] x86: Allow breakpoints to emulate call functions
Date: Fri, 3 May 2019 09:20:55 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2045370D-38D8-406C-9E94-C1D483E232C9@amacapital.net> (raw)
Message-ID: <20190503162055.tF7IcHf8PD5USPiOtpZNuj9xhHyhp7pRaS9_SQW4jVs@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190503092247.20cc1ff0@gandalf.local.home>
> On May 3, 2019,@6:22 AM, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 3 May 2019 11:29:59 +0200
> Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
>
>
>> OMG, WTF, ARGH... That code is fsck'ing horrible. I'd almost argue to
>> always do the INT3 thing, just to avoid games like that.
>
> Hehe, that's almost the exact same thoughts I had when seeing this
> code ;-)
>
>>
>> That said; for normal traps ®s->sp is indeed the previous context --
>> if it doesn't fall off the stack. Your hack detects the regular INT3
>> frame. Howver if regs->sp has been modified (int3_emulate_push, for
>> example) your detectoring comes unstuck.
>
> Yep. I realized the issue as well. But wanted to make sure this did
> work when sp wasn't changed.
>
>>
>> Now, it is rather unlikely these two code paths interact, but just to be
>> safe, something like so might be more reliable:
>>
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
>> index 4b8ee05dd6ad..aceaad0cc9a9 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
>> @@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ static inline bool invalid_selector(u16 value)
>> * stack pointer we fall back to regs as stack if no previous stack
>> * exists.
>> *
>> + * There is a special case for INT3, there we construct a full pt_regs
>> + * environment. We can detect this case by a high bit in regs->cs
>> + *
>> * This is valid only for kernel mode traps.
>> */
>> unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
>> @@ -171,6 +174,9 @@ unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
>> unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)®s->sp;
>> u32 *prev_esp;
>>
>> + if (regs->__csh & (1 << 13)) /* test CS_FROM_INT3 */
>> + return regs->sp;
>> +
>
> Thanks, I was looking into doing something like this (setting a flag in
> the int3 code), but didn't have the time to see the best way to do this.
>
> I'll add this version of the code and run it through my tests.
>
> -- Steve
>
>> if (context == (sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)))
>> return sp;
>>
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>> @@ -388,6 +388,7 @@
>>
>> #define CS_FROM_ENTRY_STACK (1 << 31)
>> #define CS_FROM_USER_CR3 (1 << 30)
>> +#define CS_FROM_INT3 (1 << 29)
>>
>> .macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_STACK
>>
>> @@ -1515,6 +1516,9 @@ ENTRY(int3)
>>
>> add $16, 12(%esp) # point sp back at the previous context
>>
>> + andl $0x0000ffff, 4(%esp)
>> + orl $CS_FROM_INT3, 4(%esp)
>> +
>> pushl $-1 # orig_eax; mark as interrupt
>>
>> SAVE_ALL
>
So here’s a somewhat nutty suggestion: how about we tweak the 32-bit entry code to emulate the sane 64-bit frame, not just for int3 but always? Basically, the entry asm for entries from kernel mode would do, roughly:
push $0 ;dummy for call emulation
push %ss
push $0 ;a dummy for ESP
push 3*4(%esp) ;EFLAGS
push 3*4(%esp) ;CS
push 3*4(%esp) ;EIP
push %rax
lea 7*4(%esp), %rax
mov %rax, 4*4(%esp) ;ESP
And the exit asm would do a little dance to write EFLAGS, CS, and EIP to the right spot, then load ESP-3*4 into %esp and do IRET.
Now the annoying kernel_stack_pointer() hack can just go away, since regs->sp is always correct!
I probably screwed up some arithmetic there, but it’s the idea that counts :)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-03 16:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 204+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190501202830.347656894@goodmis.org>
2019-05-01 20:28 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/2] x86: Allow breakpoints to emulate call functions rostedt
2019-05-01 20:28 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-02 3:24 ` rostedt
2019-05-02 3:24 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-02 16:21 ` peterz
2019-05-02 16:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-02 16:29 ` peterz
2019-05-02 16:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-02 18:02 ` torvalds
2019-05-02 18:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-02 18:18 ` peterz
2019-05-02 18:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-02 18:30 ` peterz
2019-05-02 18:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-02 18:43 ` torvalds
2019-05-02 18:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-02 19:28 ` jikos
2019-05-02 19:28 ` Jiri Kosina
2019-05-02 20:25 ` luto
2019-05-02 20:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-02 20:21 ` peterz
2019-05-02 20:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-02 20:49 ` torvalds
2019-05-02 20:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-02 21:32 ` peterz
2019-05-02 21:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-03 19:24 ` rostedt
2019-05-03 19:24 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 21:46 ` torvalds
2019-05-03 21:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-03 22:49 ` rostedt
2019-05-03 22:49 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 23:07 ` torvalds
2019-05-03 23:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-04 4:17 ` rostedt
2019-05-04 4:17 ` Steven Rostedt
[not found] ` <CAHk-=wiuSFbv_rELND-BLWcP0GSZ0yF=xOAEcf61GE3bU9d=yg@mail.gmail.com>
2019-05-04 18:59 ` torvalds
2019-05-04 18:59 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-04 20:12 ` luto
2019-05-04 20:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-04 20:28 ` torvalds
2019-05-04 20:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-04 20:36 ` torvalds
2019-05-04 20:36 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-03 22:55 ` luto
2019-05-03 22:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-03 23:16 ` torvalds
2019-05-03 23:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-03 23:32 ` luto
2019-05-03 23:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-02 22:52 ` rostedt
2019-05-02 22:52 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-02 23:31 ` rostedt
2019-05-02 23:31 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-02 23:50 ` rostedt
2019-05-02 23:50 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 1:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/2 v2] " rostedt
2019-05-03 1:51 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 9:29 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/2] " peterz
2019-05-03 9:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-03 13:22 ` rostedt
2019-05-03 13:22 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 16:20 ` luto [this message]
2019-05-03 16:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-03 16:31 ` rostedt
2019-05-03 16:31 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 16:35 ` peterz
2019-05-03 16:35 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-03 16:44 ` luto
2019-05-03 16:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-03 16:49 ` rostedt
2019-05-03 16:49 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 16:32 ` peterz
2019-05-03 16:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-03 18:57 ` torvalds
2019-05-03 18:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 8:19 ` peterz
2019-05-06 8:19 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-06 13:56 ` rostedt
2019-05-06 13:56 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-06 16:17 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 16:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 16:19 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 16:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 17:06 ` rostedt
2019-05-06 17:06 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-06 18:06 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 18:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 18:57 ` rostedt
2019-05-06 18:57 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-06 19:46 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 19:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 20:29 ` rostedt
2019-05-06 20:29 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-06 20:42 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 20:42 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 20:44 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 20:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 21:45 ` rostedt
2019-05-06 21:45 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-06 22:06 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 22:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-06 22:31 ` torvalds
2019-05-06 22:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 0:10 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 0:10 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 1:06 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 1:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 1:04 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 1:04 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 1:34 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 1:34 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 1:34 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 1:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 1:53 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 1:53 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 2:22 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 2:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 2:58 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 2:58 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 3:05 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 3:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 3:21 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 3:21 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 3:28 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 3:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 14:54 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 14:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 15:12 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 15:12 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 15:25 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 15:25 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 16:25 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 16:25 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 15:31 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 15:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 15:45 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 15:45 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 16:34 ` peterz
2019-05-07 16:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 17:08 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 17:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 17:21 ` jpoimboe
2019-05-07 17:21 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-05-07 21:24 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 21:24 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-08 4:50 ` torvalds
2019-05-08 4:50 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-08 16:37 ` rostedt
2019-05-08 16:37 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 17:38 ` peterz
2019-05-07 17:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 9:51 ` peterz
2019-05-07 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 14:48 ` luto
2019-05-07 14:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-07 14:57 ` torvalds
2019-05-07 14:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-05-07 14:13 ` mhiramat
2019-05-07 14:13 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-05-07 17:15 ` mhiramat
2019-05-07 17:15 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-05-06 14:22 ` peterz
2019-05-06 14:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 8:57 ` peterz
2019-05-07 8:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 9:18 ` David.Laight
2019-05-07 9:18 ` David Laight
2019-05-07 11:30 ` peterz
2019-05-07 11:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 12:57 ` David.Laight
2019-05-07 12:57 ` David Laight
2019-05-07 13:14 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 13:14 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 14:50 ` David.Laight
2019-05-07 14:50 ` David Laight
2019-05-07 14:57 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 14:57 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 15:46 ` David.Laight
2019-05-07 15:46 ` David Laight
2019-05-07 13:32 ` peterz
2019-05-07 13:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 9:27 ` peterz
2019-05-07 9:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 12:27 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 12:27 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 12:41 ` peterz
2019-05-07 12:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-07 12:54 ` rostedt
2019-05-07 12:54 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-07 17:22 ` masami.hiramatsu
2019-05-07 17:22 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-05-07 14:28 ` peterz
2019-05-07 14:28 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-02 20:48 ` rostedt
2019-05-02 20:48 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-06 15:14 ` jpoimboe
2019-05-06 15:14 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-05-01 20:28 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/2] ftrace/x86: Emulate call function while updating in breakpoint handler rostedt
2019-05-01 20:28 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-05-03 10:22 ` [RFC][PATCH 1.5/2] x86: Add int3_emulate_call() selftest peterz
2019-05-03 10:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-05-03 18:46 ` rostedt
2019-05-03 18:46 ` Steven Rostedt
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