linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 11:47:10 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJ-EccMAb-OX3R6mk4me0x6dS2bQw=yZrpKmF7JpzHDWSX5e4g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJ-EccMc3Xz0DZAm_u09VvTzWRzhrf9x0SpJKX=4FR6NYwqkpQ@mail.gmail.com>

I'm getting the following crash when booting after compiling a kernel
with this LSM enabled, so I'll have to figure out what is going on.
All the "core" functionality of this LSM has been tested thoroughly
(we're already using this LSM on ChromeOS), but looks like there's
some debugging of the initialization that still needs to be done.

[    0.174285] LSM: Security Framework initializing
[    0.175277] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference
at 0000000000000000
[    0.176272] #PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
[    0.176272] PGD 0 P4D 0
[    0.176272] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[    0.176272] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3+ #5
[    0.176272] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
[    0.176272] RIP: 0010:strcmp+0x4/0x20
[    0.176272] Code: 09 48 83 c2 01 80 3a 00 75 f7 48 83 c6 01 0f b6
4e ff 48 83 c2 01 84 c9 88 4a ff 75 ed f3 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48
83 c7 01 <0f> b6 47 ff 48 83 c6 01 3a 46 ff 75 07 84 c0 75 eb 31 c0 c3
19 c0
[    0.176272] RSP: 0000:ffffffff88a03eb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[    0.176272] RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: ffffffff89079bb0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    0.176272] RDX: ffffa3f087411ec5 RSI: ffffa3f087411ec0 RDI: 0000000000000001
[    0.176272] RBP: ffffffff88815d93 R08: 000000000000002c R09: ffffa3f087411ec4
[    0.176272] R10: 000000000000002c R11: 00726f6d72617070 R12: ffffa3f087411ec0
[    0.176272] R13: ffffa3f087411ec0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[    0.176272] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa3f087800000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[    0.176272] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    0.176272] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000005c0e000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[    0.176272] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[    0.176272] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[    0.176272] Call Trace:
[    0.176272]  ordered_lsm_parse+0x112/0x20b
[    0.176272]  security_init+0x9b/0x3ab
[    0.176272]  start_kernel+0x413/0x479
[    0.176272]  secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
[    0.176272] Modules linked in:
[    0.176272] CR2: 0000000000000000
[    0.176272] ---[ end trace f2a8342a377681d5 ]---
[    0.176272] RIP: 0010:strcmp+0x4/0x20
[    0.176272] Code: 09 48 83 c2 01 80 3a 00 75 f7 48 83 c6 01 0f b6
4e ff 48 83 c2 01 84 c9 88 4a ff 75 ed f3 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48
83 c7 01 <0f> b6 47 ff 48 83 c6 01 3a 46 ff 75 07 84 c0 75 eb 31 c0 c3
19 c0
[    0.176272] RSP: 0000:ffffffff88a03eb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[    0.176272] RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: ffffffff89079bb0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    0.176272] RDX: ffffa3f087411ec5 RSI: ffffa3f087411ec0 RDI: 0000000000000001
[    0.176272] RBP: ffffffff88815d93 R08: 000000000000002c R09: ffffa3f087411ec4
[    0.176272] R10: 000000000000002c R11: 00726f6d72617070 R12: ffffa3f087411ec0
[    0.176272] R13: ffffa3f087411ec0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[    0.176272] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa3f087800000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[    0.176272] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    0.176272] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000005c0e000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[    0.176272] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[    0.176272] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[    0.176272] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task!
[    0.176272] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill
the idle task! ]---

On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 1:06 PM Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> Thanks!
>
> On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 12:15 PM James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, 16 Jan 2019, mortonm@chromium.org wrote:
> >
> > > From: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
> > >
> > > SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID
> > > transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a
> > > system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given
> > > UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with
> > > CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID
> > > mappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls is
> > > supported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
> > > Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> >
> > Both applied to
> > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next-general
> >
> >
> > --
> > James Morris
> > <jmorris@namei.org>
> >

  reply	other threads:[~2019-01-28 19:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 88+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-31 15:28 [PATCH] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2018-10-31 21:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-10-31 21:57   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-31 22:37     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01  1:12       ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01  6:13         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 15:39           ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 15:56             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 16:18             ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01  6:07   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 16:11     ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 16:22       ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 16:41       ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 17:08       ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 19:52         ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 16:05           ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 17:12             ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 18:19               ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 18:30                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-02 19:02                   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 19:22                     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-08 20:53                       ` Micah Morton
2018-11-08 21:34                         ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-09  0:30                           ` Micah Morton
2018-11-09 23:21                             ` [PATCH] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable mortonm
2018-11-21 16:54                             ` [PATCH] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2018-12-06  0:08                               ` Kees Cook
2018-12-06 17:51                                 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-11 17:13                                 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2019-01-15  0:38                                   ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 18:04                                     ` [PATCH v3 1/2] LSM: mark all set*uid call sites in kernel/sys.c mortonm
2019-01-15 19:34                                       ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 18:04                                     ` [PATCH v3 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2019-01-15 19:44                                       ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 21:50                                         ` [PATCH v4 " mortonm
2019-01-15 22:32                                           ` Kees Cook
2019-01-16 15:46                                             ` [PATCH v5 " mortonm
2019-01-16 16:10                                               ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-22 20:40                                                 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-22 22:28                                                   ` James Morris
2019-01-22 22:40                                                     ` Micah Morton
2019-01-22 22:42                                                       ` [PATCH v3 1/2] " mortonm
2019-01-25 15:51                                                         ` Micah Morton
2019-01-25 20:15                                               ` [PATCH v5 2/2] " James Morris
2019-01-25 21:06                                                 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 19:47                                                   ` Micah Morton [this message]
2019-01-28 19:56                                                     ` Kees Cook
2019-01-28 20:09                                                       ` James Morris
2019-01-28 20:19                                                       ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 20:30                                                         ` [PATCH] LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM mortonm
2019-01-28 22:12                                                           ` James Morris
2019-01-28 22:33                                                         ` [PATCH v5 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls Micah Morton
2019-01-29 17:25                                                           ` James Morris
2019-01-29 21:14                                                             ` Micah Morton
2019-01-30  7:15                                                               ` Kees Cook
2019-02-06 19:03                                                                 ` [PATCH] LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest mortonm
2019-02-06 19:26                                                                   ` Edwin Zimmerman
2019-02-07 21:54                                                                     ` Micah Morton
2019-02-12 19:01                                                                   ` James Morris
2019-01-15 21:58                                         ` [PATCH v3 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls Micah Morton
2019-01-15 19:49                                     ` [PATCH v2] " Micah Morton
2019-01-15 19:53                                       ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15  4:07                                   ` James Morris
2019-01-15 19:42                                     ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 19:28                 ` [PATCH] " Micah Morton
2018-11-06 19:09                 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2018-11-06 20:59       ` [PATCH] " James Morris
2018-11-06 21:21         ` [PATCH v3] " mortonm
2018-11-02 18:07 ` [PATCH] " Stephen Smalley
2018-11-02 19:13   ` Micah Morton
2018-11-19 18:54   ` [PATCH] [PATCH] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable mortonm
2018-12-13 22:29     ` Micah Morton
2018-12-13 23:09       ` Casey Schaufler
2018-12-14  0:05         ` Micah Morton
2018-12-18 22:37         ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2019-01-07 17:55           ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 18:16             ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-07 18:36               ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 18:46                 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-07 19:02                   ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 22:57                     ` [PATCH v3] " mortonm
2019-01-07 23:13           ` [PATCH v2] " Kees Cook
2019-01-08  0:10             ` [PATCH v4] " mortonm
2019-01-08  0:20               ` Kees Cook
2019-01-09 18:39                 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-10 22:31               ` James Morris
2019-01-10 23:03                 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-08  0:10             ` [PATCH v2] " Micah Morton

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='CAJ-EccMAb-OX3R6mk4me0x6dS2bQw=yZrpKmF7JpzHDWSX5e4g@mail.gmail.com' \
    --to=mortonm@chromium.org \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body. 
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).