Re: [PATCH v2] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable

[Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>]

It seems a bit weird to me to keep security_capable_noaudit and not
add the analogous "security_capable_insetid" function (or other
one-off functions if/when people want to pass new flags to
security_capable). Taking away the function doesn't complicate the
callers in any way I can see, and somewhat cleans up the logic in at
lease one case (ns_capable_common in kernel/capability.c) since
callers can just modify the last param in security_capable rather than
calling different functions for audit vs. noaudit. I guess my take is
why keep "security_capable_noaudit" when it is easy to just call
"security_capable" with the SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT flag? I have no
strong preference here so I'll do whatever seems best.

On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 10:16 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> On 1/7/2019 9:55 AM, Micah Morton wrote:
> > Checking in to see if there are any further comments on this patch now
> > that the holidays are passed? It seems like a straightforward change
> > to me, but let me know if there is anything I can clarify that isn't
> > explained by the commit message.
> >
> > On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 2:37 PM <mortonm@chromium.org> wrote:
> >> From: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
> >>
> >> This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the
> >> security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is
> >> used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for
> >> the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag
> >> passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether
> >> security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by
> >> the proposed SafeSetID LSM).
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
> >> ---
> >> Changes since the last patch: Changed the code to use a bitmask instead
> >> of a struct to represent the options passed to security_capable.
> >>
> >>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h              |  8 +++++---
> >>  include/linux/security.h               | 28 +++++++++++++-------------
> >>  kernel/capability.c                    | 22 +++++++++++---------
> >>  kernel/seccomp.c                       |  4 ++--
> >>  security/apparmor/capability.c         | 14 ++++++-------
> >>  security/apparmor/include/capability.h |  2 +-
> >>  security/apparmor/ipc.c                |  3 ++-
> >>  security/apparmor/lsm.c                |  4 ++--
> >>  security/commoncap.c                   | 17 ++++++++--------
> >>  security/security.c                    | 14 +++++--------
> >>  security/selinux/hooks.c               | 16 +++++++--------
> >>  security/smack/smack_access.c          |  2 +-
> >>  12 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> >> index aaeb7fa24dc4..ef955a44a782 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> >> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> >> @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@
> >>   *     @cred contains the credentials to use.
> >>   *     @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
> >>   *     @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
> >> - *     @audit contains whether to write an audit message or not
> >> + *     @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h>
> >>   *     Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
> >>   * @syslog:
> >>   *     Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing
> >> @@ -1446,8 +1446,10 @@ union security_list_options {
> >>                         const kernel_cap_t *effective,
> >>                         const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> >>                         const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
> >> -       int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> -                       int cap, int audit);
> >> +       int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred,
> >> +                       struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> +                       int cap,
> >> +                       unsigned int opts);
> >>         int (*quotactl)(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
> >>         int (*quota_on)(struct dentry *dentry);
> >>         int (*syslog)(int type);
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> >> index d170a5b031f3..038e6779948c 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> >> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> >> @@ -54,9 +54,12 @@ struct xattr;
> >>  struct xfrm_sec_ctx;
> >>  struct mm_struct;
> >>
> >> +/* Default (no) options for the capable function */
> >> +#define SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT 0x0
> >>  /* If capable should audit the security request */
> >> -#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0
> >> -#define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1
> >> +#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0x01
> >> +/* If capable is being called by a setid function */
> >> +#define SECURITY_CAP_INSETID 0x02
> >>
> >>  /* LSM Agnostic defines for sb_set_mnt_opts */
> >>  #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS     1
> >> @@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ enum lsm_event {
> >>
> >>  /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> >>  extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> -                      int cap, int audit);
> >> +                      int cap, unsigned int opts);
> >>  extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
> >>  extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> >>  extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
> >> @@ -233,10 +236,10 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> >>                     const kernel_cap_t *effective,
> >>                     const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> >>                     const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
> >> -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> -                       int cap);
> >> -int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> -                            int cap);
> >> +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
> >> +                      struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> +                      int cap,
> >> +                      unsigned int opts);
> >>  int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
> >>  int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
> >>  int security_syslog(int type);
> >> @@ -492,14 +495,11 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new,
> >>  }
> >>
> >>  static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
> >> -                                  struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> >> +                                  struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> +                                  int cap,
> >> +                                  unsigned int opts)
> >>  {
> >> -       return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> >> -}
> >> -
> >> -static inline int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred,
> >> -                                          struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) {
> >> -       return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> >> +       return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, opts);
> >>  }
>
> Why get rid of security_capable_noaudit()?
>
> >>
> >>  static inline int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id,
> >> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> >> index 1e1c0236f55b..454576743b1b 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> >> @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
> >>         int ret;
> >>
> >>         rcu_read_lock();
> >> -       ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
> >> +       ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT);
> >>         rcu_read_unlock();
> >>
> >>         return (ret == 0);
> >> @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
> >>         int ret;
> >>
> >>         rcu_read_lock();
> >> -       ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
> >> +       ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> >>         rcu_read_unlock();
> >>
> >>         return (ret == 0);
> >> @@ -363,7 +363,9 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
> >>         return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
> >>  }
> >>
> >> -static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit)
> >> +static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> +                             int cap,
> >> +                             unsigned int opts)
> >>  {
> >>         int capable;
> >>
> >> @@ -372,8 +374,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit)
> >>                 BUG();
> >>         }
> >>
> >> -       capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) :
> >> -                         security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap);
> >> +       capable = security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap, opts);
> >>         if (capable == 0) {
> >>                 current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> >>                 return true;
> >> @@ -394,7 +395,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit)
> >>   */
> >>  bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> >>  {
> >> -       return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true);
> >> +       return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT);
> >>  }
> >>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
> >>
> >> @@ -412,7 +413,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
> >>   */
> >>  bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> >>  {
> >> -       return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false);
> >> +       return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> >>  }
> >>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit);
> >>
> >> @@ -448,10 +449,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
> >>  bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns,
> >>                      int cap)
> >>  {
> >> +
> >>         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap)))
> >>                 return false;
> >>
> >> -       if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0)
> >> +       if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) == 0)
> >>                 return true;
> >>
> >>         return false;
> >> @@ -500,10 +502,12 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns)
> >>  {
> >>         int ret = 0;  /* An absent tracer adds no restrictions */
> >>         const struct cred *cred;
> >> +
> >>         rcu_read_lock();
> >>         cred = rcu_dereference(tsk->ptracer_cred);
> >>         if (cred)
> >> -               ret = security_capable_noaudit(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
> >> +               ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
> >> +                                      SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> >>         rcu_read_unlock();
> >>         return (ret == 0);
> >>  }
> >> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> >> index f2ae2324c232..ddf615eb1bf7 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> >> @@ -383,8 +383,8 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
> >>          * behavior of privileged children.
> >>          */
> >>         if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
> >> -           security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
> >> -                                    CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
> >> +           security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
> >> +                                    CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) != 0)
> >>                 return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
> >>
> >>         /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
> >> diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
> >> index 253ef6e9d445..0f6dca54b66e 100644
> >> --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
> >> +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
> >> @@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
> >>   * profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap
> >>   * @profile: profile being enforced    (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined)
> >>   * @cap: capability to test if allowed
> >> - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
> >> + * @opts: SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
> >>   * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing)
> >>   *
> >>   * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM
> >>   */
> >> -static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit,
> >> -                          struct common_audit_data *sa)
> >> +static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
> >> +                          unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa)
> >>  {
> >>         int error;
> >>
> >> @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit,
> >>         else
> >>                 error = -EPERM;
> >>
> >> -       if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) {
> >> +       if (opts & SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) {
> >>                 if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
> >>                         return error;
> >>                 /* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it
> >> @@ -142,13 +142,13 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit,
> >>   * aa_capable - test permission to use capability
> >>   * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL)
> >>   * @cap: capability to be tested
> >> - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
> >> + * @opts: SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
> >>   *
> >>   * Look up capability in profile capability set.
> >>   *
> >>   * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
> >>   */
> >> -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit)
> >> +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts)
> >>  {
> >>         struct aa_profile *profile;
> >>         int error = 0;
> >> @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit)
> >>
> >>         sa.u.cap = cap;
> >>         error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
> >> -                       profile_capable(profile, cap, audit, &sa));
> >> +                       profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &sa));
> >>
> >>         return error;
> >>  }
> >> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
> >> index e0304e2aeb7f..1b3663b6ab12 100644
> >> --- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
> >> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
> >> @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct aa_caps {
> >>
> >>  extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[];
> >>
> >> -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit);
> >> +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts);
> >>
> >>  static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
> >>  {
> >> diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
> >> index 527ea1557120..4a1da2313162 100644
> >> --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
> >> +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
> >> @@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
> >>         aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
> >>         aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
> >>         aad(sa)->request = 0;
> >> -       aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
> >> +       aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
> >> +                                   SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT);
> >>
> >>         return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
> >>  }
> >> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> >> index 42446a216f3b..0bd817084fc1 100644
> >> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> >> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> >> @@ -176,14 +176,14 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
> >>  }
> >>
> >>  static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> -                           int cap, int audit)
> >> +                           int cap, unsigned int opts)
> >>  {
> >>         struct aa_label *label;
> >>         int error = 0;
> >>
> >>         label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
> >>         if (!unconfined(label))
> >> -               error = aa_capable(label, cap, audit);
> >> +               error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts);
> >>         aa_put_label(label);
> >>
> >>         return error;
> >> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> >> index 232db019f051..3d8609192e17 100644
> >> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> >> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> >> @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
> >>   * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
> >>   */
> >>  int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
> >> -               int cap, int audit)
> >> +               int cap, unsigned int opts)
> >>  {
> >>         struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;
> >>
> >> @@ -222,12 +222,11 @@ int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
> >>   */
> >>  static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
> >>  {
> >> -
> >>         /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
> >>          * capability
> >>          */
> >>         if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
> >> -                       CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
> >> +                       CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) == 0)
> >>                 return 0;
> >>         return 1;
> >>  }
> >> @@ -1208,8 +1207,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> >>                     || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))   /*[2]*/
> >>                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))   /*[3]*/
> >>                     || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
> >> -                                   current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
> >> -                                   SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)           /*[4]*/
> >> +                                   current_cred()->user_ns,
> >> +                                   CAP_SETPCAP,
> >> +                                   SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) != 0)         /*[4]*/
> >>                         /*
> >>                          * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
> >>                          * [2] no unlocking of locks
> >> @@ -1304,9 +1304,10 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
> >>  {
> >>         int cap_sys_admin = 0;
> >>
> >> -       if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> >> -                       SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
> >> +       if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns,
> >> +                               CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
> >>                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
> >> +
> >>         return cap_sys_admin;
> >>  }
> >>
> >> @@ -1325,7 +1326,7 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
> >>
> >>         if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
> >>                 ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
> >> -                                 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> >> +                                 SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT);
> >>                 /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
> >>                 if (ret == 0)
> >>                         current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> >> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> >> index d670136dda2c..d2334697797a 100644
> >> --- a/security/security.c
> >> +++ b/security/security.c
> >> @@ -294,16 +294,12 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> >>                                 effective, inheritable, permitted);
> >>  }
> >>
> >> -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> -                    int cap)
> >> +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
> >> +                    struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> +                    int cap,
> >> +                    unsigned int opts)
> >>  {
> >> -       return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> >> -}
> >> -
> >> -int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> -                            int cap)
> >> -{
> >> -       return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
> >> +       return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts);
> >>  }
> >>
> >>  int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
> >> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> >> index a67459eb62d5..a4b2e49213de 100644
> >> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> >> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> >> @@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
> >>
> >>  /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
> >>  static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
> >> -                              int cap, int audit, bool initns)
> >> +                              int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
> >>  {
> >>         struct common_audit_data ad;
> >>         struct av_decision avd;
> >> @@ -1796,7 +1796,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
> >>
> >>         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
> >>                                   sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
> >> -       if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
> >> +       if (!(opts & SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT)) {
> >>                 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
> >>                                     sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
> >>                 if (rc2)
> >> @@ -2316,9 +2316,9 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> >>   */
> >>
> >>  static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> >> -                          int cap, int audit)
> >> +                          int cap, unsigned int opts)
> >>  {
> >> -       return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns);
> >> +       return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
> >>  }
> >>
> >>  static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
> >> @@ -3245,11 +3245,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
> >>  static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
> >>  {
> >>         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> >> -       int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT;
> >> +       unsigned int opts = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT;
> >>
> >> -       if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit))
> >> +       if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
> >>                 return false;
> >> -       if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true))
> >> +       if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
> >>                 return false;
> >>         return true;
> >>  }
> >> @@ -3649,7 +3649,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> >>         case KDSKBENT:
> >>         case KDSKBSENT:
> >>                 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
> >> -                                           SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true);
> >> +                                           SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT, true);
> >>                 break;
> >>
> >>         /* default case assumes that the command will go
> >> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
> >> index 9a4c0ad46518..fac2a21aa7d4 100644
> >> --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
> >> +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
> >> @@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred)
> >>         struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
> >>         int rc;
> >>
> >> -       rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> >> +       rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT);
> >>         if (rc)
> >>                 return false;
> >>
> >> --
> >> 2.20.0.405.gbc1bbc6f85-goog
> >>
>