From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>,
jmorris@namei.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2018 12:02:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b1f95526-d0f1-712e-e0a7-9710cae7e1f0@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181102183056.GA20738@mail.hallyn.com>
On 11/2/2018 11:30 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Casey Schaufler (casey@schaufler-ca.com):
>
>> Let me suggest a change to the way your LSM works
>> that would reduce my concerns. Rather than refusing to
>> make a UID change that isn't on your whitelist, kill a
>> process that makes a prohibited request. This mitigates
>> the problem where a process doesn't check for an error
>> return. Sure, your system will be harder to get running
>> until your whitelist is complete, but you'll avoid a
>> whole category of security bugs.
> Might also consider not restricting CAP_SETUID, but instead adding a
> new CAP_SETUID_RANGE capability. That way you can be sure there will be
> no regressions with any programs which run with CAP_SETUID.
>
> Though that violates what Casey was just arguing halfway up the email.
I know that it's hard to believe 20 years after the fact,
but the POSIX group worked very hard to ensure that the granularity
of capabilities was correct for the security policy that the
interfaces defined in P1003.1. What would CAP_SETUID_RANGE mean?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-02 19:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 88+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-31 15:28 [PATCH] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2018-10-31 21:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-10-31 21:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-31 22:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 1:12 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 6:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 15:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 15:56 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 16:18 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 6:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-01 16:11 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 16:22 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 16:41 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-01 17:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-01 19:52 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 16:05 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 17:12 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 18:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-02 18:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-02 19:02 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-11-02 19:22 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-11-08 20:53 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-08 21:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-09 0:30 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-09 23:21 ` [PATCH] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable mortonm
2018-11-21 16:54 ` [PATCH] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2018-12-06 0:08 ` Kees Cook
2018-12-06 17:51 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-11 17:13 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2019-01-15 0:38 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 18:04 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] LSM: mark all set*uid call sites in kernel/sys.c mortonm
2019-01-15 19:34 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 18:04 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls mortonm
2019-01-15 19:44 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 21:50 ` [PATCH v4 " mortonm
2019-01-15 22:32 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-16 15:46 ` [PATCH v5 " mortonm
2019-01-16 16:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-22 20:40 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-22 22:28 ` James Morris
2019-01-22 22:40 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-22 22:42 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] " mortonm
2019-01-25 15:51 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-25 20:15 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] " James Morris
2019-01-25 21:06 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 19:47 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 19:56 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-28 20:09 ` James Morris
2019-01-28 20:19 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-28 20:30 ` [PATCH] LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM mortonm
2019-01-28 22:12 ` James Morris
2019-01-28 22:33 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls Micah Morton
2019-01-29 17:25 ` James Morris
2019-01-29 21:14 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-30 7:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-06 19:03 ` [PATCH] LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest mortonm
2019-02-06 19:26 ` Edwin Zimmerman
2019-02-07 21:54 ` Micah Morton
2019-02-12 19:01 ` James Morris
2019-01-15 21:58 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls Micah Morton
2019-01-15 19:49 ` [PATCH v2] " Micah Morton
2019-01-15 19:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-15 4:07 ` James Morris
2019-01-15 19:42 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-02 19:28 ` [PATCH] " Micah Morton
2018-11-06 19:09 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2018-11-06 20:59 ` [PATCH] " James Morris
2018-11-06 21:21 ` [PATCH v3] " mortonm
2018-11-02 18:07 ` [PATCH] " Stephen Smalley
2018-11-02 19:13 ` Micah Morton
2018-11-19 18:54 ` [PATCH] [PATCH] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable mortonm
2018-12-13 22:29 ` Micah Morton
2018-12-13 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-12-14 0:05 ` Micah Morton
2018-12-18 22:37 ` [PATCH v2] " mortonm
2019-01-07 17:55 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 18:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-07 18:36 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-07 19:02 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-07 22:57 ` [PATCH v3] " mortonm
2019-01-07 23:13 ` [PATCH v2] " Kees Cook
2019-01-08 0:10 ` [PATCH v4] " mortonm
2019-01-08 0:20 ` Kees Cook
2019-01-09 18:39 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-10 22:31 ` James Morris
2019-01-10 23:03 ` Micah Morton
2019-01-08 0:10 ` [PATCH v2] " Micah Morton
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