From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
serge.hallyn@canonical.com, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, djm@mindrot.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, segoon@openwall.com,
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ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de,
dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr,
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alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: [PATCH v3 3/3] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 17:38:26 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1326411506-16894-3-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1326411506-16894-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>
Documents how system call filtering using Berkeley Packet
Filter programs works and how it may be used.
Includes an example for x86 (32-bit).
v3: - call out BPF <-> Berkeley Packet Filter (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
- document use of tentative always-unprivileged
- guard sample compilation for i386 and x86_64
v2: - move code to samples (corbet@lwn.net)
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
---
Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
samples/Makefile | 2 +-
samples/seccomp/Makefile | 18 ++++++
samples/seccomp/bpf-example.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
create mode 100644 samples/seccomp/Makefile
create mode 100644 samples/seccomp/bpf-example.c
diff --git a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2db8b89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+ Seccomp filtering
+ =================
+
+Introduction
+------------
+
+A large number of system calls are exposed to every userland process
+with many of them going unused for the entire lifetime of the process.
+As system calls change and mature, bugs are found and eradicated. A
+certain subset of userland applications benefit by having a reduced set
+of available system calls. The resulting set reduces the total kernel
+surface exposed to the application. System call filtering is meant for
+use with those applications.
+
+Seccomp filtering provides a means for a process to specify a filter
+for incoming system calls. The filter is expressed as a Berkeley Packet
+Filter (BPF) program, as with socket filters, except that the data
+operated on is the current user_regs_struct. This allows for expressive
+filtering of system calls using the pre-existing system call ABI and
+using a filter program language with a long history of being exposed to
+userland. Additionally, BPF makes it impossible for users of seccomp to
+fall prey to time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) attacks that are common
+in system call interposition frameworks because the evaluated data is
+solely register state just after system call entry.
+
+What it isn't
+-------------
+
+System call filtering isn't a sandbox. It provides a clearly defined
+mechanism for minimizing the exposed kernel surface. Beyond that,
+policy for logical behavior and information flow should be managed with
+a combinations of other system hardening techniques and, potentially, a
+LSM of your choosing. Expressive, dynamic filters provide further options down
+this path (avoiding pathological sizes or selecting which of the multiplexed
+system calls in socketcall() is allowed, for instance) which could be
+construed, incorrectly, as a more complete sandboxing solution.
+
+Usage
+-----
+
+An additional seccomp mode is added, but they are not directly set by the
+consuming process. The new mode, '2', is only available if
+CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER is set and enabled using prctl with the
+PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER argument.
+
+Interacting with seccomp filters is done using one prctl(2) call.
+
+PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER:
+ Allows the specification of a new filter using a BPF program.
+ The BPF program will be executed over a user_regs_struct data
+ reflecting system call time except with the system call number
+ resident in orig_[register]. To allow a system call, the size
+ of the data must be returned. At present, all other return values
+ result in the system call being blocked, but it is recommended to
+ return 0 in those cases. This will allow for future custom return
+ values to be introduced, if ever desired.
+
+ Usage:
+ prctl(PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER, prog);
+
+ The 'prog' argument is a pointer to a struct sock_fprog which will
+ contain the filter program. If the program is invalid, the call
+ will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
+
+ The struct user_regs_struct the @prog will see is based on the
+ personality of the task at the time of this prctl call. Additionally,
+ is_compat_task is also tracked for the @prog. This means that once set
+ the calling task will have all of its system calls blocked if it
+ switches its system call ABI (via personality or other means).
+
+ If fork/clone and execve are allowed by @prog, any child processes will
+ be constrained to the same filters and syscal call ABI as the parent.
+
+ When called from an unprivileged process (lacking CAP_SYS_ADMIN), the
+ "always_unprivileged" bit is enabled for the process.
+
+ Additionally, if prctl(2) is allowed by the attached filter,
+ additional filters may be layered on which will increase evaluation
+ time, but allow for further decreasing the attack surface during
+ execution of a process.
+
+The above call returns 0 on success and non-zero on error.
+
+Example
+-------
+
+samples/seccomp-bpf-example.c shows an example process that allows read from stdin,
+write to stdout/err, exit and signal returns for 32-bit x86.
+
+Adding architecture support
+-----------------------
+
+Any platform with seccomp support will support seccomp filters
+as long as CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER is enabled.
diff --git a/samples/Makefile b/samples/Makefile
index 6280817..f29b19c 100644
--- a/samples/Makefile
+++ b/samples/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# Makefile for Linux samples code
obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLES) += kobject/ kprobes/ tracepoints/ trace_events/ \
- hw_breakpoint/ kfifo/ kdb/ hidraw/
+ hw_breakpoint/ kfifo/ kdb/ hidraw/ seccomp/
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/Makefile b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdf0282
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# This sample is x86-only.
+ifeq ($(filter-out x86_64 i386,$(KBUILD_BUILDHOST)),)
+# kbuild trick to avoid linker error. Can be omitted if a module is built.
+obj- := dummy.o
+
+# List of programs to build
+hostprogs-y := bpf-example
+bpf-example-objs := bpf-example.o
+
+# Tell kbuild to always build the programs
+always := $(hostprogs-y)
+
+HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-example.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
+ifeq ($(KBUILD_BUILDHOST),x86_64)
+HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-example.o += -m32
+HOSTLOADLIBES_bpf-example += -m32
+endif
+endif # host arch is x86
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/bpf-example.c b/samples/seccomp/bpf-example.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f98b70a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/bpf-example.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Seccomp BPF example
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
+ * Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
+ * and can serve as a starting point for developing
+ * applications using prctl(PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER).
+ */
+
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/user.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+# define PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER 36
+#endif
+
+#define regoffset(_reg) (offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, _reg))
+static int install_filter(void)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ /* Grab the system call number */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_IND, regoffset(orig_eax)),
+ /* Jump table for the allowed syscalls */
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_rt_sigreturn, 10, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_sigreturn, 9, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_exit_group, 8, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_exit, 7, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_read, 1, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_write, 2, 6),
+
+ /* Check that read is only using stdin. */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_IND, regoffset(ebx)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, STDIN_FILENO, 3, 4),
+
+ /* Check that write is only using stdout/stderr */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_IND, regoffset(ebx)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, STDOUT_FILENO, 1, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, STDERR_FILENO, 0, 1),
+
+ /* Put the "accept" value in A */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_LEN, 0),
+
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_A,0),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ if (prctl(PR_ATTACH_SECCOMP_FILTER, &prog)) {
+ perror("prctl");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define payload(_c) _c, sizeof(_c)
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ char buf[4096];
+ ssize_t bytes = 0;
+ if (install_filter())
+ return 1;
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, payload("OHAI! WHAT IS YOUR NAME? "));
+ bytes = syscall(__NR_read, STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, payload("HELLO, "));
+ syscall(__NR_write, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, bytes);
+ return 0;
+}
--
1.7.5.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-01-12 23:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-01-12 23:38 [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-01-13 0:51 ` Randy Dunlap
2012-01-12 23:59 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13 1:35 ` Randy Dunlap
2012-01-13 17:39 ` Eric Paris
2012-01-13 18:50 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:38 ` Will Drewry [this message]
2012-01-15 1:52 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Randy Dunlap
2012-01-16 1:41 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-17 23:29 ` Eric Paris
2012-01-17 23:54 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:47 ` [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch Linus Torvalds
2012-01-13 0:03 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13 0:42 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-13 0:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-13 1:11 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-13 1:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-14 13:30 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-14 19:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-14 20:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-14 21:04 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-15 20:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-15 20:59 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-15 21:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-15 22:07 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-16 2:04 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-18 3:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-01-16 2:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-16 7:45 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-16 18:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-13 1:37 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13 1:41 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-13 2:09 ` Kees Cook
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