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From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, djm@mindrot.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, segoon@openwall.com,
	rostedt@goodmis.org, jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com,
	avi@redhat.com, penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	luto@mit.edu, mingo@elte.hu, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	khilman@ti.com, borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com,
	oleg@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com,
	gregkh@suse.de, dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
	mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF
Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2012 12:39:32 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1326476372.4342.1.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1326411506-16894-2-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>

On Thu, 2012-01-12 at 17:38 -0600, Will Drewry wrote:

> diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
> index cc7a4e9..0296871 100644
> --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
> +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h

> -typedef struct { int mode; } seccomp_t;
> +struct seccomp_filter;
> +/**
> + * struct seccomp_struct - the state of a seccomp'ed process
> + *
> + * @mode:
> + *     if this is 0, seccomp is not in use.
> + *             is 1, the process is under standard seccomp rules.
> + *             is 2, the process is only allowed to make system calls where
> + *                   associated filters evaluate successfully.
> + * @filter: Metadata for filter if using CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER.
> + *          @filter must only be accessed from the context of current as there
> + *          is no guard.
> + */
> +typedef struct seccomp_struct {
> +	int mode;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> +	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
> +#endif
> +} seccomp_t;
>  
>  extern void __secure_computing(int);
>  static inline void secure_computing(int this_syscall)

Can we get rid of all of the typedef stuff?  I know you didn't add it
but now seems like a good time to follow typical kernel semantics if you
have to re-rev for some other reason.

-Eric


  parent reply	other threads:[~2012-01-13 17:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-01-12 23:38 [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-01-13  0:51   ` Randy Dunlap
2012-01-12 23:59     ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13  1:35       ` Randy Dunlap
2012-01-13 17:39   ` Eric Paris [this message]
2012-01-13 18:50     ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-01-15  1:52   ` Randy Dunlap
2012-01-16  1:41     ` Will Drewry
2012-01-17 23:29   ` Eric Paris
2012-01-17 23:54     ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:47 ` [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch Linus Torvalds
2012-01-13  0:03   ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13  0:42   ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-13  0:57     ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-13  1:11       ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-13  1:17         ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-14 13:30           ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-14 19:21             ` Will Drewry
2012-01-14 20:22             ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-14 21:04               ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-15 20:16               ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-15 20:59                 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-15 21:32                   ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-15 22:07                     ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-16  2:04                       ` Will Drewry
2012-01-18  3:12                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-01-16  2:41                       ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-16  7:45                         ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-16 18:02                           ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-13  1:37         ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13  1:41           ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-13  2:09             ` Kees Cook

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