From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com,
coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
djm@mindrot.org, segoon@openwall.com, rostedt@goodmis.org,
jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com,
penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com,
borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de,
dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 17:17:31 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFxSgYFp1psum3amgqqsT-rrvGd1T8BXJSA-mgd1EdHrwg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAObL_7F8aYPDQ1xTFjOxWgoZfrtGNFVgMe2Ld61_=D+YY427qA@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 5:11 PM, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> What if you're a daemon that needs something like CAP_NET_BIND but
> also wants to be able to run other helpers without CAP_NET_BIND?
>
> (Also, preventing dropping of privileges will probably make a patch
> more complicted -- I'll have to find and update all the places that
> allow dropping privileges.)
Hey, if it actually makes it more complicated to say "don't change
privileges", then I guess my argument that it should be simpler is
wrong.
That said, the thing you bring up is *not* the actual use-case for the
suggestion. The use-case is a "run untrusted code". So the use-case
would be to set the flag after you've dropped CAP_NET_BIND, and
*before* you actually run the other helpers. You clearly must have a
fork() or something like that there, since you want to keep the
NET_BIND in the original daemon.
So I don't t think your example is actually the expected situation.
The obvious approach for your example is
- run deamon with CAP_NET_BIND
- per connection, fork, drop privileges in child, then set
"restricted" flag, and run the untrusted code.
(where the restricted mode setting may well obviously also do other
things - like limit allowed system calls etc)
Linus
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-01-13 1:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-01-12 23:38 [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-01-13 0:51 ` Randy Dunlap
2012-01-12 23:59 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13 1:35 ` Randy Dunlap
2012-01-13 17:39 ` Eric Paris
2012-01-13 18:50 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-01-15 1:52 ` Randy Dunlap
2012-01-16 1:41 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-17 23:29 ` Eric Paris
2012-01-17 23:54 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-12 23:47 ` [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch Linus Torvalds
2012-01-13 0:03 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13 0:42 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-13 0:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-13 1:11 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-13 1:17 ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2012-01-14 13:30 ` Jamie Lokier
2012-01-14 19:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-14 20:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-14 21:04 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-15 20:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-15 20:59 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-15 21:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-15 22:07 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-16 2:04 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-18 3:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-01-16 2:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-16 7:45 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-16 18:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2012-01-13 1:37 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-13 1:41 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-01-13 2:09 ` Kees Cook
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