From: Auger Eric <eric.auger@redhat.com> To: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com>, alex.williamson@redhat.com, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, joro@8bytes.org Cc: kevin.tian@intel.com, jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com, ashok.raj@intel.com, jun.j.tian@intel.com, yi.y.sun@intel.com, jean-philippe@linaro.org, peterx@redhat.com, hao.wu@intel.com, stefanha@gmail.com, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 09/15] iommu/vt-d: Check ownership for PASIDs from user-space Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2020 18:30:27 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <0db97d4a-7c74-9fac-0763-0ed56dcc5eaa@redhat.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1595917664-33276-10-git-send-email-yi.l.liu@intel.com> Hi Yi, On 7/28/20 8:27 AM, Liu Yi L wrote: > When an IOMMU domain with nesting attribute is used for guest SVA, a > system-wide PASID is allocated for binding with the device and the domain. > For security reason, we need to check the PASID passed from user-space. > e.g. page table bind/unbind and PASID related cache invalidation. > > Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> > CC: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> > Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> > Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com> > Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> > --- > drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 10 ++++++++++ > drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 7 +++++-- > 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c > index b2fe54e..88f4647 100644 > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c > @@ -5436,6 +5436,7 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev, > int granu = 0; > u64 pasid = 0; > u64 addr = 0; > + void *pdata; > > granu = to_vtd_granularity(cache_type, inv_info->granularity); > if (granu == -EINVAL) { > @@ -5456,6 +5457,15 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev, > (inv_info->granu.addr_info.flags & IOMMU_INV_ADDR_FLAGS_PASID)) > pasid = inv_info->granu.addr_info.pasid; > > + pdata = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL); > + if (!pdata) { > + ret = -EINVAL; > + goto out_unlock; > + } else if (IS_ERR(pdata)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(pdata); > + goto out_unlock; > + } > + > switch (BIT(cache_type)) { > case IOMMU_CACHE_INV_TYPE_IOTLB: > /* HW will ignore LSB bits based on address mask */ > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c > index c85b8d5..b9b29ad 100644 > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c > @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int intel_svm_bind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev, > dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain); > > mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex); > - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, data->hpasid, NULL); > + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, data->hpasid, NULL); A question about the locking strategy. We don't take the device_domain_lock here. Could you clarify whether it is safe? > if (IS_ERR(svm)) { > ret = PTR_ERR(svm); > goto out; > @@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, > struct device *dev, u32 pasid) > { > struct intel_iommu *iommu = intel_svm_device_to_iommu(dev); > + struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain; > struct intel_svm_dev *sdev; > struct intel_svm *svm; > int ret = -EINVAL; > @@ -447,8 +448,10 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, > if (WARN_ON(!iommu)) > return -EINVAL; > > + dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain); > + > mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex); > - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, pasid, NULL); > + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL); same here. > if (!svm) { > ret = -EINVAL; > goto out; > Thanks Eric
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Auger Eric <eric.auger@redhat.com> To: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com>, alex.williamson@redhat.com, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, joro@8bytes.org Cc: jean-philippe@linaro.org, kevin.tian@intel.com, ashok.raj@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, stefanha@gmail.com, jun.j.tian@intel.com, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, yi.y.sun@intel.com, hao.wu@intel.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 09/15] iommu/vt-d: Check ownership for PASIDs from user-space Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2020 18:30:27 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <0db97d4a-7c74-9fac-0763-0ed56dcc5eaa@redhat.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1595917664-33276-10-git-send-email-yi.l.liu@intel.com> Hi Yi, On 7/28/20 8:27 AM, Liu Yi L wrote: > When an IOMMU domain with nesting attribute is used for guest SVA, a > system-wide PASID is allocated for binding with the device and the domain. > For security reason, we need to check the PASID passed from user-space. > e.g. page table bind/unbind and PASID related cache invalidation. > > Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> > CC: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> > Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> > Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com> > Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> > --- > drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 10 ++++++++++ > drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 7 +++++-- > 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c > index b2fe54e..88f4647 100644 > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c > @@ -5436,6 +5436,7 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev, > int granu = 0; > u64 pasid = 0; > u64 addr = 0; > + void *pdata; > > granu = to_vtd_granularity(cache_type, inv_info->granularity); > if (granu == -EINVAL) { > @@ -5456,6 +5457,15 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev, > (inv_info->granu.addr_info.flags & IOMMU_INV_ADDR_FLAGS_PASID)) > pasid = inv_info->granu.addr_info.pasid; > > + pdata = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL); > + if (!pdata) { > + ret = -EINVAL; > + goto out_unlock; > + } else if (IS_ERR(pdata)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(pdata); > + goto out_unlock; > + } > + > switch (BIT(cache_type)) { > case IOMMU_CACHE_INV_TYPE_IOTLB: > /* HW will ignore LSB bits based on address mask */ > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c > index c85b8d5..b9b29ad 100644 > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c > @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int intel_svm_bind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev, > dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain); > > mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex); > - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, data->hpasid, NULL); > + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, data->hpasid, NULL); A question about the locking strategy. We don't take the device_domain_lock here. Could you clarify whether it is safe? > if (IS_ERR(svm)) { > ret = PTR_ERR(svm); > goto out; > @@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, > struct device *dev, u32 pasid) > { > struct intel_iommu *iommu = intel_svm_device_to_iommu(dev); > + struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain; > struct intel_svm_dev *sdev; > struct intel_svm *svm; > int ret = -EINVAL; > @@ -447,8 +448,10 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, > if (WARN_ON(!iommu)) > return -EINVAL; > > + dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain); > + > mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex); > - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, pasid, NULL); > + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL); same here. > if (!svm) { > ret = -EINVAL; > goto out; > Thanks Eric _______________________________________________ iommu mailing list iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-15 21:32 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 114+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-07-28 6:27 [PATCH v6 00/15] vfio: expose virtual Shared Virtual Addressing to VMs Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 01/15] vfio/type1: Refactor vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl() Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 15:53 ` Alex Williamson 2020-07-28 15:53 ` Alex Williamson 2020-07-29 2:20 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-07-29 2:20 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 02/15] iommu: Report domain nesting info Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-08-13 12:52 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-13 12:52 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-14 7:15 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-14 7:15 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-16 12:40 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-16 12:40 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-18 4:21 ` Jacob Pan 2020-08-18 4:21 ` Jacob Pan 2020-08-18 6:59 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-18 6:59 ` Auger Eric 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 03/15] iommu/smmu: Report empty " Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 04/15] vfio/type1: Report iommu nesting info to userspace Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-08-13 13:19 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-13 13:19 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-14 7:36 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-14 7:36 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-20 19:52 ` Alex Williamson 2020-08-20 19:52 ` Alex Williamson 2020-08-21 0:52 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-21 0:52 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 05/15] vfio: Add PASID allocation/free support Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-08-13 15:07 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-13 15:07 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-14 7:40 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-14 7:40 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 06/15] iommu/vt-d: Support setting ioasid set to domain Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-08-13 15:06 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-13 15:06 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-14 8:04 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-14 8:04 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-16 12:42 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-16 12:42 ` Auger Eric 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 07/15] vfio/type1: Add VFIO_IOMMU_PASID_REQUEST (alloc/free) Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-08-15 16:30 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-15 16:30 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-17 5:23 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-17 5:23 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-20 20:51 ` Alex Williamson 2020-08-20 20:51 ` Alex Williamson 2020-08-21 0:37 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-21 0:37 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-21 1:49 ` Alex Williamson 2020-08-21 1:49 ` Alex Williamson 2020-08-21 2:18 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-21 2:18 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 08/15] iommu: Pass domain to sva_unbind_gpasid() Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-08-20 21:06 ` Alex Williamson 2020-08-20 21:06 ` Alex Williamson 2020-08-21 0:18 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-21 0:18 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-21 13:09 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-21 13:09 ` Auger Eric 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 09/15] iommu/vt-d: Check ownership for PASIDs from user-space Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-08-15 16:30 ` Auger Eric [this message] 2020-08-15 16:30 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-17 5:38 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-17 5:38 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 10/15] vfio/type1: Support binding guest page tables to PASID Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-08-16 11:29 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-16 11:29 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-17 6:30 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-17 6:30 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 11/15] vfio/type1: Allow invalidating first-level/stage IOMMU cache Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-08-16 11:35 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-16 11:35 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-17 6:30 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-17 6:30 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 12/15] vfio/type1: Add vSVA support for IOMMU-backed mdevs Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-08-20 21:48 ` Alex Williamson 2020-08-20 21:48 ` Alex Williamson 2020-08-21 0:53 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-21 0:53 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 13/15] vfio/pci: Expose PCIe PASID capability to guest Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 14/15] vfio: Document dual stage control Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-08-16 11:51 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-16 11:51 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-17 7:00 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-17 7:00 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-17 7:40 ` Eric Auger 2020-08-17 7:40 ` Eric Auger 2020-08-17 7:43 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-17 7:43 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` [PATCH v6 15/15] iommu/vt-d: Support reporting nesting capability info Liu Yi L 2020-07-28 6:27 ` Liu Yi L 2020-08-16 12:01 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-16 12:01 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-17 7:05 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-17 7:05 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-17 7:42 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-17 7:42 ` Auger Eric 2020-08-17 7:45 ` Liu, Yi L 2020-08-17 7:45 ` Liu, Yi L
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