From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 14:44:20 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1468619065-3222-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1468619065-3222-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on ia64.
Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/ia64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/ia64/Kconfig b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
index f80758cb7157..32a87ef516a0 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ config IA64
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
default y
help
The Itanium Processor Family is Intel's 64-bit successor to
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2189d5ddc1ee..465c70982f40 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -241,12 +241,18 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_user (void __user *to, const void __use
static inline unsigned long
__copy_to_user (void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(from, count, true);
+
return __copy_user(to, (__force void __user *) from, count);
}
static inline unsigned long
__copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(to, count, false);
+
return __copy_user((__force void __user *) to, from, count);
}
@@ -258,8 +264,11 @@ __copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
const void *__cu_from = (from); \
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
- if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
- __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_from, __cu_len, true); \
+ __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
@@ -270,8 +279,11 @@ __copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
__chk_user_ptr(__cu_from); \
- if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_to, __cu_len, false); \
__cu_len = __copy_user((__force void __user *) __cu_to, __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
--
2.7.4
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy
Subject: [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 14:44:20 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1468619065-3222-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1468619065-3222-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on ia64.
Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/ia64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/ia64/Kconfig b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
index f80758cb7157..32a87ef516a0 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ config IA64
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
default y
help
The Itanium Processor Family is Intel's 64-bit successor to
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2189d5ddc1ee..465c70982f40 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -241,12 +241,18 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_user (void __user *to, const void __use
static inline unsigned long
__copy_to_user (void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(from, count, true);
+
return __copy_user(to, (__force void __user *) from, count);
}
static inline unsigned long
__copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(to, count, false);
+
return __copy_user((__force void __user *) to, from, count);
}
@@ -258,8 +264,11 @@ __copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
const void *__cu_from = (from); \
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
- if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
- __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_from, __cu_len, true); \
+ __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
@@ -270,8 +279,11 @@ __copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
__chk_user_ptr(__cu_from); \
- if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_to, __cu_len, false); \
__cu_len = __copy_user((__force void __user *) __cu_to, __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
--
2.7.4
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 21:44:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1468619065-3222-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1468619065-3222-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on ia64.
Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/ia64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/ia64/Kconfig b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
index f80758cb7157..32a87ef516a0 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ config IA64
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
default y
help
The Itanium Processor Family is Intel's 64-bit successor to
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2189d5ddc1ee..465c70982f40 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -241,12 +241,18 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_user (void __user *to, const void __use
static inline unsigned long
__copy_to_user (void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(from, count, true);
+
return __copy_user(to, (__force void __user *) from, count);
}
static inline unsigned long
__copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(to, count, false);
+
return __copy_user((__force void __user *) to, from, count);
}
@@ -258,8 +264,11 @@ __copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
const void *__cu_from = (from); \
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
- if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
- __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_from, __cu_len, true); \
+ __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
@@ -270,8 +279,11 @@ __copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
__chk_user_ptr(__cu_from); \
- if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_to, __cu_len, false); \
__cu_len = __copy_user((__force void __user *) __cu_to, __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
--
2.7.4
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 14:44:20 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1468619065-3222-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1468619065-3222-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on ia64.
Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/ia64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/ia64/Kconfig b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
index f80758cb7157..32a87ef516a0 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ config IA64
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
default y
help
The Itanium Processor Family is Intel's 64-bit successor to
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2189d5ddc1ee..465c70982f40 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -241,12 +241,18 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_user (void __user *to, const void __use
static inline unsigned long
__copy_to_user (void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(from, count, true);
+
return __copy_user(to, (__force void __user *) from, count);
}
static inline unsigned long
__copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(to, count, false);
+
return __copy_user((__force void __user *) to, from, count);
}
@@ -258,8 +264,11 @@ __copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
const void *__cu_from = (from); \
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
- if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
- __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_from, __cu_len, true); \
+ __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
@@ -270,8 +279,11 @@ __copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
__chk_user_ptr(__cu_from); \
- if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_to, __cu_len, false); \
__cu_len = __copy_user((__force void __user *) __cu_to, __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
--
2.7.4
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 14:44:20 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1468619065-3222-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1468619065-3222-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on ia64.
Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/ia64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/ia64/Kconfig b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
index f80758cb7157..32a87ef516a0 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ config IA64
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
default y
help
The Itanium Processor Family is Intel's 64-bit successor to
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2189d5ddc1ee..465c70982f40 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -241,12 +241,18 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_user (void __user *to, const void __use
static inline unsigned long
__copy_to_user (void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(from, count, true);
+
return __copy_user(to, (__force void __user *) from, count);
}
static inline unsigned long
__copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(to, count, false);
+
return __copy_user((__force void __user *) to, from, count);
}
@@ -258,8 +264,11 @@ __copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
const void *__cu_from = (from); \
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
- if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
- __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_from, __cu_len, true); \
+ __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
@@ -270,8 +279,11 @@ __copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
__chk_user_ptr(__cu_from); \
- if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_to, __cu_len, false); \
__cu_len = __copy_user((__force void __user *) __cu_to, __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
--
2.7.4
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 14:44:20 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1468619065-3222-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1468619065-3222-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Enables CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY checks on ia64.
Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/ia64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/ia64/Kconfig b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
index f80758cb7157..32a87ef516a0 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ config IA64
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
default y
help
The Itanium Processor Family is Intel's 64-bit successor to
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2189d5ddc1ee..465c70982f40 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -241,12 +241,18 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_user (void __user *to, const void __use
static inline unsigned long
__copy_to_user (void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(from, count, true);
+
return __copy_user(to, (__force void __user *) from, count);
}
static inline unsigned long
__copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(to, count, false);
+
return __copy_user((__force void __user *) to, from, count);
}
@@ -258,8 +264,11 @@ __copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
const void *__cu_from = (from); \
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
- if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
- __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_from, __cu_len, true); \
+ __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
@@ -270,8 +279,11 @@ __copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
__chk_user_ptr(__cu_from); \
- if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_to, __cu_len, false); \
__cu_len = __copy_user((__force void __user *) __cu_to, __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
--
2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-15 21:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 257+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-15 21:44 [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:00 ` [PATCH] mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:00 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:00 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:00 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:00 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 10:24 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 9:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
[not found] ` <5790711f.2350420a.b4287.2cc0SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-25 9:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:03 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:03 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:03 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-26 4:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 04/11] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 05/11] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 08/11] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 09/11] s390/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 11/11] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-18 8:26 ` [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Balbir Singh
2016-07-18 8:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2016-07-18 8:26 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-18 8:26 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-18 8:26 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-18 8:26 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-18 8:26 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 9:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 16:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
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