From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 22:44:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <578E914A.7070900@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+HqLY1gZycV9S9_Vf8uuQj4Z3qsV8WBxLORuseiJaw5Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 07/19/2016 10:34 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
[...]
>>
>> So what about for the CONFIG text:
>>
>> An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a secondary
>> linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one virtual
>> kernel address that points to the kernel image. This is used to verify
>> that kernel text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
>
> Sounds good, I've adjusted it for now.
>
>>> I wonder if I can avoid the CONFIG entirely if I just did a
>>> __va(__pa(_stext)) != _stext test... would that break anyone?
>>
>> Can this be resolved on all platforms at compile time?
>
> Well, I think it still needs a runtime check (compile-time may not be
> able to tell about kaslr, or who knows what else). I would really like
> to avoid the CONFIG if possible, though. Would this do the right thing
> on s390? This appears to work where I'm able to test it (32/64 x86,
> 32/64 arm):
>
> unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
> unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
> unsigned long textlow_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow);
> unsigned long texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh);
>
as we have
#define PAGE_OFFSET 0x0UL
#define __pa(x) (unsigned long)(x)
#define __va(x) (void *)(unsigned long)(x)
both should be identical on s390 as of today, so it should work fine and only
do the check once
> if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
> return "<kernel text>";
>
> /* Check against possible secondary linear mapping as well. */
> if (textlow != textlow_linear &&
> overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
> return "<linear kernel text>";
>
> return NULL;
>
>
> -Kees
>
PS: Not sure how useful and flexible this offers is but you can get some temporary
free access to an s390 on https://developer.ibm.com/linuxone/
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>Davi
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 22:44:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <578E914A.7070900@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+HqLY1gZycV9S9_Vf8uuQj4Z3qsV8WBxLORuseiJaw5Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 07/19/2016 10:34 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
[...]
>>
>> So what about for the CONFIG text:
>>
>> An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a secondary
>> linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one virtual
>> kernel address that points to the kernel image. This is used to verify
>> that kernel text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
>
> Sounds good, I've adjusted it for now.
>
>>> I wonder if I can avoid the CONFIG entirely if I just did a
>>> __va(__pa(_stext)) != _stext test... would that break anyone?
>>
>> Can this be resolved on all platforms at compile time?
>
> Well, I think it still needs a runtime check (compile-time may not be
> able to tell about kaslr, or who knows what else). I would really like
> to avoid the CONFIG if possible, though. Would this do the right thing
> on s390? This appears to work where I'm able to test it (32/64 x86,
> 32/64 arm):
>
> unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
> unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
> unsigned long textlow_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow);
> unsigned long texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh);
>
as we have
#define PAGE_OFFSET 0x0UL
#define __pa(x) (unsigned long)(x)
#define __va(x) (void *)(unsigned long)(x)
both should be identical on s390 as of today, so it should work fine and only
do the check once
> if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
> return "<kernel text>";
>
> /* Check against possible secondary linear mapping as well. */
> if (textlow != textlow_linear &&
> overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
> return "<linear kernel text>";
>
> return NULL;
>
>
> -Kees
>
PS: Not sure how useful and flexible this offers is but you can get some temporary
free access to an s390 on https://developer.ibm.com/linuxone/
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:44:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <578E914A.7070900@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+HqLY1gZycV9S9_Vf8uuQj4Z3qsV8WBxLORuseiJaw5Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 07/19/2016 10:34 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
[...]
>>
>> So what about for the CONFIG text:
>>
>> An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a secondary
>> linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one virtual
>> kernel address that points to the kernel image. This is used to verify
>> that kernel text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
>
> Sounds good, I've adjusted it for now.
>
>>> I wonder if I can avoid the CONFIG entirely if I just did a
>>> __va(__pa(_stext)) != _stext test... would that break anyone?
>>
>> Can this be resolved on all platforms at compile time?
>
> Well, I think it still needs a runtime check (compile-time may not be
> able to tell about kaslr, or who knows what else). I would really like
> to avoid the CONFIG if possible, though. Would this do the right thing
> on s390? This appears to work where I'm able to test it (32/64 x86,
> 32/64 arm):
>
> unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
> unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
> unsigned long textlow_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow);
> unsigned long texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh);
>
as we have
#define PAGE_OFFSET 0x0UL
#define __pa(x) (unsigned long)(x)
#define __va(x) (void *)(unsigned long)(x)
both should be identical on s390 as of today, so it should work fine and only
do the check once
> if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
> return "<kernel text>";
>
> /* Check against possible secondary linear mapping as well. */
> if (textlow != textlow_linear &&
> overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
> return "<linear kernel text>";
>
> return NULL;
>
>
> -Kees
>
PS: Not sure how useful and flexible this offers is but you can get some temporary
free access to an s390 on https://developer.ibm.com/linuxone/
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 22:44:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <578E914A.7070900@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+HqLY1gZycV9S9_Vf8uuQj4Z3qsV8WBxLORuseiJaw5Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 07/19/2016 10:34 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
[...]
>>
>> So what about for the CONFIG text:
>>
>> An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a secondary
>> linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one virtual
>> kernel address that points to the kernel image. This is used to verify
>> that kernel text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
>
> Sounds good, I've adjusted it for now.
>
>>> I wonder if I can avoid the CONFIG entirely if I just did a
>>> __va(__pa(_stext)) != _stext test... would that break anyone?
>>
>> Can this be resolved on all platforms at compile time?
>
> Well, I think it still needs a runtime check (compile-time may not be
> able to tell about kaslr, or who knows what else). I would really like
> to avoid the CONFIG if possible, though. Would this do the right thing
> on s390? This appears to work where I'm able to test it (32/64 x86,
> 32/64 arm):
>
> unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
> unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
> unsigned long textlow_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow);
> unsigned long texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh);
>
as we have
#define PAGE_OFFSET 0x0UL
#define __pa(x) (unsigned long)(x)
#define __va(x) (void *)(unsigned long)(x)
both should be identical on s390 as of today, so it should work fine and only
do the check once
> if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
> return "<kernel text>";
>
> /* Check against possible secondary linear mapping as well. */
> if (textlow != textlow_linear &&
> overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
> return "<linear kernel text>";
>
> return NULL;
>
>
> -Kees
>
PS: Not sure how useful and flexible this offers is but you can get some temporary
free access to an s390 on https://developer.ibm.com/linuxone/
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: borntraeger@de.ibm.com (Christian Borntraeger)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 22:44:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <578E914A.7070900@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+HqLY1gZycV9S9_Vf8uuQj4Z3qsV8WBxLORuseiJaw5Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 07/19/2016 10:34 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
[...]
>>
>> So what about for the CONFIG text:
>>
>> An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a secondary
>> linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one virtual
>> kernel address that points to the kernel image. This is used to verify
>> that kernel text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
>
> Sounds good, I've adjusted it for now.
>
>>> I wonder if I can avoid the CONFIG entirely if I just did a
>>> __va(__pa(_stext)) != _stext test... would that break anyone?
>>
>> Can this be resolved on all platforms at compile time?
>
> Well, I think it still needs a runtime check (compile-time may not be
> able to tell about kaslr, or who knows what else). I would really like
> to avoid the CONFIG if possible, though. Would this do the right thing
> on s390? This appears to work where I'm able to test it (32/64 x86,
> 32/64 arm):
>
> unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
> unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
> unsigned long textlow_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow);
> unsigned long texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh);
>
as we have
#define PAGE_OFFSET 0x0UL
#define __pa(x) (unsigned long)(x)
#define __va(x) (void *)(unsigned long)(x)
both should be identical on s390 as of today, so it should work fine and only
do the check once
> if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
> return "<kernel text>";
>
> /* Check against possible secondary linear mapping as well. */
> if (textlow != textlow_linear &&
> overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
> return "<linear kernel text>";
>
> return NULL;
>
>
> -Kees
>
PS: Not sure how useful and flexible this offers is but you can get some temporary
free access to an s390 on https://developer.ibm.com/linuxone/
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 22:44:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <578E914A.7070900@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+HqLY1gZycV9S9_Vf8uuQj4Z3qsV8WBxLORuseiJaw5Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 07/19/2016 10:34 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
[...]
>>
>> So what about for the CONFIG text:
>>
>> An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a secondary
>> linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one virtual
>> kernel address that points to the kernel image. This is used to verify
>> that kernel text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
>
> Sounds good, I've adjusted it for now.
>
>>> I wonder if I can avoid the CONFIG entirely if I just did a
>>> __va(__pa(_stext)) != _stext test... would that break anyone?
>>
>> Can this be resolved on all platforms at compile time?
>
> Well, I think it still needs a runtime check (compile-time may not be
> able to tell about kaslr, or who knows what else). I would really like
> to avoid the CONFIG if possible, though. Would this do the right thing
> on s390? This appears to work where I'm able to test it (32/64 x86,
> 32/64 arm):
>
> unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
> unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
> unsigned long textlow_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow);
> unsigned long texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh);
>
as we have
#define PAGE_OFFSET 0x0UL
#define __pa(x) (unsigned long)(x)
#define __va(x) (void *)(unsigned long)(x)
both should be identical on s390 as of today, so it should work fine and only
do the check once
> if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
> return "<kernel text>";
>
> /* Check against possible secondary linear mapping as well. */
> if (textlow != textlow_linear &&
> overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
> return "<linear kernel text>";
>
> return NULL;
>
>
> -Kees
>
PS: Not sure how useful and flexible this offers is but you can get some temporary
free access to an s390 on https://developer.ibm.com/linuxone/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-19 20:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 257+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-15 21:44 [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:00 ` [PATCH] mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:00 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:00 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:00 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:00 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 10:24 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 9:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger [this message]
2016-07-19 20:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman
[not found] ` <5790711f.2350420a.b4287.2cc0SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-25 9:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:03 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:03 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 2:03 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-26 4:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 04/11] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 05/11] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 08/11] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 09/11] s390/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 11/11] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-18 8:26 ` [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Balbir Singh
2016-07-18 8:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2016-07-18 8:26 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-18 8:26 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-18 8:26 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-18 8:26 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-18 8:26 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 9:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 16:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
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