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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 15:48:55 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1511902135.3473.5.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171026084055.25482-2-mjg59@google.com>

Hi Matthew,

On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 01:40 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the
> credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the
> child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target
> and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In
> ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and
> the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started.
> This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to
> include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same
> credentials that it did previously.

< snip >

> @@ -305,7 +304,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> -			security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> +			security_cred_getsecid(cred, &sid);
>  			rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
>  							rule->lsm[i].type,
>  							Audit_equal,

Based on the patch description, I wouldn't expect to see any changes
here, unless this is wrong to begin with.  In which case, it should be
a separate patch.

Mimi

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH V3 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 15:48:55 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1511902135.3473.5.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171026084055.25482-2-mjg59@google.com>

Hi Matthew,

On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 01:40 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the
> credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the
> child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target
> and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In
> ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and
> the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started.
> This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to
> include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same
> credentials that it did previously.

< snip >

> @@ -305,7 +304,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> -			security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> +			security_cred_getsecid(cred, &sid);
>  			rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
>  							rule->lsm[i].type,
>  							Audit_equal,

Based on the patch description, I wouldn't expect to see any changes
here, unless this is wrong to begin with. ?In which case, it should be
a separate patch.

Mimi

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 15:48:55 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1511902135.3473.5.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171026084055.25482-2-mjg59@google.com>

Hi Matthew,

On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 01:40 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the
> credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the
> child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target
> and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In
> ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and
> the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started.
> This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to
> include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same
> credentials that it did previously.

< snip >

> @@ -305,7 +304,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> -			security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> +			security_cred_getsecid(cred, &sid);
>  			rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
>  							rule->lsm[i].type,
>  							Audit_equal,

Based on the patch description, I wouldn't expect to see any changes
here, unless this is wrong to begin with.  In which case, it should be
a separate patch.

Mimi

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-11-28 21:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-26  8:40 [PATCH V3 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook Matthew Garrett
2017-10-26  8:40 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-26  8:40 ` [PATCH V3 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy Matthew Garrett
2017-10-26  8:40   ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-26  9:11   ` James Morris
2017-10-26  9:11     ` James Morris
2017-11-28 20:48   ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2017-11-28 20:48     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-28 20:48     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-28 21:22     ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-28 21:22       ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-28 21:35       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-28 21:35         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-28 21:35         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-28 21:37         ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-28 21:37           ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-28 22:33           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-28 22:33             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-12-15 22:24             ` Matthew Garrett
2017-12-15 22:24               ` Matthew Garrett
2017-12-15 22:35               ` Matthew Garrett
2017-12-15 22:35                 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-12-18 15:39                 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-12-18 15:39                   ` Mimi Zohar
2017-12-18 15:39                   ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26  9:04 ` [PATCH V3 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook James Morris
2017-10-26  9:04   ` James Morris
2017-10-26 13:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-10-26 13:21   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-10-30 10:54   ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-30 10:54     ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-26 14:20 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-10-26 14:20   ` Stephen Smalley
2017-10-26 14:20   ` Stephen Smalley
2017-10-30 10:57   ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-30 10:57     ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-30 17:03     ` Stephen Smalley
2017-10-30 17:03       ` Stephen Smalley
2017-10-30 17:03       ` Stephen Smalley
2017-11-14 19:42       ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 19:42         ` Matthew Garrett

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