From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> To: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>, linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>, Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>, Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>, Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>, George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>, Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>, Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>, "Oliver O'Halloran" <oohall@gmail.com>, Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2019 08:48:58 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1571575738.5342.7.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1571508377-23603-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> On Sat, 2019-10-19 at 14:06 -0400, Nayna Jain wrote: > While secure boot permits only properly verified signed kernels to be > booted, trusted boot takes a measurement of the kernel image prior to > boot that can be subsequently compared against good known values via > attestation services. > Instead of "takes a measurement", either "stores a measurement" or "calculates the file hash of the kernel image and stores the measurement prior to boot, that". > This patch reads the trusted boot state of a PowerNV system. The state > is used to conditionally enable additional measurement rules in the IMA > arch-specific policies. > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> > --- > arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h | 6 ++++++ > arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h > index 07d0fe0ca81f..a2ff556916c6 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h > +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c > index 99bba7915629..9753470ab08a 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c > @@ -7,6 +7,17 @@ > #include <linux/of.h> > #include <asm/secure_boot.h> > > +static struct device_node *get_ppc_fw_sb_node(void) > +{ > + static const struct of_device_id ids[] = { > + { .compatible = "ibm,secureboot-v1", }, > + { .compatible = "ibm,secureboot-v2", }, > + {}, > + }; > + scripts/checkpatch.pl is complaining that secureboot-v1, secureboot-v2 are not documented in the device tree bindings. Mimi
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> To: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>, linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>, Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>, Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>, Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>, Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>, George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2019 08:48:58 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1571575738.5342.7.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1571508377-23603-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> On Sat, 2019-10-19 at 14:06 -0400, Nayna Jain wrote: > While secure boot permits only properly verified signed kernels to be > booted, trusted boot takes a measurement of the kernel image prior to > boot that can be subsequently compared against good known values via > attestation services. > Instead of "takes a measurement", either "stores a measurement" or "calculates the file hash of the kernel image and stores the measurement prior to boot, that". > This patch reads the trusted boot state of a PowerNV system. The state > is used to conditionally enable additional measurement rules in the IMA > arch-specific policies. > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> > --- > arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h | 6 ++++++ > arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h > index 07d0fe0ca81f..a2ff556916c6 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h > +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c > index 99bba7915629..9753470ab08a 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c > @@ -7,6 +7,17 @@ > #include <linux/of.h> > #include <asm/secure_boot.h> > > +static struct device_node *get_ppc_fw_sb_node(void) > +{ > + static const struct of_device_id ids[] = { > + { .compatible = "ibm,secureboot-v1", }, > + { .compatible = "ibm,secureboot-v2", }, > + {}, > + }; > + scripts/checkpatch.pl is complaining that secureboot-v1, secureboot-v2 are not documented in the device tree bindings. Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-20 12:49 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-10-19 18:06 [PATCH v8 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies Nayna Jain 2019-10-19 18:06 ` Nayna Jain 2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 1/8] powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system Nayna Jain 2019-10-19 18:06 ` Nayna Jain 2019-10-22 23:37 ` Michael Ellerman 2019-10-22 23:37 ` Michael Ellerman 2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 2/8] powerpc/ima: add support to initialize ima policy rules Nayna Jain 2019-10-19 18:06 ` Nayna Jain 2019-10-20 0:16 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-20 0:16 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 3/8] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system Nayna Jain 2019-10-19 18:06 ` Nayna Jain 2019-10-20 12:48 ` Mimi Zohar [this message] 2019-10-20 12:48 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-22 23:38 ` Michael Ellerman 2019-10-22 23:38 ` Michael Ellerman 2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 4/8] powerpc/ima: add measurement rules to ima arch specific policy Nayna Jain 2019-10-19 18:06 ` Nayna Jain 2019-10-20 0:16 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-20 0:16 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 5/8] ima: make process_buffer_measurement() generic Nayna Jain 2019-10-19 18:06 ` Nayna Jain 2019-10-20 1:21 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-20 1:21 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 6/8] certs: add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hash Nayna Jain 2019-10-19 18:06 ` Nayna Jain 2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 7/8] ima: check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig Nayna Jain 2019-10-19 18:06 ` Nayna Jain 2019-10-20 0:58 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-20 0:58 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-20 16:06 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-20 16:06 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-20 16:09 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-20 16:09 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-10-19 18:06 ` [PATCH v8 8/8] powerpc/ima: update ima arch policy to check for blacklist Nayna Jain 2019-10-19 18:06 ` Nayna Jain
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=1571575738.5342.7.camel@linux.ibm.com \ --to=zohar@linux.ibm.com \ --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \ --cc=benh@kernel.crashing.org \ --cc=cclaudio@linux.ibm.com \ --cc=erichte@linux.ibm.com \ --cc=erpalmer@us.ibm.com \ --cc=gcwilson@linux.ibm.com \ --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \ --cc=jk@ozlabs.org \ --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org \ --cc=matthew.garret@nebula.com \ --cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \ --cc=nayna@linux.ibm.com \ --cc=nramas@linux.microsoft.com \ --cc=oohall@gmail.com \ --cc=paulus@samba.org \ --cc=prsriva02@gmail.com \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.