From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> To: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com, matthewgarrett@google.com, sashal@kernel.org, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 5/6] IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2019 22:43:25 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1576017805.4579.44.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20191204224131.3384-6-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> On Wed, 2019-12-04 at 14:41 -0800, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote: > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 1525a28fd705..5db990c8b02d 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -356,6 +357,51 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, > return NOTIFY_OK; > } > > +/** > + * ima_match_keyring - determine whether the keyring matches the measure rule > + * @rule: a pointer to a rule > + * @keyring: name of the keyring to match against the measure rule > + * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation > + * > + * Returns true if keyring matches one in the rule, false otherwise. > + */ > +static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, > + const char *keyring, const struct cred *cred) > +{ > + char *keyrings, *next_keyring, *keyrings_ptr; > + bool matched = false; > + > + /* If "keyrings=" is not specified all keys are measured. */ With the addiitonal "uid" support this isn't necessarily true any more. Mimi > + if (!rule->keyrings) > + return true; > + > + if (!keyring) > + return false; > + > + if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid)) > + return false; > + > + keyrings = kstrdup(rule->keyrings, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!keyrings) > + return false; > + > + /* > + * "keyrings=" is specified in the policy in the format below: > + * keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima|.evm > + */ > + keyrings_ptr = keyrings; > + while ((next_keyring = strsep(&keyrings_ptr, "|")) != NULL) { > + if (!strcmp(next_keyring, keyring)) { > + matched = true; > + break; > + } > + } > + > + kfree(keyrings); > + > + return matched; > +} > +
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> To: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com, matthewgarrett@google.com, sashal@kernel.org, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 5/6] IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2019 17:43:25 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1576017805.4579.44.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20191204224131.3384-6-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> On Wed, 2019-12-04 at 14:41 -0800, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote: > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 1525a28fd705..5db990c8b02d 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -356,6 +357,51 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, > return NOTIFY_OK; > } > > +/** > + * ima_match_keyring - determine whether the keyring matches the measure rule > + * @rule: a pointer to a rule > + * @keyring: name of the keyring to match against the measure rule > + * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation > + * > + * Returns true if keyring matches one in the rule, false otherwise. > + */ > +static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, > + const char *keyring, const struct cred *cred) > +{ > + char *keyrings, *next_keyring, *keyrings_ptr; > + bool matched = false; > + > + /* If "keyrings=" is not specified all keys are measured. */ With the addiitonal "uid" support this isn't necessarily true any more. Mimi > + if (!rule->keyrings) > + return true; > + > + if (!keyring) > + return false; > + > + if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid)) > + return false; > + > + keyrings = kstrdup(rule->keyrings, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!keyrings) > + return false; > + > + /* > + * "keyrings=" is specified in the policy in the format below: > + * keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima|.evm > + */ > + keyrings_ptr = keyrings; > + while ((next_keyring = strsep(&keyrings_ptr, "|")) != NULL) { > + if (!strcmp(next_keyring, keyring)) { > + matched = true; > + break; > + } > + } > + > + kfree(keyrings); > + > + return matched; > +} > +
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-10 22:43 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-12-04 22:41 [PATCH v10 0/6] KEYS: Measure keys when they are created or updated Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-04 22:41 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-04 22:41 ` [PATCH v10 1/6] IMA: Check IMA policy flag Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-04 22:41 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-10 22:42 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-12-10 22:42 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-12-10 23:29 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-10 23:29 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-11 0:03 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-12-11 0:03 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-12-04 22:41 ` [PATCH v10 2/6] IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-04 22:41 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-04 22:41 ` [PATCH v10 3/6] IMA: Define an IMA hook " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-04 22:41 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-10 22:42 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-12-10 22:42 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-12-04 22:41 ` [PATCH v10 4/6] KEYS: Call the " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-04 22:41 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-10 22:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-12-10 22:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-12-04 22:41 ` [PATCH v10 5/6] IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-04 22:41 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-10 22:43 ` Mimi Zohar [this message] 2019-12-10 22:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-12-10 23:23 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-10 23:23 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-04 22:41 ` [PATCH v10 6/6] IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-04 22:41 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2019-12-10 22:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-12-10 22:43 ` Mimi Zohar
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