From: rgb@redhat.com (Richard Guy Briggs) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2017 01:54:05 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170914055405.GT3405@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhTa_f+5zMq0OMmMgofCF-5FnMS-dwtiPZb4iEhg4P7a3A@mail.gmail.com> On 2017-09-08 13:02, Paul Moore wrote: > On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote: > > The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid > > application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was > > supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities > > in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event > > really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly > > records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on > > set*id. > > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 > > > > The first to eighth just massage the logic to make it easier to > > understand. Some of them could be squashed together. > > > > The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth. > > > > It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of > > "!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)" > > to > > "!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid))" > > but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think > > I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand. > > > > The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging > > based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some > > duplication in the logic. > > > > Passes: (ltp 20170516) > > ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap > > ./runltp -f securebits > > ./runltp -f cap_bounds > > ./runltp -f filecaps > > make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs) > > > > v4 > > rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes > > minor local func renames > > > > v3 > > refactor into several sub-functions > > convert most macros to inline funcs > > > > v2 > > use macros to clarify intent of calculations > > fix original logic error > > address additional audit logging conditions > > > > Richard Guy Briggs (10): > > capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root > > capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status > > capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap > > capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic > > capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes > > capabilities: move audit log decision to function > > capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic > > capabilities: invert logic for clarity > > capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root > > capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions > > > > security/commoncap.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ > > 1 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) > > I took a quick look at this latest revision and aside from some > disagreements on style/formatting it looks okayish to me. However, I > am going to walk back my previous I-can-take-this-via-the-audit-tree > comments, I think this probably should go in via the capabilities > (Serge) and/or linux-security (James) tree. "okayish"? That sounds positive. :-) Can you offer a clear ack or reviewed-by? > paul moore - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>, James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH V4 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2017 01:54:05 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170914055405.GT3405@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhTa_f+5zMq0OMmMgofCF-5FnMS-dwtiPZb4iEhg4P7a3A@mail.gmail.com> On 2017-09-08 13:02, Paul Moore wrote: > On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote: > > The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid > > application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was > > supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities > > in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event > > really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly > > records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on > > set*id. > > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 > > > > The first to eighth just massage the logic to make it easier to > > understand. Some of them could be squashed together. > > > > The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth. > > > > It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of > > "!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)" > > to > > "!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid))" > > but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think > > I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand. > > > > The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging > > based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some > > duplication in the logic. > > > > Passes: (ltp 20170516) > > ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap > > ./runltp -f securebits > > ./runltp -f cap_bounds > > ./runltp -f filecaps > > make TARGETS=capabilities kselftest (when run locally, fails over nfs) > > > > v4 > > rebase on kees' 4.13 commoncap changes > > minor local func renames > > > > v3 > > refactor into several sub-functions > > convert most macros to inline funcs > > > > v2 > > use macros to clarify intent of calculations > > fix original logic error > > address additional audit logging conditions > > > > Richard Guy Briggs (10): > > capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root > > capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status > > capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap > > capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic > > capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes > > capabilities: move audit log decision to function > > capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic > > capabilities: invert logic for clarity > > capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root > > capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions > > > > security/commoncap.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ > > 1 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) > > I took a quick look at this latest revision and aside from some > disagreements on style/formatting it looks okayish to me. However, I > am going to walk back my previous I-can-take-this-via-the-audit-tree > comments, I think this probably should go in via the capabilities > (Serge) and/or linux-security (James) tree. "okayish"? That sounds positive. :-) Can you offer a clear ack or reviewed-by? > paul moore - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-14 5:54 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-09-05 6:46 [PATCH V4 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-06 6:05 ` James Morris 2017-09-06 6:05 ` James Morris 2017-09-07 19:42 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-07 19:42 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-07 19:57 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-07 19:57 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:15 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:15 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 05/10] capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:22 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:22 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:23 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:23 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 07/10] capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:26 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:26 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 08/10] capabilities: invert logic for clarity Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:27 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:27 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-20 22:11 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-20 22:11 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-20 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-20 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-20 22:27 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-20 22:27 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 10/10] capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:36 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:36 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-20 22:22 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-20 22:22 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-08 17:02 ` [PATCH V4 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Paul Moore 2017-09-08 17:02 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 5:54 ` Richard Guy Briggs [this message] 2017-09-14 5:54 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-14 6:46 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 6:46 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 6:49 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 6:49 ` Paul Moore
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