From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 11:23:50 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJaT2Q1oH8-QZ=L4bsf+qojNpSsMZyTdigosKPwM7KTEA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <36700dd2a846de06fc5f6585e94d2f261f6f3083.1504591358.git.rgb@redhat.com> On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote: > Move the audit log decision logic to its own function to isolate the > complexity in one place. > > Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Kees > --- > security/commoncap.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- > 1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > index d37ebec..eae7431 100644 > --- a/security/commoncap.c > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > @@ -527,6 +527,32 @@ static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > { return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); } > > +/* > + * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set > + * > + * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: > + * 1) cap_effective has all caps > + * 2) we are root > + * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) > + * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. > + * > + * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think > + * that is interesting information to audit. > + */ > +static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root) > +{ > + bool ret = false; > + > + if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred)) { > + if (!__cap_full(effective, cred) || > + !__is_eff(root, cred) || !__is_real(root, cred) || > + !root_privileged()) { > + ret = true; > + } > + } > + return ret; > +} > + > /** > * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). > * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds > @@ -604,26 +630,10 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new))) > return -EPERM; > > - /* > - * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set > - * > - * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: > - * 1) cap_effective has all caps > - * 2) we are root > - * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) > - * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. > - * > - * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think > - * that is interesting information to audit. > - */ > - if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { > - if (!__cap_full(effective, new) || > - !__is_eff(root_uid, new) || !__is_real(root_uid, new) || > - !root_privileged()) { > - ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); > - if (ret < 0) > - return ret; > - } > + if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, root_uid)) { > + ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); > + if (ret < 0) > + return ret; > } > > new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); > -- > 1.7.1 > -- Kees Cook Pixel Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, linux-audit@redhat.com, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>, James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH V4 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 11:23:50 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJaT2Q1oH8-QZ=L4bsf+qojNpSsMZyTdigosKPwM7KTEA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <36700dd2a846de06fc5f6585e94d2f261f6f3083.1504591358.git.rgb@redhat.com> On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 11:46 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote: > Move the audit log decision logic to its own function to isolate the > complexity in one place. > > Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Kees > --- > security/commoncap.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- > 1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > index d37ebec..eae7431 100644 > --- a/security/commoncap.c > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > @@ -527,6 +527,32 @@ static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > { return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); } > > +/* > + * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set > + * > + * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: > + * 1) cap_effective has all caps > + * 2) we are root > + * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) > + * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. > + * > + * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think > + * that is interesting information to audit. > + */ > +static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root) > +{ > + bool ret = false; > + > + if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred)) { > + if (!__cap_full(effective, cred) || > + !__is_eff(root, cred) || !__is_real(root, cred) || > + !root_privileged()) { > + ret = true; > + } > + } > + return ret; > +} > + > /** > * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). > * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds > @@ -604,26 +630,10 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new))) > return -EPERM; > > - /* > - * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set > - * > - * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: > - * 1) cap_effective has all caps > - * 2) we are root > - * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) > - * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. > - * > - * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think > - * that is interesting information to audit. > - */ > - if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { > - if (!__cap_full(effective, new) || > - !__is_eff(root_uid, new) || !__is_real(root_uid, new) || > - !root_privileged()) { > - ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); > - if (ret < 0) > - return ret; > - } > + if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, root_uid)) { > + ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); > + if (ret < 0) > + return ret; > } > > new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); > -- > 1.7.1 > -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-08 18:23 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-09-05 6:46 [PATCH V4 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-06 6:05 ` James Morris 2017-09-06 6:05 ` James Morris 2017-09-07 19:42 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-07 19:42 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-07 19:57 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-07 19:57 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:15 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:15 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 05/10] capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:22 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:22 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:23 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2017-09-08 18:23 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 07/10] capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:26 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:26 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 08/10] capabilities: invert logic for clarity Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:27 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:27 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-20 22:11 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-20 22:11 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-20 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-20 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-20 22:27 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-20 22:27 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 10/10] capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:36 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:36 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-20 22:22 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-20 22:22 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-08 17:02 ` [PATCH V4 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Paul Moore 2017-09-08 17:02 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 5:54 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-14 5:54 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-14 6:46 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 6:46 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 6:49 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 6:49 ` Paul Moore
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