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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Samuel Neves <samuel.c.p.neves@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Greg Kaiser <gkaiser@google.com>,
	Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>,
	tomer.ashur@esat.kuleuven.be, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	"D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] crypto: chacha20-generic - refactor to allow varying number of rounds
Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2018 17:15:24 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180808001524.GD25300@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180807215121.GB25300@gmail.com>

On Tue, Aug 07, 2018 at 02:51:21PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 07, 2018 at 11:21:04AM +0100, Samuel Neves wrote:
> > > The best attack on ChaCha breaks 7 rounds, and that attack requires 2^248 operations.
> > 
> > This number, as far as I can tell, comes from the "New features of
> > Latin dances" paper. There have been some minor improvements in the
> > intervening 10 years, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4], which pull back the
> > complexity of breaking ChaCha7 down to 2^235. In any case, every
> > attack so far appears to hit a wall at 8 rounds, with 12 rounds---the
> > recommended eSTREAM round number for Salsa20---seeming to offer a
> > reasonable security margin, still somewhat better than that of the
> > AES.
> > 
> > Best regards,
> > Samuel Neves
> > 
> > [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/698
> > [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/217
> > [3] https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1034
> > [4] https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2017.04.034
> 
> Thanks Samuel, I'll fix that number in the next iteration of the patchset.
> 

Oops, sorry, for some reason I thought you had quoted one of my commit messages,
but it was actually Paul's email.  I did mention in "crypto: chacha - add
XChaCha12 support" that "the best known attack on ChaCha makes it through only 7
rounds", but I didn't specify the complexity.

- Eric

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: ebiggers@kernel.org (Eric Biggers)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 3/9] crypto: chacha20-generic - refactor to allow varying number of rounds
Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2018 17:15:24 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180808001524.GD25300@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180807215121.GB25300@gmail.com>

On Tue, Aug 07, 2018 at 02:51:21PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 07, 2018 at 11:21:04AM +0100, Samuel Neves wrote:
> > > The best attack on ChaCha breaks 7 rounds, and that attack requires 2^248 operations.
> > 
> > This number, as far as I can tell, comes from the "New features of
> > Latin dances" paper. There have been some minor improvements in the
> > intervening 10 years, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4], which pull back the
> > complexity of breaking ChaCha7 down to 2^235. In any case, every
> > attack so far appears to hit a wall at 8 rounds, with 12 rounds---the
> > recommended eSTREAM round number for Salsa20---seeming to offer a
> > reasonable security margin, still somewhat better than that of the
> > AES.
> > 
> > Best regards,
> > Samuel Neves
> > 
> > [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/698
> > [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/217
> > [3] https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1034
> > [4] https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2017.04.034
> 
> Thanks Samuel, I'll fix that number in the next iteration of the patchset.
> 

Oops, sorry, for some reason I thought you had quoted one of my commit messages,
but it was actually Paul's email.  I did mention in "crypto: chacha - add
XChaCha12 support" that "the best known attack on ChaCha makes it through only 7
rounds", but I didn't specify the complexity.

- Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2018-08-08  0:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-06 22:32 [RFC PATCH 0/9] crypto: HPolyC support Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32 ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32 ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] crypto: chacha20-generic - add HChaCha20 library function Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32   ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] crypto: chacha20-generic - add XChaCha20 support Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32   ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] crypto: chacha20-generic - refactor to allow varying number of rounds Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32   ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32   ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 23:16   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2018-08-06 23:16     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2018-08-06 23:47     ` Paul Crowley
2018-08-06 23:48     ` Paul Crowley
2018-08-06 23:48       ` Paul Crowley
2018-08-07  0:15       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2018-08-07  0:15         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2018-08-07  1:06         ` Paul Crowley
2018-08-07  1:06           ` Paul Crowley
2018-08-07 10:21       ` Samuel Neves
2018-08-07 10:21         ` Samuel Neves
2018-08-07 21:51         ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-07 21:51           ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-08  0:15           ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2018-08-08  0:15             ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32   ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] crypto: arm/chacha20 - add XChaCha20 support Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32   ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] crypto: arm/chacha20 - refactor to allow varying number of rounds Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32   ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: arm/chacha - add XChaCha12 support Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32   ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] crypto: arm/poly1305 - add NEON accelerated Poly1305 implementation Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:32   ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-07 12:09   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-07 12:09     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-07 12:09     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-07 23:19     ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-07 23:19       ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-07 23:19       ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-22 10:00       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-22 10:00         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-22 10:00         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 22:33 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] crypto: hpolyc - add support for the HPolyC encryption mode Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 22:33   ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-06 23:04 ` [PATCH] crypto: remove speck Jason A. Donenfeld
2018-08-06 23:04   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2018-08-07  1:03   ` Jeffrey Walton
2018-08-07  1:03     ` Jeffrey Walton
2018-08-07 20:18     ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-07 20:18       ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-07  1:19   ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-07  1:19     ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-07  2:38     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2018-08-07  2:38       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2018-08-07  3:12       ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-07  3:12         ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-07  3:12         ` Eric Biggers
2018-08-07  3:15         ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-08-07  3:15           ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-08-07  3:15           ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-08-07 12:51           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-07 12:51             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-07 12:51             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-07  6:22     ` [PATCH v2] crypto: remove Speck Jason A. Donenfeld
2018-08-07  6:22       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2018-08-07  6:57       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-07  6:57         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-07  6:57         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-09-04  4:55       ` Herbert Xu
2018-09-04  4:55         ` Herbert Xu
2018-09-04  4:55         ` Herbert Xu

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