From: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
To: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, dyoung@redhat.com,
Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: add panic_on_taint
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 16:42:19 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200507204219.GJ205881@optiplex-lnx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <C5E11731-5503-45CC-9F72-41E8863ACD27@lca.pw>
On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 10:50:19PM -0400, Qian Cai wrote:
>
>
> > On May 6, 2020, at 6:28 PM, Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch
> > introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to
> > provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch
> > a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag.
> >
> > This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids rebuilding
> > the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() or BUG() into
> > code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest.
> > Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> > as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> > case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.
>
> Andrew, you can drop the patch below from -mm now because that one is now obsolete,
>
> mm-slub-add-panic_on_error-to-the-debug-facilities.patch
>
Please, don't drop it yet. I'll send a patch to get rid of the bits,
once this one gets accepted, if it gets accepted.
-- Rafael
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
To: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
dyoung@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: add panic_on_taint
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 16:42:19 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200507204219.GJ205881@optiplex-lnx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <C5E11731-5503-45CC-9F72-41E8863ACD27@lca.pw>
On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 10:50:19PM -0400, Qian Cai wrote:
>
>
> > On May 6, 2020, at 6:28 PM, Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch
> > introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to
> > provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch
> > a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag.
> >
> > This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids rebuilding
> > the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() or BUG() into
> > code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest.
> > Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> > as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> > case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.
>
> Andrew, you can drop the patch below from -mm now because that one is now obsolete,
>
> mm-slub-add-panic_on_error-to-the-debug-facilities.patch
>
Please, don't drop it yet. I'll send a patch to get rid of the bits,
once this one gets accepted, if it gets accepted.
-- Rafael
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-07 20:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-06 22:28 [PATCH] kernel: add panic_on_taint Rafael Aquini
2020-05-06 22:28 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-06 23:24 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-06 23:24 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-07 0:12 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 0:12 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 0:20 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-05-07 0:20 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-05-07 2:50 ` Qian Cai
2020-05-07 2:50 ` Qian Cai
2020-05-07 20:42 ` Rafael Aquini [this message]
2020-05-07 20:42 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 22:05 ` Qian Cai
2020-05-07 22:05 ` Qian Cai
2020-05-07 22:15 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 22:15 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 23:07 ` Qian Cai
2020-05-07 23:07 ` Qian Cai
2020-05-07 23:36 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 23:36 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-08 0:28 ` Qian Cai
2020-05-08 0:28 ` Qian Cai
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