All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, dyoung@redhat.com,
	Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: add panic_on_taint
Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 22:50:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <C5E11731-5503-45CC-9F72-41E8863ACD27@lca.pw> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200506222815.274570-1-aquini@redhat.com>



> On May 6, 2020, at 6:28 PM, Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch
> introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to
> provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch
> a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag.
> 
> This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids rebuilding
> the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() or BUG() into
> code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest.
> Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.

Andrew, you can drop the patch below from -mm now because that one is now obsolete,

mm-slub-add-panic_on_error-to-the-debug-facilities.patch

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, dyoung@redhat.com,
	Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: add panic_on_taint
Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 22:50:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <C5E11731-5503-45CC-9F72-41E8863ACD27@lca.pw> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200506222815.274570-1-aquini@redhat.com>



> On May 6, 2020, at 6:28 PM, Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch
> introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to
> provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch
> a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag.
> 
> This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids rebuilding
> the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() or BUG() into
> code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest.
> Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.

Andrew, you can drop the patch below from -mm now because that one is now obsolete,

mm-slub-add-panic_on_error-to-the-debug-facilities.patch
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-05-07  2:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-06 22:28 [PATCH] kernel: add panic_on_taint Rafael Aquini
2020-05-06 22:28 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-06 23:24 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-06 23:24   ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-07  0:12   ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07  0:12     ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07  0:20 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-05-07  0:20   ` Randy Dunlap
2020-05-07  2:50 ` Qian Cai [this message]
2020-05-07  2:50   ` Qian Cai
2020-05-07 20:42   ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 20:42     ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 22:05     ` Qian Cai
2020-05-07 22:05       ` Qian Cai
2020-05-07 22:15       ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 22:15         ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 23:07         ` Qian Cai
2020-05-07 23:07           ` Qian Cai
2020-05-07 23:36           ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 23:36             ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-08  0:28             ` Qian Cai
2020-05-08  0:28               ` Qian Cai

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=C5E11731-5503-45CC-9F72-41E8863ACD27@lca.pw \
    --to=cai@lca.pw \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=aquini@redhat.com \
    --cc=bhe@redhat.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dyoung@redhat.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mcgrof@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.