From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH v19 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 13:32:06 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200724203226.16374-4-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200724203226.16374-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init() fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(), will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series. At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> --- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 10 ++++++++-- 6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 591dae299c6f..294410533b51 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1878,7 +1878,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, + void **lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule); #else @@ -1894,8 +1895,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) return 0; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void **lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, + u32 op, void **lsmrule) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index f9a632ae7be1..15a7fb80d6a7 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1331,6 +1331,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; pid_t pid; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: @@ -1361,8 +1362,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_isset) { security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, - f->type, f->op, + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match( + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } break; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index bafa03a5c866..975c3b8c8d0d 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; unsigned int sessionid; cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); @@ -654,7 +655,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, + f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } @@ -669,15 +672,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (f->lsm_isset) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); result = security_audit_rule_match( - name->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); if (security_audit_rule_match( - n->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) { @@ -689,7 +694,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) break; - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) ++result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 9d94080bdad8..d72af93f8d6f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -414,8 +414,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, return -EINVAL; } -static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, + u32 op, void *lsmrule) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index a442b8940e93..9a0f462e8891 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid; + struct lsmblob lsmdata; if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) { if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p) @@ -492,7 +493,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, + lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules); @@ -500,7 +502,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid, + lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 17d701cd7f69..f9a249a93215 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2542,11 +2542,14 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule) hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) { if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) continue; + if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) + continue; hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); } } -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, + void **lsmrule) { struct security_hook_list *hp; int rc; @@ -2554,7 +2557,10 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule) hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) { if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) continue; - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, + if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) + continue; + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + field, op, &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); if (rc) return rc; -- 2.24.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH v19 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 13:32:06 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200724203226.16374-4-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200724203226.16374-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init() fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(), will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series. At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> --- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 10 ++++++++-- 6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 591dae299c6f..294410533b51 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1878,7 +1878,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, + void **lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule); #else @@ -1894,8 +1895,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) return 0; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void **lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, + u32 op, void **lsmrule) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index f9a632ae7be1..15a7fb80d6a7 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1331,6 +1331,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; pid_t pid; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: @@ -1361,8 +1362,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_isset) { security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, - f->type, f->op, + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match( + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } break; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index bafa03a5c866..975c3b8c8d0d 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; unsigned int sessionid; cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); @@ -654,7 +655,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, + f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } @@ -669,15 +672,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (f->lsm_isset) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); result = security_audit_rule_match( - name->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); if (security_audit_rule_match( - n->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) { @@ -689,7 +694,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) break; - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) ++result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 9d94080bdad8..d72af93f8d6f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -414,8 +414,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, return -EINVAL; } -static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, + u32 op, void *lsmrule) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index a442b8940e93..9a0f462e8891 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid; + struct lsmblob lsmdata; if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) { if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p) @@ -492,7 +493,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, + lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules); @@ -500,7 +502,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid, + lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 17d701cd7f69..f9a249a93215 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2542,11 +2542,14 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule) hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) { if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) continue; + if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) + continue; hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); } } -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, + void **lsmrule) { struct security_hook_list *hp; int rc; @@ -2554,7 +2557,10 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule) hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) { if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) continue; - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, + if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) + continue; + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + field, op, &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); if (rc) return rc; -- 2.24.1 -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-24 20:36 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 92+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top [not found] <20200724203226.16374-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com> 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-27 16:12 ` Stephen Smalley 2020-07-27 16:12 ` Stephen Smalley 2020-07-27 21:04 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-27 21:04 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-28 19:50 ` John Johansen 2020-07-28 19:50 ` John Johansen 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler [this message] 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-28 10:34 ` John Johansen 2020-07-28 10:34 ` John Johansen 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-28 10:57 ` John Johansen 2020-07-28 10:57 ` John Johansen 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-28 11:11 ` John Johansen 2020-07-28 11:11 ` John Johansen 2020-07-28 23:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-28 23:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-29 0:30 ` John Johansen 2020-07-29 0:30 ` John Johansen 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-27 20:36 ` James Morris 2020-07-27 20:36 ` James Morris 2020-07-27 20:40 ` John Johansen 2020-07-27 20:40 ` John Johansen 2020-07-28 18:29 ` John Johansen 2020-07-28 18:29 ` John Johansen 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-28 20:13 ` John Johansen 2020-07-28 20:13 ` John Johansen 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-28 20:28 ` John Johansen 2020-07-28 20:28 ` John Johansen 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-27 20:37 ` James Morris 2020-07-27 20:37 ` James Morris 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-30 8:40 ` John Johansen 2020-07-30 8:40 ` John Johansen 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-27 19:04 ` Stephen Smalley 2020-07-27 19:04 ` Stephen Smalley 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object " Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-27 20:40 ` James Morris 2020-07-27 20:40 ` James Morris 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-30 10:03 ` John Johansen 2020-07-30 10:03 ` John Johansen 2020-07-30 20:44 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-30 20:44 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-30 20:57 ` John Johansen 2020-07-30 20:57 ` John Johansen 2020-07-30 22:22 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-30 22:22 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` [PATCH v19 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler 2020-07-24 20:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-30 9:23 ` John Johansen 2020-07-30 9:23 ` John Johansen
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